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ANNUAL RETROSPECT

OF

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

FOR 1831.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. I.



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1831.

THE

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ADVERTISEMENT.

It is intended to publish in the Cabinet Library, at the commencement of each year, an historical view of the year which has just closed. The present work forms the first of this annual series.

The Editor intended to have limited the subject to a single volume; but the unusual variety and importance of the public events of the year 1830, which it became necessary to record, rendered it impossible to comprise within the proposed limit such a history of the year as would be creditable to the Library, or instructive to the reader. The "Retrospect" will, therefore, in the present instance, be extended to two volumes.

In this first volume, a view of the state of politics at the close of 1829 is followed by an account of the proceedings of the British parliament until the decease of the late king, with some notice of that monarch and his successor. The political state of France before the revolution of July, and the various causes which led to that event, form the subject of the next chapter. The remainder of the volume is

devoted to the discussion of the great political changes produced in France and Belgium.

In the second volume, the consideration of the Belgic revolution will be resumed, and the other consequences of the French revolution, manifested in Switzerland and Poland, will be discussed. The work will conclude with a view of domestic politics at the close of the year.

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ANNUAL RETROSPECT

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1831.

CHAPTER I.

STATE OF EUROPE AT THE BEGINNING OF THE YEAR.

THE year which has just expired has been fruitful in striking events, and has, perhaps, sown the seeds of still greater changes. It has supplied us with more materials for history in the last six months than we had derived from the sixteen years which had intervened since the overthrow of the French empire, and the settlement of the general peace.

We have seen the crown of Greece extorted from an infidel despot, offered to a British prince, accepted by him, and renounced before it was worn. The conquest of Northern Africa, and the overthrow of a piratical despotism, which had braved the arms and insulted the civilisation of Europe for more than three hundred years, were only the prelude to greater revolutions on our own continent. The cannon of the *Invalides* at Paris had only a few days

before announced the capture of Algiers, when the belfry of Nôtre Dame sounded the fall of the Bourbons; and the exiled dynasty had scarcely left the soil of France, when the throne of the Netherlands began to totter. The revolutionary movement extended to the Alps and the Vistula, and Switzerland and Poland are now in the vortex of political change. The African despot has become a happier citizen in Italy; Charles X., with his family, occupies the ancient palace of the deposed Stuarts; and the king of the Netherlands has been driven within the former limits of the stadtholder, while his Belgic provinces have established their rights of admission into the community of European states. The traces left by the hoof of conquest on the independence of the French nation, and of the brave though less powerful Belgians, have been effaced; dynasties erected and unions formed by the crusaders of legitimacy have been overthrown; the diplomatic network of the Holy Alliance, destined to protect anti-national arrangements, has been blown away like a cobweb by the breath of popular indignation; and the decisions of successive congresses have been rendered of as little authority as collections of obsolete law written on mouldering parchments.

At home our political movement, though not so obviously revolutionary, has scarcely been less striking. Its force and rapidity may be measured from the distance to which it has carried us in the course of two little months. Parliament opened with the ministry of the duke of Wellington: we have now that of lord Grey. It opened with the ministerial cry of no surrender of abuse; and from the ministerial

benches we have now promises of unshrinking retrenchment. It opened with a professed hostility in the head of the cabinet to all change in our system of representation; and we have now a promise of parliamentary reform, supported by the cabinet and sanctioned by the king.

A brief outline of the annals of this momentous period, therefore, detailing its most important events, and placing them in such connection with each other as may make their mutual bearing best understood, and cause their mutual influence to be most easily traced, cannot but be interesting to the general reader.

While the world is moving around us we every where see the materials of the historian — the events of one year become history the next: but the scene shifts so rapidly; the actors and their parts are so imperfectly observed, or so soon forgotten; the incidents often appear so inconsistent with each other, because unexplained; or so uninteresting, because the link which connects them with great results escapes our eye, or their accumulation fatigues our memory,— that when the curtain of the year drops, we have often a very imperfect knowledge or indistinct recollection of the piece which has been played; or, to use another illustration, to become acquainted with the characteristic features of a city or a locality, we must not collect extensive sketches of particular buildings or streets, but ascend an eminence to obtain a view of the whole. To understand the chief events of a year, we must not examine detached despatches, documents, or debates, but form for ourselves, or procure from the diligence

of others, a panorama of the year. Such is the design of the sketch which we now present to the public. And we may add, whatever may be its imperfections, or whatever apologies it may require on the score of hasty composition, it is the result of considerable labour, and may be relied upon as an accurate record of facts.

But, before we begin our narrative of the events of the year 1830, it may be useful to describe the situation of Europe, and the state of political parties at its commencement.

The most prominent series of events for the last six months of the previous year related to the termination of the war and the stipulations of the peace between Russia and Turkey. The Turkish empire, which, in the words of Mr. Burke, had nearly "fallen by the hands of a woman" sixty years ago, had crumbled into dust under the feet of her grandson. Its continued decline had been seen in the increasing independence of some of its vassals and the defection of others; in its contests with its own troops; in its general disorganisation; and particularly in its inability, during seven or eight years, to extinguish the Greek insurrection. Two campaigns, in which Russia surrounded and pressed her shrinking antagonist in Asia, — on the Danube, on the waters of the Mediterranean and the shores of the Black Sea, — sufficed to bring the Cossacks over the Balkan, and to place a victorious negotiator within a few days' march of Constantinople. The haughty despot, who, in reliance on the division of the allies, had resisted all overtures of accommodation when he might have saved his pride, if not his provinces, — when he might

have retained the semblance of undiminished power consistently with concessions to his Christian subjects,—when, at least, he might have avoided the humiliation of bending the knee before an infidel victor, and confessing in his seraglio that the commander of the faithful was no longer the favourite of heaven,—was obliged to sign the articles of a treaty which deserved no other name but a capitulation.

The passage of the Balkan, considered hitherto as the impregnable rampart of the Turkish empire on the side of the Danube, by the Russian troops, and the surrender of Adrianople without striking a blow, though occupied with two pachas and an army of 10,000 men,—the defeat of the Turkish forces in Asia, and the appearance of a Russian fleet at the mouth of the Bosphorus, convinced the sultan that he could make no further resistance. He had issued orders to all the governors of his extensive dominions to send their contingents to the army; but the orders were not obeyed. He had himself taken up his quarters in the camp, near his capital, to forward the levies, to accelerate the discipline, and to excite the spirit of his troops, without effect. The standard of the prophet had been unfurled without causing any warlike enthusiasm in the Mussulmans; a hatti sheriff issued, commanding the faithful to throw off their shawls and pelisses, to desert their luxurious banquets, and to hasten, in the uniform of soldiers, to repel the invader, had brought no fresh forces. Having destroyed the fanaticism of his people, by attempting their civilisation, he found a resource neither in the system

which he had abandoned, nor in that which he had adopted. For a long time he had relied on the friendship of Austria and of England, or of their jealousy of Russia, as a protection in case of danger; though he refused to make those concessions on the affairs of Greece which would have permitted them, consistently with their principles, to interfere in his favour. That reliance was abandoned when he saw the Russians pursue their unobstructed march towards his capital. The ambassadors of England and France had returned to Constantinople only a few weeks before the Russians crossed the Balkan. They bore with them the same set of propositions on the affairs of Greece which the sultan had previously rejected. He resisted them still; and they seemed to be there as if to witness the last agonies of Mussulman independence, or to assist at the obsequies of Turkish power.

Their arrival, and their failure on the eve of the final triumph of Russia, showed their weakness in mediation, as much as that of their Turkish ally in resistance. The negotiator who had most power with the belligerents on both sides was a Prussian, general Muffling, who had arrived only after the Russians had passed the mountains. The treaty of Adrianople, signed on the 14th of September, added immensely to the character, resources, and influence of Russia, while it almost blotted out Turkey from the map of independent states. Though nominally the sultan lost no territory but that of Greece, and some districts on the east of the Euxine, he had become from this time the vassal of his conqueror, and saw a "line of blockade (as a French author

expresses it) drawn around the skeleton of his empire, which gave Russia the command of all its remaining resources." Though he retained his nominal sovereignty in the provinces north of the Danube, he was obliged to dismantle those fortresses which both protected his own dominions and overawed those principalities. The form of granting investiture to their princes, whom he cannot élect, and of receiving a tribute, which the first disturbance will abolish, merely saves the humiliation of an immediate surrender. The protectorship of Russia is the real sovereignty; and even in name a Russian governor remains in power till all pecuniary obligations toward Russia are satisfied. The opening of the straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles to ships of all nations is a real advantage to European commerce, but chiefly increases the power and trade of Russia, by giving her a passage into the Mediterranean, by connecting Odessa with St. Petersburgh, and by enabling her fleets on the Black Sea to communicate with those in the Baltic. The acquisitions made in Asia, though of small value in point of territory, rounds the Russian possessions in that quarter, and opens a way, at any time, for a Russian army to the plain of the Euphrates.

But the most important articles of the treaty of Adrianople, as respects Turkey, was that which settled the enormous amount of indemnity for the war and gave Russia a mortgage on Turkey till it was paid; and that which settled the relations of Russian subjects with the Turkish empire. The indemnity for the war and for commercial spoliations, being nearly five millions sterling for the

former, and more than a million for the latter, was a sum which, in the exhausted state of Turkey, and in the total absence of the resource of borrowing, incident to a despotic and barbarous power, cannot for a long time be paid. By the seventh article, which specifies the privileges of the Russians in the Turkish dominions, the sultan abdicates his power. The subjects, ships, and merchandise of Russia are to be protected against all violence and chicane by their own diplomatic agents, and are not to be subject to Turkish authorities.

The treaty of Kainardgi, in 1775, gave the Russian government a kind of protectorship of the Greek church in Turkey; its seventh article stipulating that the Porte shall protect the Christian religion and its church, and permitting the Russian minister to make representations in their favour. By the second article in the treaty of Constantinople, in 1783, these privileges were renewed, and the free navigation of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles secured.

By the tenth article of the treaty of Adrianople, Russia decided for Greece what the allies had been unable to accomplish.

The Russian power thus rose on the ruins of the Turkish empire. The success of Russia was the more conspicuous that the enterprise had been opposed by her allies as well as by her enemies. The result showed the weakness of English councils. It was the more remarkable still, that from stopping short of the Turkish capital the czar obtained the credit of moderation in the midst of victory. His troops might have proceeded unobstructed to Con-

stantinople, had he desired the vain eclat of a triumph. A conspiracy had been discovered in that capital. The Mussulman troops had been sent to Asia. Those at Adrianople had been disarmed and directed home. The Russians were favoured by the inhabitants of the province through which they had to pass. The city was defended only by old walls, and a detachment of Russians had already arrived at the mouth of the straits; but here the Russian eagle arrested his flight. Europe interfered, humanity demanded peace, and the seraglio was saved from violation. The war and its consequences, the mission of ambassadors to St. Petersburgh to obtain a reduction of the indemnity, occupied the attention of Europe towards the end of the year; and none but the blind enemies of Russian aggrandisement regretted that the sultan had been made amenable to the laws of Christian civilisation.

With regard to the internal state of England towards the latter end of 1829 and the beginning of 1830 we have little to say.

She could likewise boast of the victory which she had achieved in 1829, as well as Russia; victories gained not by arms but by concessions — not over infidel barbarians, but over religious intolerance — not over foreign enemies, but over domestic disunion. The passing of the catholic relief bill was not only an incalculable triumph to the cause of religious freedom, but added six millions of people to our friends, and thus erected new bulwarks to our national security. It removed one of the main causes of our national danger in war and agitation in peace. It put an end for ever to those angry par-

liamentary contests between bigotry and liberal opinions which occupied so unprofitably the councils of the nation, which maintained in perpetual activity the angry passions of the multitude, which divided the servants of the sovereign into parties having no relation to the substantial interests of the country, which from time to time excited alarm and led to outrage, and which every day must have become more dangerous by the combinations of knowledge and the exasperation of resistance. This purification of our statute book from enactments against opinions, creeds, confessions, and sacraments, was not only the means of wiping off a national stigma, but of uniting the empire more than the articles of union. Ireland is again agitated by discontent: her starving population may again break out into acts of outrage, but, at any rate, no priest will be able to preach from his altar that their conscience is persecuted or their faith proscribed. We every day see the advantages of this glorious measure; but, in order to have a full view of them at once, let us just imagine that during the revolutions of France and the distractions of the Netherlands we had Ireland in the same state of agitation as in the autumn of 1828. In this case the catholic association would have been converted into a national congress, and O'Connell would have been the De Potter of Ireland.

But this memorable blessing did not come unalloyed. The advantage of security was purchased by some sacrifices of character. The abrupt change in the cabinet on the question of the emancipation, without being justified by any satisfactory reason

for the change, — the great number of members swelling the majorities in its favour in both houses who had all their lives long clamoured against it, — and the sudden conversion of many public functionaries, subjected all of them to charges of hypocrisy, insincerity, or corruption. Their opinions had kept too closely by their interests; and the charge of apostacy was so general, that the character of public men suffered nearly in proportion to the national benefit. If the character of public men is national property, this property became much deteriorated. The position in which the king was placed rendered his prerogative of little value; and had the object been less laudable, the means would have been called a *coup d'état.* Some part of the press continued the war against the deserters from the standard of intolerance after the standard had been struck; and the influence exercised by the ministry over both houses laid the foundation for fresh demands for parliamentary reform, while they increased the number of its partisans. Some of the journals, which had displayed a scandalous violence during the debates, were unnecessarily prosecuted at their close. The ministers forgot that contempt often destroys calumny, as some serpents are said to die of being spit upon.*

In Ireland the grace of concession was lost, and the effects of the healing measure weakened, by the capricious hostility shown to Mr. O'Connell. The man who was looked upon as the champion of the cause ought to have been treated with some regard when

* Est utique ut serpens hominis contacta saliva
Disperet, ac sese mordendo conficit ipsa.

that cause was gained, though it had only been to show a sincere desire of reconciliation, and to attach to peace the most successful instigator of discord.

It would have been insane to imagine that the catholic relief bill,—which merely admitted a greater number to the privileges of the constitution, and removed a cause of irritation,— could produce any immediate improvement in the material interests of the country. The existence of religious disabilities prevented it from enjoying security or peace in *any* circumstances; but their removal could neither give bread nor employment to those whom these disabilities had irritated.

A great degree of distress was felt towards the end of the year in the English manufacturing districts, which extended to the classes engaged in agriculture. Numerous meetings were accordingly held, and great solicitude was shown for a reduction of taxes and a reform in the representation.

If we looked abroad to the condition of our immediate neighbours on the Continent, we found the commencement of those civil conflicts which led to the revolutions of the last six months, and placed Europe in its present condition.

Our favourite ally, the king of the Netherlands, had advanced far towards an open rupture with his Belgic subjects. Neither the general affability of his manners, and his assiduous attention to the wants and wishes of his people, nor his constant devotion to business, and the frugal economy of his court, could secure for him the affection and confidence of the Belgians. They could never pardon him for being a Dutchman, and never forget that he was a

protestant. The promotion of all plans for education, of every project of charity or benevolence,—the encouragement extended to industry by repeated and splendid exhibitions of its productions,—the stimulus given to trade by canals, roads, and commercial treaties,—the institution of economical savings in the public expenditure,—the mild administration of the laws, and the general prosperity which was the consequence, had all equally failed in procuring confidence in the government. The Netherlands, therefore, bore the appearance of the most free and prosperous, but at the same time the most dissatisfied, nation of Europe. Even strangers delighted to contemplate its embellished cities, its happy villages, its improving agriculture, and the beneficial working of its rural and municipal institutions in promoting the general ease and prosperity. The press was so free that for seven years the works prohibited in France were published in Brussels, and persecuted authors had only to cross the frontier to receive security and protection. The discussions in the states-general were always as independent, and often as enlightened, as in the British parliament; and though the Belgic members often failed in obtaining points at which they aimed, in many cases of importance they commanded majorities.

But all the efforts of the government, and all the national prosperity of which they were productive, could not destroy the original vice of the union with Holland, or reconcile the Belgians to that Dutch preponderance which the northern provinces had acquired by giving a ruler to the southern. They had

ineffectually forbidden the banns, and the best treatment could not reconcile them to the forced alliance. Their national pride, political predilections, and peculiar tastes, were every day attacked or offended, though their material interests were promoted, and their civil rights respected. Nothing, therefore, could overcome their mutual jealousies or national antipathies. Differing from the Hollanders in habits, manners, tastes, creeds, religion, and language, they saw the Dutch government resolved to destroy their nationality, to grind them into a uniform mass, and thus to amalgamate the two people. Always fearful of a partiality in the Belgians to France, in proportion as they showed a repulsive feeling towards Holland, the king desired to mark the boundary between his dominions and that country by a line of language and manners, as well as by a line of custom-houses and fortresses. Hence the ordinance for restricting the use of the French tongue which gave so much offence, and which was only repealed when stronger causes of disaffection had arisen.

To these feelings of national antipathy and increasing jealousy, which were sufficient to have neutralised the benefits or prevented the consolidation of the union, were added other more intelligible and more substantial grievances; some incorporated in the fundamental law, and others resulting from Dutch partialities. The Belgians complained that they were made to pay the interest of the Dutch debt (amounting to nearly three millions sterling); but they forgot that they came into a partnership of the Dutch trade and a share of the Dutch colonies, which that debt had been contracted to im-

prove or defend. They complained that, though amounting to four millions of people, they had only received the same measure of the national representation as the Dutch, who only amounted to two and a half millions; but they forgot that as the representation was grounded on property, and as the Dutch paid more than one half of the taxes, they were entitled at least to a half of the representation. At any rate, the jealousy which they showed might have rendered another division oppressive to their neighbours. They complained that public employments were unequally distributed, without considering how small a portion of the nation can be ministers of state; that the king is allowed to choose his servants; and that if, under a prince of Orange, the cabinet wore a little of the *orange* colour, there was at least no disgrace in exclusion, when that exclusion proceeded from no civil or religious disqualification.

It was the misfortune of this state of things, that while the two sets of provinces were so equal, nothing could be done by government agreeable to one part of them without exciting equally the distrust of the other; and that by the press, among the commercial classes, in the chambers, at the court, and in the departments of public office, every measure was canvassed, every promotion examined, and the value of every smile calculated under the bias of national rivalry. The opposition to government thus became, not the opposition of a party or a faction, but of a nation or a people. The votes of the legislature might be counted, not by classes of opinion, but by classes of provinces. In the chamber of representatives we

found not a right and a left side, as in the French chamber, but a Belgic and a Dutch side; not ministerial and opposition benches, as in the parliament of England, but Dutch and Belgic benches; and the announcement of the subject being given, as it affected Holland or Belgium, we could almost always predict the result of the scrutiny. There was no fusion of parties, no amalgamation of interests, even in the ballot-box. Lists could be made out of the state of suffrages for the last thirteen or fourteen years, in which we found in divisions the numbers of votes arranged according to their nations.* Thus, in the voting for the imposition of a tax on flour, in 1821, we find the measure carried by fifty-three Dutch votes to fifty-one Belgic. The same proportion is observed in the other chamber by nineteen to seventeen. In the vote on the right of succession, we have the Dutch forty-eight and the Belgians twenty-two. The discussions on the annual budget, in 1829, ended by the rejection of the project by fifty-four Belgians against thirty-five Dutch members. The votes of the two nations on many occasions stood as forty-eight to forty-nine; as thirty-six to forty-four; as thirty-seven to forty-six. On the project of law for restricting the license of the press, the division was forty-eight to forty-six.

As the Dutch portion of the assembly was generally joined by some Belgians in the ministry, or occupying places about the person of the king, the Belgians complained that their opposition was ren-

* The chamber of deputies, or the second chamber, consisted of one hundred and ten members, fifty-five for Holland, and fifty-five for Belgium. The sittings were generally well attended, nearly one hundred being present.

dered ineffectual—that they were taxed and administered by Holland; and that, as the first chamber was nominated by the king, and generally sided with the court, they had thus the king and the two chambers, or the three powers of the state, against them.

This tendency to division, though it never lost its spring during the whole reign, was, to a certain degree, counteracted by the position of domestic parties during the long administration of M. de Villele in France. The liberals, who prevailed in the legislature, and directed the press in Belgium, dreaded the approach of the *parti-prêtre* and the jesuits, who were supported by the court of France, and were cherished by the ultramontane portion of the Belgic church. Afraid of an invasion, they made common cause with the king against these ecclesiastical intruders, and therefore ceased to act as a national party. At this time they supported the government in giving a liberal tendency to education, and praised the establishment of the college of Louvain, erected with the intention of taking the philosophical instruction of the youth destined for the church out of the hands of the bishops. Religious gloom was gathering so fast on the French frontier, and the oppression of the press was so great among their neighbours, that they were contented with a Dutch king and a protestant government, rather than run the hazard of a French connection and the jesuits. But no sooner had the Martignac ministry been established, in 1828, than the elements of the opposition to the Dutch government coalesced; and that union was formed between

the catholics and the liberals, which has since proved so fatal to the dynasty. The grievances which the united party now discovered were, besides those formerly enumerated, restraints on the freedom of public instruction; an erroneous system of taxation; the enslavement of the press; the want of ministerial responsibility; the dependence of the judges on the executive; and the refusal of trial by jury. This unnatural union, being joined by nearly all the members of the second chamber, displayed its principles through a portion of the press, and extended them by the aid of the confessional. To instigate the mass of the people, petitions were drawn up by the society of the union, and hawked about for signatures all over the country by lay and clerical apostates. In these petitions demands were made for the abolition of alleged unequal taxes, particularly of the tax upon flour*; for an equal division of offices between the northern and southern provinces; for trial by jury; for a law of ministerial responsibility; and for freedom of instruction.

These petitions and their objects were supported in the journals and advocated in the chambers. They even procured a majority of the second chamber to an address of fifty-six Belgic members to forty-three Dutch, by which his majesty was respectfully solicited to consider the grievances of which the petitioners complained, and to introduce measures for their redress. The neglect of this address, which

* This is a favourite Dutch tax. We find it alluded to by Grotius in his Annals of the year 1588. His words, in speaking of Dutch taxation, are, "agri, ædes, *annona*, vestes, capita; nihil immune."

was not seconded by the upper chamber, increased the general opposition to the government. The decennial budget was thrown out by great majorities, composed of nearly all the Belgic members, and some of the liberal representatives of the northern provinces. The elections during the summer — directed by the union of catholics and liberals — went against the government; and towards the close of the year the legislature again met, under increased exasperation, and with a reinforced opposition. None of the vague promises of amelioration in the government had any effect in allaying the general dissatisfaction; and a message from the king, on the 11th of December, denouncing the press as the cause of the general opposition, proposing to repeal its protecting law, passed the previous May, and terminating with a measure to restrain its violence, only exasperated the nation, without strengthening the government. Menaces are always impolitic when they proceed from weakness; and the denunciation to the people of an instrument like the press, which can only be strong by their support, is nothing but an exasperating appeal to themselves against themselves, and a hopeless attempt to procure a verdict of self-conviction. If the press had, in the words of the message, "contributed to promote disquietude, disunion, and distrust, and to propagate doctrines alike pernicious to the existence of all social institutions under any government, and contrary to the government and dynasty of the Netherlands," it was plain that the second chamber, to which the message was sent, was an accomplice, and therefore unfit for being a judge. It was worse than useless, then, to call their attention

to an instrument, "which, instead of serving to promote knowledge and instruction, had, in the hands of the malevolent, been the means of spreading discord and discontent, a thirst for disputes and for rebellion; which had attacked and interrupted public tranquillity, the forces of the state, the free march of the government, and the accomplishment of its duties in its public relations," as the deputies entertained different opinions on all the points in dispute. The principle was again acted upon of "no redress, no supplies;" and the budget was rejected by a Belgic majority, after a series of angry debates, in which politics were discussed more than finance, in which the national breach was widened by successive explosions of indiscreet zeal, in which charges of faction and sedition on one side, were answered by charges of oppression and injustice on the other, and in which threats held out, of exchanging the turbulent condition of discord and disorder for absolute power, were repelled by the strong defiance of freedom, supported on established right. "The monopoly of language," cried one of the Belgic orators, "has become a monopoly of office; and if we are seditious, our manual of sedition is the royal almanack, which, in its nominations to employment, evinces the partiality of government."

The government was obliged to propose a temporary law of supplies, in which the obnoxious tax on flour was omitted; and the chambers adjourned at the end of the year, with a promise of concession from the king, but without any disposition to yield on either side — unreconciled to each other, but pleased to have avoided a premature rupture.

The state of France towards the end of 1829 was as agitated as that of the Netherlands, and more calculated to excite alarm than at any period since the restoration; though the general discontent did not break out in plots, or display itself in acts of violence. The Bourbon government, in almost a perpetual struggle with the nation for the last fifteen years, had assumed a more menacing attitude as its power had diminished and the strength of its adversaries increased. After a stormy session of the legislature, in which a temperate and prudent cabinet had endeavoured to mediate between the court and the chambers, and to restrain the violence of both, without possessing the confidence of either, the king had dismissed his ministers, and called to his councils those more congenial servants, who were destined in less than a year to overturn the throne. Just eight days after the chambers were prorogued, the country learned with astonishment and alarm that M. de Polignac, whom they had always looked upon as the evil genius of the restoration—the personification of the counter-revolution—was called to the ministry. Several of the colleagues with whom he was joined were worthy of such a chief, and added to the general consternation. The most prominent among the latter was M. de la Bourdonnaye, for the interior, whose fiery anti-revolutionary antipathies, and sanguinary denunciations, made him be regarded as the Robespierre of royalty.

The opportunity of the prorogation had been watched to carry into effect the designs of the court without calling forth the remonstrance of the

legislature. The ministry of Martignac got through the business of the session without any eclat, but still without offering any offence to the country. It had been opposed in the chamber, on the ground of being too subservient to the court; and was obnoxious to the court, because it had made too many concessions to the chamber. Without any popularity in the country, without a fixed majority in the legislature, and without the confidence of the king, it was difficult to see how its existence could have been prolonged. Its members, though men of capacity and good intentions, represented no great interest, and possessed no personal or family influence. The reins, which it ought to have held tightly in its hands, were often pulled aside by the church, whom it had enraged, and by its subaltern agents in the provinces, who could not serve faithfully men which they expected not to serve long. The departmental and municipal laws which they had withdrawn were next year to be presented in an amended form; and the fear of their being driven to the promised concessions made his majesty dismiss them for M. de Polignac, the champion of absolutism, and M. de La Bourdonnaye, the declared enemy of popular influence, whose anti-constitutional principles made him the leader of the high divine right party, who was hated by the people because he was the admirer of feudal privileges, and who could only be rescued from the public indignation as a deputy by becoming the object of public terror as a minister.

To them was joined as minister of war, to be placed at the head of the army, general Bourmont, who on a memorable occasion, on the eve of the battle of

Waterloo, had deserted its standard and betrayed honour. This act of treachery, though praised by the Bourbons, whom it served, could never be forgotten by the nation.

The other members of the cabinet, M. Courvoisier, de Chabrol, and Montbel, were men of moderate opinions though of no great capacity, but had neither character to spare to their obnoxious* colleagues, nor power to resist them. The appointment of Mangin the prefect of police still added to the unpopularity of the choice.

From the first announcement of its accession in the *Moniteur*, the appointment of such a ministry at such a time was regarded as an open defiance of public opinion—an overt act of treason against the public liberties, the proof of a permanent conspiracy against the charter. It was in vain that they made protestations of their constitutional principles: their names were more powerful than their declarations. It was in vain that they cried out, "Wait till you see our acts:" in their past history was discovered the type of their future government. They had succeeded a ministry thought too royalist by the nation, but not royalist enough for the king; therefore it was alleged they were to rule on the principles of pure monarchy. They had succeeded to a ministry who were turned out for concessions; therefore their motto was "no concessions." The press sounded

* The ministers nominated, besides Polignac and La Bourdonnaye, were, for the marine, de Rigny, who declined to act; for ecclesiastical affairs, Montbel; for finance, Chabrol; for justice, Courvoisier; for war, Bourmont. Montbel is the only one who was in the cabinet which signed the ordinances.

the tocsin of alarm. All the men of character refused to serve with them; the ambassador gave back his credentials, and the counsellor of state threw off his gown. Never did such a general explosion of rage and indignation welcome the accession to power of any set of ministers. The invectives, the denunciations, which every day appeared in the Paris journals, were copied into those of the provinces, found echoes in every part of France, and soon agitated the whole mass of the population.

The late ministry, by those concessions to public opinion which lost them the favour of the court, had strengthened the hands and increased the numbers of the popular party. The press had been for two years unshackled. New journals had arisen and taken a bolder flight into the region of politics, both in the capital and the provinces. The discussions of the chambers had been more free, and had spread floods of light on the country. The electoral lists had been purified, and the independence of the electors secured. Public opinion had wrested these fruits of victory from the ultra-party, at the same time that it had compelled the ministry to banish the jesuits and to restrain clerical usurpations. From the activity of the public mind, from the removal of restraints on the progress of knowledge, and the ardent devotion of so many to political discussion, the nation had lived half a century in two years. Its indignation was, therefore, not only the stronger against the insult offered to its opinion, but its power to punish it had become more formidable. The terms in which the liberal papers denounced the choice of the court could not have been more vio-

lent, though the hetman of the Cossacks had been made prime minister.

To these charges no answer was returned by the two or three journals which lent their feeble and vacillating support to their ministerial patrons. They, indeed, attacked the liberals with fury, calling them jacobins, revolutionists, and traitors, but dared not defend the characters, or uphold the designs of the new ministers. One of them uniformly ascribed the opposition to the government, not to the alarms of patriotism or the hatred of the stirring part of the community, but to the influence of two new powers or fictions, called *journalisme* and the *directing committee*; forgetting that if journalism was a power, it, like other powers, depended for its strength on the number of its subjects or the justice of its cause, and that a political committee without arms or authority could only direct those who were willing to be led. The very complaint that journalism, or the periodical press, had declared war against the government, was an admission that public opinion was their enemy: for journals, in order to possess influence, must be read; in order to be read, they must be approved of; and in order to be approved of, must coincide with the doctrines or flatter the prejudices of those by whom they are purchased. They may sometimes form public opinion, and sometimes yield to its dictates; but, when free from the shackles of a censorship, they must always be its exponents, or representatives, in proportion as they are read. In times of factious excitement, or revolutionary violence, the press, like an inflammatory orator in a public assembly, may act on

the passions of the multitude, and become rather an organ of their will than of their reason; but, like the orator, it can only produce its effect by adopting their views, or flattering their prejudices: on that condition only can the one be heard, or the other read; and both may be said to express the public opinion of the moment. The question here is, not whether the journals were right or wrong, but whether the opinions expressed by the journalists, and supported by the directing committee, were not generally those of France.*

If this fact could be for a moment doubtful, its truth was soon established by alarming symptoms of more active fermentation and more organised resistance. M. de Lafayette, who has been so much before the public eye, had left Paris before the end of the session, and was travelling in the

* If the press did not support the Bourbons, the inefficiency of their journals did not proceed from want of encouragement, as the following extract from a French paper will show: —

"There were found, on the 29th of July, in the château of the Tuilleries, several manuscripts filled with curious details of some of the manœuvres of the old court, as to the employment of a great part of the funds of the civil list. No means were left untried to stifle liberal opinions, and all possible sacrifices were made to propagate despotic doctrines. The purchase of certain journals has cost France near five millions of francs, distributed in the following amounts: — Le Pilote, which lived but two years, cost 414,400f. Les Tablettes Universelles received 384,053f. 91c.; Le Journal de Paris, 984,933f. 96c.; La Foudre, 49,000f.; L'Oriflamme, 426,741f.; La Quotidienne, 442,364f. 78c.; Le Journal des Maires, des Villes, et des Campagnes, 463,500f.; La Gazette de France, 391,633f. 21c.

south without exciting any more attention than he would have done at the same moment in the streets of the capital. But no sooner was the change of ministry known, and the occupation of the king's cabinet by the alleged enemies of the country announced, than he was erected into a popular idol, whose shrine was served by the patriotic sacrifice of the enemies of freedom. He was feasted in the different towns through which he passed, and entered Lyons in a kind of patriotic ovation, which the authorities dared not restrain. The account of this more than *royal progress* was regularly transmitted to the journals of Paris; the speeches of the general were universally read; and the ministers were covered with odium by a voice which resounded from a dinner-table or a popular assembly in Lyons to all the corners of France.

"To-day," said he, in one of his speeches, "after a long diversion of brilliant despotism, and constitutional hopes, I find myself in the midst of you, at a moment which I should call critical, if I had not recognised every where on my journey, if I had not seen in this great city the calm and even disdainful firmness of a great people who know their rights, who feel their force, and who will be faithful to their duties."

Several other deputies on the popular side of the chamber were hailed in the provinces with an applause proportioned to their efficient hostility to the new cabinet.

Amid the cries which the journals raised, or the alarms which the public felt, it was announced successively that the ministers intended to abolish

the charter, to add two hundred deputies to the chamber, to order the elections by the directors-general of departments, and to levy the taxes by royal ordinance.

In order to prepare a resistance to such unconstitutional acts, the plan of an association was formed for indemnifying its members for the losses which they might sustain in refusing to pay taxes illegally imposed. This association was called the Association of Britany; but the prospectus was given to the public of Paris on the 11th of September, even before the association had been formed in the province. The plan appeared effective to the liberals, and dangerous to the ministers. It formed a political combination against the government, grounded on the most odious allegation, that they were plotting the overthrow of the public liberties; and though it marshalled the strength of the nation in a legal confederacy to resist, perhaps, a chimera, it taught them on what they might rely in a case of real danger. The vagueness of the condition of breaking the charter would justify resistance in many cases; but it is not a little singular that the association could have met so well the case which afterwards did actually occur. The second article of the prospectus runs thus: "The subscription will form a fund common to Britany, destined to indemnify the subscribers for the expenses which they may incur in consequence of a refusal to pay public contributions *illegally* imposed; either without the free, regular, and constitutional agreement of the king and the two chambers, in conformity with the charter and existing laws, or with the agreement of the chambers

formed by *an electoral system* which shall not have been voted according to constitutional forms." Notwithstanding the prosecution of the journal which published this prospectus, associations after this model were formed in many provinces. At Paris, all the representatives of the department of the Seine enrolled themselves as members. The prosecution of the journals, and even their condemnation, was a new triumph to the cause which they supported. The government called the intention ascribed to it a seditious libel, tending to provoke disobedience to the laws, or to excite hatred against the government, by spreading a belief that the ministry was plotting for the overthrow of the charter. The tribunals condemned it, on the ground that to suppose such a thing as the laying on of taxes without legal authority was an outrage. They thus sanctioned the principle of the association, and justified resistance in the most explicit manner should the attempt be made against which it was directed.

Nor was the scheme of resistance unlikely to succeed had a more expeditious method not been adopted. The liberals are the richest classes in France. Their opinion was decided in support of the cause. A considerable portion of the taxes are direct. Suppose a case of refusing to pay: a distraint would have taken place, the property would have been offered for sale — but who would buy? The party who lost would then be indemnified, and the taxes would not be paid.

Though the union of M. de la Bourdonnaye in the ministry had added to their unpopularity, his resignation on the 17th of November, which was reck-

oned a triumph of the jesuits over the party of the old *noblesse*, represented by this minister, did not allay the storm. He had, like Bonaparte, his "hundred days" of usurpation; but his abdication did not leave the ministry stronger in public opinion. His successor, M. Guernon de Ranville, since so unfortunate in his politics, was not more popular, though less known. He had only been recommended to the prime minister by his powers of oratory and his soundness of royalist opinion; and was called from a provincial bar to occupy the hotel of a minister of public instruction, M. Montbel being moved to the interior, to succeed M. Bourdonnaye.

The breach every day widened between the court and the country, and the irritation and violence of factions daily increased. In the excited state of men's minds, antagonist parties believed the most absurd and atrocious designs of each other. The ministry were not only accused of entertaining projects against the charter, but of having formed alliances with foreign nations for support in case of attempting its overthrow; thus prepared to add the horrors of foreign invasion to the abolition of domestic liberty, or to rivet the chains of France with foreign steel. Rome and Wellington, the jesuits and prince Metternich, were sounded in the ears of the public by the liberals; and their enemies retorted by charging the latter with being traitors to the throne, and rebels to the royal prerogative. The prosecutions before the courts could do nothing to stop this torrent of factious libel, or to allay this increasing ferment of opinion. The ministry could not explain their own existence; they could not tell why they occupied

their places, except as men pledged to do something which their predecessors had refused to do, or to abrogate the laws which their predecessors had carried. Their very appearance in the king's cabinet, with *their habit and repute* (to use a phrase of our Scottish neighbours), was evidence of their treasonable designs. Hence the nation was ranged on one side, and the ministers on the other; hence the court was isolated from the people as much as the head-quarters of troops in an enemy's country; and hence was prepared that unanimity of resistance, that instinct of horror to the Bourbons, which effected the revolution of the following July. The inaction and protestations of the ministry were not believed; and nothing but their resignation could have saved the monarchy.

What designs the ministry entertained at this time against the charter, and how far the court had revealed its secret intentions to its public servants is not known, but there can be no doubt that the king, his son, and his occult councillors, had formed at this time a conspiracy against the national liberties. This was so notorious to the cabinet, that the new minister, M. Guernon de Ranville, who had not been gained over by the considerations which were afterwards so effectual and so fatal, had thought it necessary to write a memoir to satisfy his own conscience, and to confirm the opinion of his colleagues, that the charter could not with honour or safety be invaded. "The project," says he, "which some imprudent royalists would wish to push the government to adopt, would consist in dissolving the chamber, and convoking a new one, after having modified by ordi-

nance the electoral law, and suspended the freedom of the press by establishing the censorship. *I know not if this would save the monarchy;* but it would be a *coup d'état* of extreme violence. It would be a violation of the thirty-fifth article of the charter; that is, a violation of the oath taken to maintain it. Such a step would never become the king nor conscientious ministers." After pointing out its danger, he adds one consideration which ought to have determined them against it. "*The king has sworn to observe* the charter; we have all taken the same oath: let it be for ever as the holy ark."

The declaration of M. de Polignac, on reading this memoir, that he was of the same opinion, may perhaps be believed the more easily, when we recollect that at the beginning of the session he appeared at the tribune of the chamber of peers, and delivered his constitutional profession of faith, in which he lauded the English constitution, and declared that he was studying it for the purpose of suggesting, from the fruits of his labours, something that might be of use to his country.

But the secret advisers of the king were in the mean time busy; and a manuscript found in the Tuilleries after the revolution, and since published, which had been put into the hands of the dauphin by its author, shows what councils were attended to and encouraged. "A sovereign," said this memorialist, "is sometimes forced to dissemble his projects, in order to seize the best moment for their success. He may make *coups d'état* for the good of his subjects. They will almost always succeed, if he shows that they are for the benefit of great

proprietors and the army, if force and secrecy are employed in their execution, and if prompt justice is executed on the factious. *Bayonets support thrones:* the soldier belongs to him who pays him. The party of the liberals is without a chief. That the people or the troops should revolt, they must find or hope for safety and guarantees. It is not a few groups of students, easy to be dispersed by a few shots or a few charges of cavalry, that will give these guarantees." This despotic reformer afterwards says, that "a national representation is contrary to the genius, manners, and character of a nation so frivolous and turbulent as Frenchmen."*

* The following is a passage from the manuscript in question: —

"Il doit être de la politique des gouvernemens entièrement monarchiques de saisir toutes les occasions pour rendre les pays gouvernés par des chambres *aussi malheureux que possible*, afin que leurs sujets n'envient point de changement ou le sort de leurs voisins." He says to King Charles: "Frappez d'une main ferme les institutions qui doivent leur naissance à la révolution, et qui la perpétuent. — La représentation nationale est contraire au génie, aux mœurs, au caractère d'une nation frivole et turbulente comme la nôtre. Avec cinquante mille avocats, autant de procureurs, autant de clercs praticiens, et cette foule de médecins, de chirurgiens imbus des principes révolutionnaires, le gouvernement représentatif, *résultant de la charte*, est une lutte continuelle des partis, qui met le désordre, divise les habitans et rend un état faible. Le gouvernement représentatif est antipathique à la France. Il faut au roi, pour qu'il soit ferme et prépondérant au-dehors comme au-dedans, *un conseil suprême et non deux chambres rivales.* — La noblesse a des droits incontestables à l'administration de l'état; le clergé ne peut rester étranger au gouvernement de la France; et le roi très-chrétien doit réparer à son égard une

Thus, towards the beginning of last year, the history of which we are about to sketch, great events or changes were to be expected in the course of a few months, though their particular form and shape could not have been anticipated. Severe distress, unaccompanied with disaffection, prevailed in England, which, as it was the result of a long train of causes, not immediately dependent on the government, the government could not remedy, but by the gradual operation of a counteracting policy. In the two great constitutional states on the Continent, the government itself was the offence. The agitation rose from antagonist views and opinions, the danger consisting in want of sympathy between the government and the people, while the materials of public prosperity abounded. The jealousies of rival nations, forcibly united by the holy alliance into one kingdom, and the opposition of a great people to a dynasty imposed upon them without their consent, had, in the natural course of things, after many years of hesitation and vicissitude, in which they were mining what they could not shake, began to precipitate the overthrow of that vast overgrown system of organised resistance to popular claims, of that irresponsible colossus of privilege and divine right against reason and freedom, and of that subjection of the many to the will of the few, which were established by a million of bayonets on the ruins of Bonaparte's military despotism. Several nations of the Continent, such as Prussia and the

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grande injustice en lui rendant une partie des biens, dont il fut violemment dépouillé."

German states, were improving their institutions, and have yet been sheltered from the storm of revolution; and in others, which still remain stationary, nothing probably will clear the political atmosphere from pestilence and corruption but a hurricane.

CHAP. II.

GREECE.

THE chief political topic of foreign, and we may add, in a certain sense, of domestic interest, which occupied public attention before the meeting of parliament, and which engaged some of the most animated debates of that assembly, was the settlement of the Greek question, the nomination of prince Leopold of Saxe Cobourg to the Greek throne, and the final renunciation of the trust by his royal highness. As the subject is extremely curious, and not very generally understood, we shall, perhaps, be forgiven for detailing the facts and negotiations relating to it at considerable length.

How the English ministry, having so long resisted any liberal concessions in favour of the Greeks, and so zealously supported "our ancient ally" the Turks, came to have a Greek crown to bestow,—how prince Leopold was chosen by the parties to the treaty of London to wear it in preference to any other given prince,—what were the obligations under which we were to come in order to uphold his throne,—and why he exposed his plenipotentiary patrons to ridicule, and himself to animadversion, by ultimately rejecting a prize for which at first he keenly contended, are questions the solution of which forms a popular episode in history, and deserve from their singularity a development which their intrinsic importance could not probably com-

mand. At the same time, their importance ought not to be undervalued as an appropriate afterpiece to the long and frightful tragedy of the Greek revolution, and the Turko-Russian war by which it was terminated.

In no country of Europe were the vicissitudes of the Greek struggle and the chances of Greek independence seen through the medium of a greater variety of opinions, or more striking alternations of interest and indifference, than in England.

Those whose sympathies are always on the side of power, and who find only evil in revolt, however justifiable, saw in the despotism of the Turks an authority as legitimate as any other, and viewed with aversion or indifference the efforts of the Greeks to shake off the yoke of their infidel masters. To such politicians the vices which oppression creates furnish a reason for its continuance; and by them the Greeks were pronounced for ever unworthy of freedom, because they had once been slaves, and did not possess those virtues which must have been fatal to them in a state of slavery. From this class of persons we daily heard of domestic claims on our sympathy and beneficence, as a reason for not extending our assistance or consideration to the victims of Turkish oppression; while a rich mine was opened for their ridicule and sarcasm in the real or affected enthusiasm which some of our French neighbours or of our own countrymen testified for the cause of slaves, robbers, and banditti, merely because they happened to live in the country of Leonidas and Aristides, and numbered among their ancestors legislators, poets, and philosophers.

But by far the most numerous class of persons who take an interest in political affairs beyond our own shores sympathised in the sufferings of the Greek population, rejoiced in the success of their revolt, and were ready to second or stimulate their efforts, either by charitable contributions, or by an encouraging applause of their principles. These feelings were particularly prevalent and powerful at the earlier periods of the war, when the sacrifices and bravery of the Greeks were known without their selfishness or rapacity,—when their chiefs were considered as the champions of liberty, instead of being devoted to the acquisition of power and plunder,—and when anarchy and factious feuds had not yet destroyed the fruits of hard-earned victory.

But when the characteristic vices of rebellious slaves had been developed by the heat of partial freedom, and when we heard more of the domestic dissensions of the Greeks than of their efforts to expel their oppressors, our interest in their success a good deal subsided. The conduct of many of the adventurers who joined their standard from a restless desire of excitement, or a selfish ambition of honours and employments of which they were found unworthy at home, added to the growing discredit of their cause. But what gave it a death-blow in England for several years was, the dishonest and rapacious conduct of the ephemeral governments and agents of Greece, in making greater exertions to obtain the money of foreigners than in securing the freedom of their country; in fighting about loans and contracts when they ought to have been fighting their Turkish oppressors; and in mortgaging for their

own benefit the land of their country, which they had not yet conquered. When the Greek cause got into the stock exchange; when romantic adventures and classical recollections were employed as a zest to gambling speculations; when we heard more of Greek bonds than of Greek bondage; when the fall or the rise of Greek liberty was measured in Greek stock, and a successful skirmish or a defeat was valued at so much per cent; and when, in addition to this, we saw the agents of the Greeks and their pretended friends squander the funds of patriotism in jobs and extravagance unconnected with their interests, all our anxiety about the Greeks and their fate had nearly ceased.

It was not till, from these causes, the sympathy of the people of Europe was nearly exhausted, that the disorders incident to a state of war and piracy in the Levant compelled the interference of their governments, and gave occasion to such combinations of diplomacy, and such displays of military prowess, as almost set the examples of history and the fables of romance at defiance. Our interest was awakened anew, when, to save Greece in her last agonies, the marine of the three greatest states in the world—never before united for a common object—combined to protect her political perseverance; when, to fight her battles, the battalions of France were marshalled against turbaned Mussulmans from Egypt and Nubia; and the gigantic military power of Russia sent the Cossacks of the Don and the tribes of the Caucasus, mingled with disciplined barbarians from the neighbourhood of the polar ices, to settle the

question of Greek independence within a short distance of Constantinople.

The negotiations which preceded, accompanied, and followed these events have now been disclosed, and must be understood, before the important bearings of the Greek question can be fully comprehended. It was long felt by every man of humane disposition and liberal principles, that a people who had resisted the yoke of despotic masters for the protracted term of seven or eight years deserved their independence, and might receive assistance in securing that highly prized blessing, when the only alternative was success or extermination, without holding out any tempting premium to revolt.* At the same time, it required little reflection or sagacity to foresee that such assistance must come from the Russians, who had for more than half a century claimed the right of protecting the Greeks, and who might not be satisfied with using their inevitable triumph over the Turks for Greek purposes alone. Hence the admirable conception of the treaty of

* We need scarcely allude to authorities for a justification of interference in cases similar to that of the Greeks. The following passages from Grotius may be reckoned sufficient. In sec. 40. chap. 20. book ii.: "*Sciendum quoque est reges et qui par regibus jus obtinent jus habere pœnas poscendi, non tantum ob injurias in se, aut subditos suos commissas, sed ob eas quæ ipsos peculiariter non tangunt, sed in quibuvis personis jus naturæ aut gentium immaniter violant.*" Has not the IMMANIS VIOLATIO of the rights of nature occurred during the whole of this struggle? Again, in sec. 8. chap. 24. book ii., he almost mentions the case of the Greek Christians in justifying the interference of the Roman emperor to protect Christians against their Asiatic persecutors. We have not room for the quotation.

London, intended to mediate between insurrection and tyranny, and calculated on the one hand to fulfil the calls of humanity, and on the other to prevent the single-handed interference and the probable aggrandisement of a third power. Had this treaty been executed with vigour and consistency in the true spirit of its provisions,—had no hopes been held out to the sultan by the wavering of one of the parties that he could break the alliance which it formed,—had he seen no alternative but submission to fate, like a good Mussulman, in permitting the liberation of Greece, without being allowed to treat about its conditions, to which he could never accede from free choice,—had the victory of Navarin been followed up by the blockade of the Dardanelles instead of being repudiated as an "untoward event,"—and had the alliance, which began for pacific objects, employed jointly at the beginning of their mediation those means which they were obliged singly to employ towards its close, it is extremely probable that Greece would have been liberated two years earlier; that the Russian troops would not have passed the Balkan; and that the Turkish empire would not have been loaded with tribute in the shape of indemnity, or lost its northern provinces as a mortgage for its payment. But England, under two changes of ministry, hung constantly as a drag on the wheels of the movement in favour of Greece; and to recapitulate all the ways and occasions in which the British government opposed obstacles to a satisfactory settlement, would fill a volume of more ludicrous inconsistency than it falls to the lot of most statesmen to compose. We shall only recapitulate a few.

After the signature of the protocol of St. Petersburgh, in April, 1826, nothing was done for some time, the English ministry imagining that Russia would be satisfied, and that the Porte would yield a qualified consent. Meanwhile the Turks and Egyptians were employed in pounding to dust the very basis of the treaty, by overrunning the country —by dispersing the remnants of a Greek army— by retaking the Greek fortresses, and by exterminating the Greek population. Pushed by Russia to act with her jointly, in order to prevent her from acting separately, and opposed by Austria, which would not to act at all, England was obliged to apply to France, and found, after a short trial, in the new recruit a zeal that was more active than agreeable. Hitherto the world knew little of the negotiations going forward, and took little interest in the result. The treaty might still, therefore, have remained for some time longer a profound secret, or a dead letter, had not some zealous Philhellene given the world a copy of it before its ratification, and thus made all Europe a kind of party to its fulfilment. During the first six months after the publication of the treaty, there seem to have been different sets of negotiators at work, who all gave it a different interpretation—the club of the three allied ministers in London, their representatives at Constantinople, and their admirals in the Levant. The first remained undecided, and trusted to favourable accidents, giving directions to the two last which they either did not understand, or received too late to act upon. At last the admirals interpreted the treaty in their own way, and gave

their new reading in the bay of Navarino. Contradictions and inconsistencies then redoubled. The English cabinet did not know what to make of its victory; and while they distributed ribands and crosses on the one hand, were almost on the point of signing the order for a general mourning with the other. France hailed it as a glorious exploit; Russia repaid it with a shower of stars and orders; and all the Philhellenes of Europe broke out in pæans of triumph. The sultan did not see the friendly mediation of broadsides in the same light, and still refused to accede to the stipulations of the treaty. The allied ambassadors, therefore, left his court with expressions of friendly regret, and assumed a middle position between him and his insurgent subjects, without taking the side of either. Consuls were appointed to the latter, while the ambassadors still stretched out their arms to the former.

One of the allies having succeeded, by the aid of the other two, in destroying the Turkish fleet in the south, and seeing that those other two would not follow up the blow, to obtain the objects common to all, immediately moved her troops to obtain her separate objects in the north; thus becoming a belligerent in one degree of latitude, and remaining a friendly mediator in another. As the armistice proposed in the treaty was accepted by the Greeks, while it was resisted by the Turks, France and Russia testified their satisfaction with the former by pecuniary advances, to extend conquests which England, the third ally, joined the Turks in thinking too extensive already. Our classical cabinet insisted that a Greek state could do very tolerably

without Greece; and therefore opposed any extension of the Greek territory beyond the Morea. Even this narrow domain they would not agree to clear of Ibrahim and his Nubians; while the no less classic and chivalrous statesmen of France sent cannon, to complete the work of negotiation. England resisted this expedition with all her might; but, strong in the sympathies of the people, and hankering after a little military renown, the white flag was displayed, and we offered it a place on board our ships of war. The Morea was swept in a week from the exterminating barbarians; and eastern and western Greece invited, for a similar service, the holyday victors. But though it is known that the sultan would have yielded to *fate*, in the latter case as in the former, *and to nothing but fate, or great guns, in either*, it did not suit our views that he should have that excuse for submitting to the laws of humanity. The isthmus of Corinth, therefore, bounded the parade of the French army. While the plenipotentiaries at London had decided provisionally for the limits of the Morea, and the French arms had been confined to that peninsula, the allied ambassadors at Poros had fixed on a more enlarged demarkation between the *Pelasgic* and *Ambracian* gulfs. Contradictions thicken. The Turk had agreed to a provisional surrender of the Morea, on the sole ground of superior force; and having secured that portion of territory alone by compulsion, we proposed that he should give up the rest from moral considerations,—thus bringing fate and free will into Turkish diplomacy, and expecting the Peloponnesus from the one,

and northern Greece from the other. Had general Maison been in possession of the acropolis of Athens, and the straits of Thermopylæ, as well as of Patras and the isthmus of Corinth, the sultan would have been as well disposed to yield the former as the latter to the Greek president.

But the inconsistency of these proceedings does not stop here. The Russians meanwhile were pursuing their victorious career; and announced to Europe that they would settle the Greek question beneath the walls of Constantinople. Their ambassador could not be received at the Porte *till then;* but the other two allied governments despatched their representatives, with a document in their pockets, as the basis of negotiation, called the protocol of the 22d of March. To the conditions of this protocol, which continued the feudal dominion of the sultan over the Greek state, gave him the investiture of the Greek prince, and fixed the tribute money which he was to derive from his former vassals, he refused to listen. It was only when the Russians approached Adrianople that his highness yielded to the representations of the ambassadors; and it was only in the 10th article of the treaty, which was signed in that city on the 14th of September, that the full amount of the allied demands was admitted.

Having hitherto been inefficient as an alliance, in obtaining their common object, two parties to the treaty of London (especially the English government) felt their pride offended that a Russian general should have cut the knot of their negotiations with his sword, and have settled in a few lines of a

more important convention, an arrangement which their joint efforts for years had failed to accomplish. They therefore demanded an explanation on the subject from the Russian government; and being satisfied that, by thus acting alone in the affairs of Greece, Russia did not intend to dissolve the alliance, or to preclude the two other powers from their due share in all its arrangements, the ministers of the three courts proceeded, towards the beginning of 1830, to dispose of the concessions which the sultan had made. These concessions were embodied in the following very ample declaration:— "The Porte, having already adhered to the treaty of London, now further promises and pledges itself to the representatives of the powers who signed the said treaty to subscribe entirely to all the decisions which the conference of London shall adopt, with respect to its execution." Such a pledge might be abused by the allies, in making unjust exactions from their humbled friend; but its unreserved frankness left them no apology, in the scruples or resistance of the Porte, for not doing full justice to the other more oppressed party interested in their mediation. The measures which they felt themselves called upon to take were, to settle the relations of the new state to Turkey; to define its limits, to fix its form of government, and to nominate its chief. These great points, besides others of minor importance, were discussed in repeated conferences, which took place in London, towards the beginning of the year; and the result was consigned to a protocol, signed by the plenipotentiaries of the three powers, on the 3d of February, 1830. The time was well

chosen for the conclusion of the negotiations. The signature of the protocol took place the day before the meeting of parliament, and gave the English ministry an opportunity of making a display in the king's speech of the success of their diplomatic labours. So definitive and satisfactory did the plenipotentiaries consider the arrangements to which they had come, that they record, at the end of the document which contains them, their mutual congratulations on the happy termination of their arduous and protracted task. This document, therefore, may be viewed as the authoritative deed for erecting a new state in Europe — the baptismal register of a new Greek commonwealth.

The arrangements which it sanctioned differed considerably from the provisions of former protocols. By that of 22d March, 1829, the sultan was entitled to an acknowledgment of his feudal superiority, and to the payment of 1,500,000 Turkish piastres of tribute-money, besides having a concurrent voice in the nomination of the prince who might be elevated to the Greek throne. But, as his highness had resisted these favourable terms when they were offered, and had exposed his English allies to ridicule, by obstinately defeating their predictions, he was now deprived of his feudal tenure, and obliged to submit to the mortification of seeing another limb torn from his empire, without even the pretence of a qualified or nominal consent. The conference decided that Greece should form an independent state, "and enjoy all the rights, political, administrative, and commercial, attached to complete independence." But, as a species of indemnity for this new diplo-

matic extortion, the allied plenipotentiaries agreed that the extent of territory, for which a limited independence had been claimed by the protocol of the 22d March, should be reduced by the final decision of 3d February, 1830. The line of frontier was no longer to extend on the north between the gulfs of Arta and Volo, but was "to take its departure from the mouth of the Aspropotamos, ascend that river as far as the latitude of the lake *Angelo*, and, traversing that lake as well as those of *Vrachori* and *Saurovitza*, strike Mount Artolina, follow the ridge of Mount Oxas, the valley of Calouri, and the ridge of Œta, as far as the gulf of Zeitun at the mouth of the Sperchius." It thus cut off a large district of territory on the east, and the greatest part of Acarnania and other districts on the west, inhabited by the most warlike portion of the Greek nation. Whether the surrender of an insignificant tribute, which might have been redeemed by an advance of a round sum of money, and the abolition of the mere nominal superiority o. the sultan, were not too dearly purchased by the loss of a military frontier easily defensible, and the expatriation of fifty or sixty thousand Greeks, as well entitled to independence as their brethren, can scarcely admit of dispute. It is needless to add, that the important islands of Candia and Samos were excluded from the new Greek principality formed by the protocol of February, 1830, as well as from the limits of the state contemplated in that of March, 1829.

The government to be established in this new independent state could scarcely be expected to be any other than monarchical. It was not likely that

the absolute monarch of Russia, with his allies of France and England, would incur expenses and concert measures for the erection of a republic, though that form of government had been better adapted to the genius of the people, and more calculated to secure their tranquillity than it really was. But, without any regard to the political taste of the Greek people, the decision was right. Every attempt which the Greeks themselves had made to establish a government had only begun in faction and ended in anarchy; because they adopted the democratic model, for which neither their progress in civilisation nor the structure of their society had fitted them. Ambitious and unprincipled chieftains, accustomed under the Turkish dominion to a life of rapine and violence, habituated to constant feuds, unacquainted with the restraints of social life, and unable to relish the blessings of peace and order, could neither be safely entrusted with the administration of a republican government, nor be expected to submit to its feeble control. In such hands a republican administration would have degenerated into an oligarchy of turbulent *Capitani* or rapacious primates, oppressive to the people and factiously hostile to each other, affording no guarantee of internal order, and as little qualified to promote social happiness or to extend civilisation as the Turkish pachas whom they succeeded. Nothing but a monarchical government, with sufficient power and resources to command the obedience instead of consulting the passions of the emancipated slaves of despotism, could establish order amid such elements of confusion, restore industry and cultivation on the traces

of a desolating war, and render the interference of the allies a blessing to the great body of the people. The parties to the treaty of London were, therefore, right in deciding on the form of government to be given to the Greeks. They had not only the experience of the last two years, during which a kind of monarchy prevailed in Greece, in their favour, but they had the deliberate opinions and declarations of the provisional chief of that government, count Capo d'Istrias, to support their views. It is rather to be lamented, then, that so certain of their right course, and so fortified by authority, they should not have allowed the Greeks themselves to be consulted on the point, under the presidency and direction of a man who coincided in their opinions. The mischievous use made of this haughty neglect of the wishes and feelings of the Greeks will appear in the sequel.

Having decided on a monarchical form of government, the next object was to find for the head of the monarchy a personage whose principles and character were calculated to secure the confidence of the allied courts, and whose elevated sentiments, great accomplishments, and princely magnanimity would enable him to grace the new throne, and to found his dynasty on the obedience and admiration of his willing subjects. The self-denying ordinance of the parties to the treaty, who resolved that no prince connected with the families of the allied courts should be promoted to the throne of Greece, narrowed the list of candidates; and as the quality of prince was specially mentioned, the claims of the present president to continue at the head of the state,

which he had administered with ability and success for more than two years, were out of the question. None of the titled slaves of the Fanar; none of the materials out of which the Porte had been accustomed to manufacture hospadars and waywodes for the provinces on the Danube; none of the Soutzos, Ipsylantis, or Mavrocordatos were thought of. They had been too much accustomed to abuse their authority under the Turkish government to exert it beneficially under the patronage of the allies, and had become too demoralised themselves to afford any hope that they could regenerate their nation. Besides, rampant before power, and ready to become the instruments of oppression, luxurious, treacherous, and rapacious, the princes of the Fanar were looked upon with contempt by their brethren in continental Greece and the islands; and therefore could not have commanded respect to their government but by tyranny.

The allied courts were therefore obliged to look to Germany — that land so fertile in princes, for a sovereign to Greece: and here abundance of candidates presented themselves, as eager, if not as numerous, as the suitors of Penelope for the throne of her husband. After disposing of the claims of prince Paul of Wirtemburg, of a prince of Baden, and several others, the choice of the three courts fell upon prince Leopold of Saxe Cobourg, who was formally nominated in the second part of the same protocol of 3d February, which definitively settled the other arrangements. The plenipotentiaries decided, that "among the persons particularly recommended to the choice of the alliance by their

personal qualities, and the circumstances of their rank and station, the prince of Saxe Cobourg offered to Greece, and to Europe in general, every possible guarantee, that, according to the information hitherto received, there was reason to believe *that the Greeks would receive him with gratitude for their sovereign.*"

Thus the candidate of the British government, which had never sent any pecuniary succours to Greece, and had resisted as long, and as far as possible, any satisfactory arrangement, was preferred to all others. The French press was particularly clamorous against this nomination, ascribing it to the subserviency of their anti-national ministry to English dictation, and finding in it another title of unpopularity against prince Polignac. The manner in which such a result was produced deserves to be recorded.

The three powers, of course, professed the greatest disinterestedness, as their renunciation of any preference to the members of their own reigning families testified. Russia, satisfied with the glory of having, by her arms, formed the new state, and secure, by the provisions of the treaty of Adrianople, of being always able to exert such a control over Turkey as to render any peculiar influence in the affairs of Greece unnecessary, either for the protection of her trade or the extension of her power in the Archipelago, found that she could afford to be generous at a small expense, and therefore deposited her proxy for the election in the hands of his most christian majesty, who deserved such a compliment, for his expedition to the Morea, and for his constant support of the Greek cause. Charles X. had only one prince un-

connected with his family, according to the conditions of the protocol, in whom he felt any decided interest, — prince John of Saxony, who must have been unexceptionable to the English government. This prince refused the proffered honour; and as prince Leopold had obtained from his majesty a promise of support, should his rival not accept, the contest was easily decided in his favour.

As doubts have been thrown by superficial reasoners or political scoffers on the value of the prize which the prince of Saxe Cobourg thus obtained, it may be proper to mention, that though his task would have been arduous, the honour and fame with which a successful exercise of his authority would have been rewarded were worthy of the most princely ambition. His principality, though curtailed more than it ought to have been, embraced the territory of many celebrated kingdoms and republics of ancient Greece, and nearly all its renowned localities. Its position in the Mediterranean, and its relative situation to Europe and Asia, — on the confines of both, — with its numerous islands and bays, peculiarly fitted it for maritime commerce. Furnishing an asylum against Asiatic despotism, it would, under a firm and liberal government, have invited Greek emigrants from all parts of Turkey, and have attracted the capital and the trade of Smyrna, Egypt, and Constantinople to its ports. Its sovereign would have had the glory of extending the line of civilisation towards the east; and would have furnished another experiment to history, whether free institutions can ever be planted in a soil which has been scorched by oriental despotism.

The Greek population in the Turkish empire, suffering with other rayas the oppression of infidel masters, is variously computed at between three and four millions. Of these, 1,640,000 are stated to reside in Roumelia; about 700,000 in the Morea; and the rest in the Greek islands, Albania, and the provinces on the Danube.

The character and condition of the several portions of this scattered race were extremely different; but all would have profited by the establishment of a free commonwealth in the country to which all their eyes are turned as their own. Without alluding to the Fanariots, or the refuse of the commercial population of Smyrna and the Levant, we may remark, that the territory now protected by the flag of independence can as yet have enjoyed few of its advantages. The islands under the Turkish government, though free from the continued residence of their masters among them, were subjected to heavy tributes, liable every moment to invasion, and restrained in their commercial enterprises by the feeling of their insecurity. The inhabitants of the Peloponnesus, with the exception of the Maniotes, were more oppressed than the islanders, because exposed every moment, not only to the pecuniary exactions, but to the insulting presence and vexatious interference of their tyrants. The Greeks in the cities and fortresses north of the Peloponnesus, such as Athens, and other towns of continental Greece, suffered under the same intolerable servitude; but a considerable portion of the Roumeliots, bordering on the mountains, or inhabiting the mountainous districts, had been able to check the power

of their masters, or retire from its excesses. Formed into clans for mutual protection, or assembled under chieftains for defence or attack; living on the produce of their flocks, or the plunder of their enemies, they enjoyed in their union and knowledge of arms a kind of rude and insecure independence. In crowded cities or cultivated plains, the haunts of industry and the seats of wealth, a small body of armed tyrants are sufficient to retain in bondage a large population; but the mountain, the forest, and the ravine can generally defy the invader or oppressor.

Such was the condition of the districts now comprised in the new state when under Turkish sway: but even *then* the active and spirited race, which have since obtained the protection of Europe, were not entirely debarred from some of the sources of wealth and the fountains of knowledge; and the use which they made of their opportunities demonstrates the extent of their capabilities under a better system. Reversing the parable of the sower, they scattered the "*good* seed" while the enemy "slept." While the Porte was engaged in foreign war, or in contests with its own revolted pachas, the Greeks were making considerable progress in arts and industry, — in the establishment of institutions for education, and the acquirement of commercial wealth. "A middle class," says M. Soutzo, "had begun to appear in Greece, between the oppressive primates and the oppressed villagers. Seconded by the profits which the wars of the Continent offered, Greece in a short time succeeded in acquiring a commercial marine, consisting of about

six hundred ships. Thirty thousand Greeks having become the coasting traders of the Mediterranean, for the exportation of Turkish produce, acquired new ideas by their frequent contact with civilised nations. From the commencement of the present century several schools were founded in the isles of the Archipelago, in the principal cities of the Ottoman empire, and even under the seraglio of the sultan. Young Greeks, fresh from the lyceums of France, Germany, and Italy, inculcated in the minds of their pupils the principles of patriotism and virtue. Theatres were opened in the provinces on the Danube; and the masterpieces of Voltaire and Alfieri electrified a youth greedy of emotions."*

The cruel devastations of the war, the violence of contending factions, and the total absence of all regular government, had effaced those evidences of improvement before the arrival in Greece of Capo d'Istrias, in the beginning of the year 1828; but

* "Since the French revolution," says a French writer, "the Greeks were put in possession of the trade of the Mediterranean. They had entirely replaced the French and Italians. They alone sailed to the Euxine to carry on the trade in corn, and in a great degree provisioned Constantinople. Their wealth had increased with extraordinary rapidity. From that time they had no rivals. Far from limiting themselves, as at first, to the mere hire of their vessels, they employed them in business of their own. In the commerce of the Ottoman empire, they were the best treated. They had only three per cent of custom-house duty, like Europeans. A commerce so favoured, which daily increased by the activity of the Greek marine, and by the establishment of commercial houses in France and England, had accumulated in the islands of the Archipelago (principally at Hydra, Spezzia, and Ipsara,) immense capitals."

plans of amelioration were devised, and successfully pursued, by the president which promised the happiest results. The turbulent chiefs were controlled; the peasantry protected; and cultivation and industry again resumed their course. Secured in its independence by the allies, and fostered by an administration at once mild and vigorous, the new state might be expected to improve in resources, and to increase in population and power, beyond any former precedent.

But, whatever were the present fortunes or future prospects of Greece, it is certain that the vision of a Greek crown had great attractions for prince Leopold. When in Paris, in November, he paid repeated visits to the Tuilleries as a candidate, and put himself in communication with our ambassador, lord Stuart, to facilitate his object. On his return to London, towards the end of the year, he had interviews with the plenipotentiaries on the subject of his canvass; and having ascertained their final decision in his favour,— a decision which was at first objected to by his late majesty George IV., because he was not consulted before the king of France,—he began to prepare himself for his new destinies with great zeal and assiduity, by endeavouring to obtain all the information which books or travellers could supply respecting his future subjects and dominions. He had formerly been acquainted with count Capo d'Istrias; but aware of his jealousy, and cautious of revealing diplomatic secrets, he did not correspond with him till after his formal nomination.

The protocol of the 3d of February was transmitted to prince Leopold on the following day,

along with a letter from the plenipotentiaries of the three courts, containing a formal tender of the Greek crown. His royal highness took some days to deliberate on the course which he ought to pursue, and did not return an answer till the 11th of February, connecting his acceptance of that offer with such conditions as opened the way to new negotiations, and led to a final rejection of the coveted honours.

After declaring how profoundly sensible he was of the flattering honour bestowed upon him, he added that he should ill justify the confidence reposed in him by the plenipotentiaries, if he did not submit to them certain things which he thought necessary to the due execution of his trust. In the first place, he expected a guarantee of the new state against foreign aggression. In the second, protection for the inhabitants of Candia and Samos, by the interference or intercession of the allied powers. In the third place, a change in the frontier of the new state, so as to give it a better line of defence on the north. In the fourth place, pecuniary succours, proportioned to its wants, for the new state till its own resources had recovered their vigour; and lastly, an aid of troops to the new sovereign, until such time as he shall have been able to organise those necessary for maintaining order. On the first point there was no difficulty in agreeing to the proposition of his royal highness. To the second and the third a decided resistance was made; and the fourth and the fifth were only agreed to in a qualified manner, and after a great deal of discussion. The prince owed it to his own character and honour — to his patriotic regard for his

adopted country, and to his respect for the credit and consistency of the allied courts who had nominated him to complete the work of its independence and pacification, to make the latter demand of an aid in military and pecuniary resources. As a sovereign, he could no more have entered Greece without money than the hero of the Æneid could have entered Tartarus without the golden bough. Hitherto the government of the president had been supported chiefly by subsidies contributed by Russian and French generosity; and its success, if not its existence, depended upon their continuance till civil order was somewhat restored, and the devastations of the revolution somewhat repaired. The greatest part of the unhappy country which his royal highness was about to govern was in a state of waste and desolation, which cannot easily be conceived beyond the withering range of Turkish oppression, and the exterminating violence of civil anarchy, following in the footsteps and gleaning the few remaining spoils of barbarian warfare. Trade and cultivation had nearly ceased; and the whole revenue which could be wrung for the state out of the misery of the people scarcely amounted to the rent of an English nobleman's estate, and could not afford either food, pay, or arms to the troops. As, without foreign pecuniary assistance, the prince could have had no means of supporting his government, or preserving the attachment of his friends; so, without troops, he could have had no power to overawe his enemies. The English government had hitherto granted no pecuniary aid to Greece; and in this, as in former steps of the negotiation,

endeavoured to reduce to its lowest term the generosity of the allies.

In the conferences of the plenipotentiaries between the 11th and 20th of February, they had considered the propositions of prince Leopold, and consigned to their protocol of the latter day their consent to the guarantee of a loan to be made by the Greek government, "of which the object should be to provide for the pay and maintenance of the troops to be raised for the prince's service," and their agreement, with the concurrence of France, that the French troops then in Greece should prolong their stay for one year, to obviate the temporary difficulties which his royal highness might experience before his own troops should be organised. The details of these measures being settled after an active correspondence between the English government and their royal nominee, and after a great deal of jealous discussion on minute details, the plenipotentiaries agreed, in their protocol of the 26th of February, to transmit to the sultan and to the provisional government of Greece the documents connected with their final arrangement, and to desire their concurrence in measures on the provisions of which they were not consulted.

The rumours of a new loan for Greece, and the prospect of that rise in Greek credit which might be expected to result from the definitive establishment of a regular government in that country, and the consequent improvement of its resources, revived those disgraceful practices of gambling in Greek stock, which we have formerly alluded to as one of the main causes of the aversion and indif-

ference with which Greek affairs were at one time viewed. The loan which the allies finally agreed to guarantee was sixty millions of francs, or about two millions and a half sterling; each of them undertaking for a third of that sum, but giving their security separately: and it was probably the apprehension lest any part of the resources thus placed at the command of the prince should be employed in paying off former incumbrances on the Greek republic, which made the plenipotentiaries propose that they should be exclusively dedicated to the maintenance of his troops. This restriction was afterwards removed. The English government, unwilling to contract pecuniary obligations along with other states, had proposed to obtain from parliament a grant of half a million for the Greek government, as the contribution of England to the cause of pacification; but the prince rejected the offer, and obtained the higher terms.

All these arrangements were contested between the prince and the English plenipotentiary in the character of antagonist parties: the former raising his demands, apparently that he might meet with a refusal, and maintaining them with a menace of resignation; and the latter, at first resisting them with ill humour, and then yielding them a qualified assent, that the contract might be concluded. Indeed, it was evident, before the crown was formally offered to the prince, that his ambition to wear it had considerably cooled; that the character of elector and candidate had entirely changed; and that the former was desirous to complete his work, by "thrusting honours" upon the latter, which the latter

sought pretexts to decline. Whether this change of purpose arose from a change in his advisers; whether the absence of the kingly title might not have had some weight in it; whether it was occasioned by a more extensive examination into the resources of Greece, and fuller information on the difficulties of his task; or whether the state of the king's health, and the brighter prospects which might open to him in England under a new reign, or the eventual regency of his sister, might not have had some influence on his determination, we shall not stop to enquire: but the fact of his being desirous to withdraw from the honour of founding a Greek dynasty, under any arrangement which the allies could be expected to form, is evident from every line of his correspondence. Hence he proposes to include the kingdom of Minos in his dominions, three days before he has the formal offer of the other classic lands about to form his principality, and gets lectured by lord Aberdeen, in his letter of the 31st of January, for an affected misapprehension of previous agreements: "I was certainly unprepared," says his lordship, "for the sentiments expressed by your royal highness yesterday, *for the first time*, upon this subject, and not until his majesty's assent had been signified to the nomination of your royal highness. However these sentiments may accord with the political objects of persons in this country, by whom your royal highness may have been advised, I think your royal highness cannot fail to perceive, upon reflection, how little such a course could contribute to the real dignity and consistency of your character."

Hence his demand for explanations from the duke of Wellington on points which treaties and the declarations of the plenipotentiaries had already settled. And hence his numerous scruples about the boundaries, the amount of the loan, and the stay of the French troops, which the allied ministers were obliged to answer. These scruples increased in proportion as the plenipotentiaries yielded to his demands; and the exertions of the British government to keep him to his engagement multiplied in proportion as he appeared anxious to escape the intended honours. "If," says he, on the 25th of March, "the conference is not prepared to meet me to the *full extent* of the sum which I have already made known to your lordship, *I have no hesitation in stating very distinctly that I must return* into the hands of the plenipotentiaries that trust which the favour of the allied sovereigns has conferred upon me." Never was a crown, in Greece or any other country, so exactly valued in French money, or so openly set up to auction on the stock exchange.

But if the prince sovereign elect of Greece was anxious to discover, without being able to find, good reasons for declining his Greek crown, in his correspondence with the allied plenipotentiaries, his hesitations were removed and his resolutions confirmed by his earliest official intelligence from Greece. He had written to count Capo d'Istrias on the 28th of February, after his acceptance of the tender of the allies, and had, in his letter, taken to himself the credit, which he was entitled to claim, of having been the mediator between the Greek state and those by whom its destinies were to be settled. In

this letter he had described his battle for the enlarged boundary; his zeal to have Candia included in the new arrangement, or protected from Turkish vengeance by the allied governments; his proposition to admit the Greek government to participate in these negotiations, in the result of which it was most interested; and his own resolution not to undertake the immense trust of governing the Greek people without giving them an opportunity of confirming or rejecting the choice of the three courts. In thus describing what he had done for his future subjects,—the obstacles which he had to encounter,—and the resolution which he had formed, not to reign over them without their consent to his nomination, his royal highness used modes of expression through which the acknowledged sagacity and quick penetration of the president easily saw that the prince sovereign would not be very much distressed to be relieved from his trust, if he could afford the allies a good reason for his change of purpose. To afford such a pretext for a premature abdication, by insisting on the terms which the prince himself had suggested, and alarming his prudence on the tranquillity of his reign or the safety of his government, if these terms were refused, was equally suitable to the alleged ambition of the president and the suspected timidity of the sovereign elect. If his royal highness were induced to resign, by the dissatisfaction expressed with the arrangements of his royal patrons, the reins of the provisional government would remain for some time longer in the hands of the count, and his chance of permanent power would be increased. If, on the contrary, the prince, notwithstanding the

alarming representations made him, should proceed to Greece to replace the presidential chair by an hereditary throne, the count would be able to retire with the honour of having asserted the rights of Greece in the last acts of his administration, and, perhaps, leave to his successor troubles and dangers calculated to avenge his neglected pretensions. If this was the stake for which the president wished to play, never was any game played with more skill or dexterity.

The president received the letters of the sovereign elect before the official announcement of the new arrangements by the plenipotentiaries; and, while he prepared himself for submitting to the latter, immediately set about acting on the former. On the two days of the 6th and the 7th of April he wrote no less than three long letters to his royal highness, descriptive of his alarm at the limitation of the boundary, and expressive of his dissatisfaction at not being consulted in the arrangement of the allies. He tells the prince, that, by accepting of the crown on the condition of the protocol, he sanctions the surrender to the Turk of eight provinces, containing a Christian population of from eighty to one hundred thousand souls, furnishing nearly two thirds of the Greek army, who will thus be deprived of their country; and that he sacrifices the independence of Greece, by coming without the concurrence of the nation legally expressed through its representatives. The wily Greek then plays off against his hesitating successor the declarations of the congress of Argos, called in the previous year with a view to a definitive arrangement, and the

feelings and resolutions of his senate, who agreed to submit to the allies, but refused to be parties to their proceedings. His excellency had called this body *confidentially* together; and describes its members as receiving the communication of the new arrangements with "deep and mournful silence." In another letter he endeavours to alarm the timidity of the prince, by a moving picture of the hardships which await him in his adopted country; by showing that if he really desired to secure obedience or to obtain popularity among his subjects, he must abandon all thoughts of the pleasures of splendid station, or even the comforts of civilised life, and must resolve to submit to privations, toils, and perils to which no crowned head in the world is exposed. "It is," says he, "during the bivouac, it is under the wretched shelter of a hut,—no matter what the inclemency of the season, what my age and my infirmities,—that the people and the soldiery have often discoursed with me upon their interests; that they have learned to know me; and that I have been able to inspire them with a feeling of what they owe to themselves, to their government, and the civilised world." Alas! how could the princely inmate of Marlborough House,—how could the lord of Claremont, think of exchanging his splendid saloons and luxurious couches, surrounded with distinguished guests and embroidered lacqueys, to bivouac with his councillors on a barren shore, or to attempt in modern Greek, "under the wretched shelter of a hut," to convince half barbarians of the duties "which they owe to the civilised world." But this was not all. His royal highness was expected

not only to endure bodily hardships, to gratify his ragged and houseless subjects, but to do violence to his conscience by adopting their superstition. "Your royal highness is disposed to embrace the religion of the country. May you be pleased to announce this?" says the artful alarmist, without ever having heard a hint which justified the imputation or warranted the question. After giving a frightful view of the desolate state of Greece, of the discontented feelings of the senate, and of the probable resistance of the people to the arrangements of the protocol; after having enjoyed in imagination the effect which these representations would produce on the nerves of his royal friend, already shaken by domestic objects, he invites his speedy arrival in the country, as the only talisman to establish tranquillity. "Come soon (is the import of his language)—come soon; but bring a new map of Greece in your pocket with enlarged boundaries, or I cannot answer for the peace of the country, or the welcome reception of your royal highness. Hasten your departure from England; but send a subsidy before you, or you may find the treasury empty, and the army in a state of mutiny, before you reach the Greek shores. Candia is the key of the Archipelago; let us have the key, or the house is not safe. Let no private consideration prevent you from grasping immediately the helm of state: for the storm begins to rage, on account of the surrender of our territory and the contempt of our rights; and I, 'the provisional government,' may be thrown overboard by occupying the place of your royal highness. I am condemned every moment

to see sailors, soldiers, agriculturists, public servants, who consider themselves on the eve of losing even the hope of recovery from their long calamities. My chamber is never empty. I do all I can to tranquillise them; but I cannot restore their confidence, as they consider me the cause of losing their territory. Come, therefore, among them, and convince yourself that Candia and Acarnania are severed from the Greek state." The president is as much disposed, in his private correspondence, to express his displeasure towards the plenipotentiaries as to alarm the sovereign elect, while he pretends publicly to evince his own gratitude and that of his country. Like Antony haranguing the people over Cæsar's body against the conspirators, he compliments their character while he excites distrust of their conduct. "See," cries he, "how Greece is deprived of her territory and stripped of her rights by the conferences of London: but the plenipotentiaries are all honourable men. Behold how our country lies bleeding at the feet of Mussulman despotism; and the allies, instead of endeavouring to heal its wounds, have ordered one of its limbs to be cut off: but they are all your benefactors, they are all kind-hearted men. They have sent you a ruler without consulting your wishes, knowing that you claimed the power of concurring in the choice; this was contemptuous treatment, and you have a right to protest against it: but the allies are your friends — they are all honourable men, and are to be considered as liberal patrons of your independence."

The consequence of such representations from count Capo d'Istrias, and the memorial of the se-

nate, written most probably by the same hand, and under the same inspiration, was the final resignation of prince Leopold, on the 21st of May, a few days after their receipt. He had previously prepared the plenipotentiaries for this step on the arrival of his private letters from Greece; and the formal act of the senate, together with the documents containing the proceedings of the congress, were merely waited for as the grounds of a formal decision. An attempt was made to change the resolution of his royal highness by showing him that the public acts of the Greek government, and the expressed sentiments of the Greek people, were opposed to the spirit of the private communications which he had received from the president, and evinced a decided opinion in his favour; but though such antagonist forces might destroy each other, it was impossible to neutralise those extraneous elements which formed perhaps the real cause of the prince's determination. Thus, the president of Greece has succeeded in prolonging his reign another year; the Greek throne is still vacant; and prince Leopold is at hand, preparing for any higher destiny that may offer.

Looking at the whole of these proceedings, it may be difficult to say whether Greece, by the resignation of prince Leopold, has made an escape, or lost an advantage. His royal highness in some respects must have been a mighty acquisition to that unfortunate country. He possessed, in his enormous English pension (which would of course have been continued), a civil list ready made. The favour of the English government, and the greater facilities

of intercourse with England and the Ionian islands, which must have been the result of his establishment in Greece, would have been no mean advantages in a commercial point of view. More English travellers would have visited the ruins of that classic land, and more English trade would have been attracted to its ports. But in other respects the choice might not have been so fortunate. Prince Leopold is evidently not the man best adapted to be the founder of a new dynasty, in troubled times, and in a semi-barbarous land, however deeply his mind might have been at one time smit with the prospect of becoming a Lycurgus or a Solon. Though distinguished for a cultivated understanding and liberal principles, though allowed to possess a considerable knowledge of mankind, and not to be destitute of a theoretic acquaintance with the affairs of administration and government, he is evidently deficient in that strength of character and those resources of genius which his untried situation would have required, and was but ill prepared for bearing the privations or performing the duties of his arduous though exalted appointment. When a man hesitates between the acceptance of a crown and the indulgence of his private ease,—when, after having solicited an opportunity of exercising supreme power, he recoils from the ordeal of its difficulties,—when he thinks more of the luxuries which he abandons than of the glory at which he aspires,—when he wishes a revolutionary throne, but first expects it to be made a seat of repose,—when he must settle, by tedious negotiations, the exact amount of the loan, and the

exact number of troops on which he is to rely, without placing any reliance on his own character or enterprise,—we should say that such a man ought not to be nominated to the Greek principality. Such discreet ambition and prudent circumspection may fit a prince for aptly representing royalty in ordinary times, and with a regular budget; but the first occupant of a throne founded amid disorder and ruins should be made of rougher clay, and animated by a loftier spirit.

All grants of money to the Greek government have ceased since the treaty was broken off with prince Leopold. The boundary line towards the north has not yet been settled by commissioners from the three powers; nor has any sovereign yet been agreed upon. Prince Paul of Wirtemburg was still in the field, and was a humble suitor to Charles X. for the Greek crown, at the time that he issued the ordinances which deprived him of his own.

Meanwhile the question of a more liberal settlement has become more complicated by the recent events in Europe. Candia, in the course of the autumn, has been transferred to the pacha of Egypt, and is now occupied by Egyptian troops.

Were not Europe at the present crisis too much occupied with more pressing affairs, the new Greek state might expect great advantages from the recent changes of ministry and policy in France and England. It is not a little singular, that general Sebastiani, the most strenuous and able supporter of the Greek cause in the chamber of deputies, and lord Palmerston, its most zealous defender in the house

of commons, are both now ministers for foreign affairs. How will they dispose of the question of Candia in office? Their opinion was decided when out of office.

CHAP. III.

PROCEEDINGS OF PARLIAMENT. — DEATH OF THE KING.

THE proceedings of parliament always occupy a great portion of the history of the year in England. For six or seven months they fill every newspaper, and occupy every conversation. At the end, or during the currency, of the session they are transferred from the more fugitive pages of the daily press, where they are mixed with other matters, and formed into more exclusive volumes, for the benefit of posterity or the use of the future historian. The year that has just elapsed has left us an immense legacy of such recorded discussions. In "Hansard's Parliamentary Debates" they occupy upwards of four thousand columns; and the "Mirror of Parliament" *reflects* a still more extensive surface of published deliberations.

The length of these debates, it will be confessed by every body but the speakers themselves, is much out of proportion either to their intrinsic value or their practical result. A great part of them consists of mere talk without object or aim, which would not be thought worthy of being reported from any other assembly than the two houses of parliament; another portion is mere repetition of former opinions and statements, in different words; a third consists in contradictions, re-assertions, explanations, or correc-

tions, which can only be listened to or read in the midst of the personal interest or passions which they excite: and when these and other deductions are made, very little is left for the spread of useful information, for the rectification of popular opinion, or the advancement of beneficial legislation. Indeed, we might almost apply to the debates in parliament what the schoolmen say of a category,—that "the greater the extension, the less the comprehension."

It cannot, therefore, be expected that in our brief retrospect of a year, so full of remarkable events, we should occupy much space with the parliamentary proceedings of the first session of 1830. If we were to satisfy ourselves with a description of the acts which it has left on the statute book, or an explanation of the grounds on which they were passed, the task would be short indeed; for probably there never was a session in which so much was said, and so little done,—in which so many legislative suggestions lost their way to the royal assent.

The royal speech, which opened the session on the 4th of February, announced the termination of the war between Russia and Turkey; expressed satisfaction at the settlement of the Greek question, and promised early information on its details; lamented the continued differences between the members of the Braganza family, and the inability of the English government, as yet, to renew its diplomatic relations with Portugal. In the portion of the speech addressed exclusively to the house of commons, his majesty announced a considerable reduction in the public expenditure, and stated, that although the revenue had fallen off, the diminution

was not so great as to excite any alarm about our future prosperity. In the concluding part of the speech, addressed to the two orders of the legislature, his majesty announced his intention of submitting to them some measures calculated to facilitate and expedite the course of justice in different parts of the United Kingdom, and others which appeared necessary preliminaries to a revision of the practice and proceedings of the superior courts. But by far the most interesting topic on which his majesty touched was that contained in the last paragraph, which, after informing parliament that "the export of British produce and manufactures in the last year had exceeded that of any former year," lamented "that, notwithstanding this indication of active commerce, distress should prevail among the agricultural and manufacturing classes in *some* parts of the United Kingdom."

This last sentence furnished the text for most of the anti-ministerial speeches delivered on the address; which was moved in the house of lords by the duke of Buccleugh, and seconded by lord Saltoun; and in the house of commons by lord Darlington (who said that he supported a Tory administration because it had adopted Whig principles), and seconded by Mr. Ward, the member for London. The debate turned, in a great measure, on the extent of the distress alluded to in the speech as being only partially felt,—on its causes and its remedies. The opposition contended that it was felt in all parts and corners of the empire, and extended to every branch of industry—to all the great interests of the country, agricultural, manufacturing, and commercial, and

to every class of society, except those who lived upon the taxes. The country gentlemen brought from their several districts reports of the sufferings among their tenantry and labourers; complained that agricultural produce could not find a market, that rents could not be paid, and that poor's rates had absorbed the profits of the farmers. The representatives of the commercial part of the community drew a picture equally gloomy of the state of trade, navigation, and manufactures; complaining that business had sensibly declined, that capital could not find employment, that profits had consequently fallen, and that bankruptcies had increased. This general chorus of complaint and suffering drowned the voice of the ministers, who in the speech had admitted only the existence of partial distress. Unable to find any part of England which could be cited as an example of comfort or prosperity, the chancellor of the exchequer stated that Ireland was an exception to the general prevalence of suffering, and was contradicted by Mr. O'Connell and other members from that country. The former stated, that nothing ever surprised him so much as to hear that Ireland was prosperous; that he had seen none of that prosperity, but had every where heard of extreme suffering; that in the city of Dublin alone there were no less than seven thousand registered persons subsisting on three halfpence a day, the fruits of a miserable charitable subscription; that the condition of the occupiers of land and their labourers, in all the provinces, was little better; that the rents were in many cases paid out of the capital of the farmer, and not out of the profits of

his farm; and that the blanket and the potatoe-pot of the tenant were often sold to pay the landlord. The only industrious portion of the community which could be alleged to enjoy comparative prosperity, was the retail dealers in the country; and that exception was disclaimed by some of the members who were acquainted with the situation of that class.

The concurrence of the members of both houses was so strong in the opinion, that the distress of the country was general and severe, that had that question alone been made the subject of an amendment to the address, the amendment must have been carried. But when the parties who agreed to the universality of the difficulties with which the country had to contend, came to speak of their cause, and to suggest their remedies, their divergence of sentiment was as great as their previous agreement. Every member had his own system of political economy, and his own legislative nostrum. Some ascribed the miseries of the people entirely to the excessive fiscal burdens with which their industry is loaded, aggravated by the changes in the currency. The remedy suggested by this class of politicians was to reduce taxation, and to repeal the act which restored the metallic standard. Others were of opinion, that the distress of the labouring classes was to be traced to an excess of population; and that a well organised system of emigration might alleviate the evil. Some laid great stress on the corn laws as one of the causes of the national sufferings; and others were as confident about the pernicious tendency of free trade. Thus, by a strange contradiction, mo-

nopoly and freedom of commerce were at the same time adduced as the cause of present sufferings and threatened ruin.

Nor did the contradiction stop here. Some of the members of both houses discovered the cause of our distress in a deficiency of capital; and others assured us that capital was so abundant, that millions were locked up by capitalists with their bankers, from the impossibility of finding employment for it. Some of these apparent contradictions, no doubt, actually exist in fact. We have a population annually increasing at a rapid rate, in the midst of continued fluctuation in our property, and the increasing privations of the labouring classes. Our manufactures have extended in an unprecedented degree; the produce of our industry has prodigiously increased; and our exports, as stated in the king's speech, exceeded in the previous year any known example; and yet all the world complains of diminished profits, and the difficulty of finding employment. Foreign manufacturers ascribed their distress, which was as great as our own, to an inundation of British goods; and, in this country, the successful competition of foreigners in markets formerly exclusively supplied by us, is adduced as one of the main sources of our calamities.

An amendment, pledging parliament to an enquiry into the state of the country, was moved in both houses, but was not carried in either. The ministry, however, learned from this first debate, that they could not rely on the support of many of their former friends; that many who had forborne to attack them in a former session, out of gratitude for

the Catholic Relief bill, were not always to be so complaisant, and that they must, in order to keep their places, introduce some measures of general retrenchment, however much they might dispute the general distress.

As the amendment moved by lord King in the house of peers contained, in a short space, his entire system of internal policy, rather than an alteration in the address which he could not hope to carry, we shall make no apology for inserting it, though our space will not allow us to enter into farther particulars on the debate, of which it formed the most interesting portion, though it seemed to pass unheeded.

" That, after fifteen years of uninterrupted peace, this house laments that the general condition of the people is not materially improved, nor the prosperity of the country perceptibly increased. That, on the contrary, the landed and manufacturing interests, as well as the traders and the labouring classes of every description, have frequently been afflicted, and still continue to be weighed down by severe distress. That it is the duty of parliament to examine into the causes which have produced these distresses, and to remove, if possible, the impediments which retard the progress of the national prosperity.

" That the necessaries of life, and the materials of agriculture, are made dear by taxation and regulation. By these means too much is taken from the industrious classes, and, in many instances, too much is given to the privileged classes of society.

" That it is a grievous aggravation of the public burdens, in addition to near fifty millions of taxes, deemed necessary for the public service, still further

to suffer enormous sums to be extorted from the people by the intolerable monopolies of corn, beer, sugar, and tea, and of other articles, established for the private benefit of powerful and favoured classes, at the expense of the great body of consumers and of the public good.

" By these monopolies the cost of the first necessaries of life is enhanced, the rate of profit in all trades is diminished, capital is driven abroad to seek a more profitable employment, and the productive powers of the national industry greatly reduced.

" By the restrictions imposed on the import of foreign corn, the markets of other nations are in a great degree closed against us, the demand for the produce of the national industry is limited, and the symptoms of general distress are manifested in the inadequate reward of labour, in the increasing difficulties of finding any profitable employment for capital and industry.

" By the partial and exorbitant duties of excise imposed upon beer and malt, combined with the double monopoly conferred both on the grower of barley, and on those who are licensed to sell beer, the price of that necessary of life is so greatly enhanced, that, in the course of eighty years, whilst the population of England has been more than doubled in number, the consumption of malt has actually decreased.

" By the monopoly conferred on the cultivators of sugar in the British West India islands, the price of that great article of consumption is very much enhanced, at the expense of the people of England, who might be better supplied if permitted to resort

to other markets; and who are also, for the benefit of the monopolists of the said sugar islands, burdened with the heavy charge of defending those unhealthy possessions.

"By the exclusive privilege of navigation and trade to China, conferred on the East India Company, the whole supply of tea consumed in the United Kingdom is placed at the discretion of a single company of traders. Monopoly in this, as in every similar instance, has produced its usual consequences.

"The price of tea of every description is greatly increased, as compared with the price of the same article in free markets of Europe and America; the quantity imported is limited by the narrow views, of obtaining a large profit on a small supply, entertained by the monopolist company. The British manufactures, suited to the Chinese market, are consequently exported in much smaller amount; and the public thus suffers in the increased price of tea, in the diminished demand for home manufactures, and in the exclusion from all navigation and trade to one of the greatest markets in the world.

"That it appears that these gigantic monopolies, superadded to the heavy load of taxation, have impoverished the country, and produced the public distress. That all prohibitions and restrictions imposed for the benefit of particular classes or companies, for the purpose of producing artificial high prices, are no less impolitic than unjust. That our own exclusion from the great market of the world, and the cessation of demand at home, are the necessary consequences of our own measures; because

it is in the nature of things that a nation, which refuses to buy the productions of other countries, cannot sell its own.

"That we can only expect to derive permanent relief from our distresses and impoverishment in our condition from the strictest economy in every branch of the public expenditure; from the abolition of all exclusive privileges and monopolies; from an unrestricted supply of the first necessaries of life, and of the materials of manufacture; and from a real free trade, by which the whole community, as consumers, will be greatly benefited,—the labouring classes enabled to procure a fair reward,—the capitalist, to augment those funds by which all labour is supported,—and the efficiency of British industry fully permitted to produce its natural result in enriching the country, and thus to restore and secure the public prosperity."

In briefly noticing some of the most prominent discussions of the session, and adverting to the only important measures which it passed, we shall classify the subjects to which they refer under the heads, 1. Of the domestic state of the country; 2. Trade, finance, and retrenchment; 3. Legal and parliamentary reform; 4. Foreign affairs.

The advocates for an enquiry into the state of the country, having failed in the debate on the address, resolved to bring forward the subject of national distress on separate motions. In the mean time, they were reinforced by numerous petitions, which poured in from every part of the kingdom, to negative the ministerial declarations, and to show the severity as well as the universality of the na-

tional sufferings. Some hundreds of these petitions have been printed by order of the house of commons; and present a picture of poverty and misery drawn by the people themselves, the fidelity of which can scarcely be doubted, and the force of which cannot be increased. More than fifty of these petitions came from Kent, and describe a state of things which ought to have rendered the late tumults and conflagrations in that county no matter of surprise. One from Bedfordshire states that the labourers are "receiving wages which give them barely the means of protracting a cheerless existence, deprived of all the comforts and almost all the necessaries of life." This same petition mentions that there are parishes in the county, purely agricultural, where there are from fifty to ninety able-bodied men, who, destitute of other work, are employed by the parishes and *receiving four shillings a week;* and that no blame attaches to the farmers, who are unable to afford more. From a Berkshire county meeting the same complaint is sent. The poor are said to be in a miserable state, "their parish allowance and wages being scarcely sufficient to maintain even their existence. The weekly payments to able-bodied men who could not find employment is stated in some *places so low as two shillings and eight-pence.* There is no wonder, therefore, that this county was latterly visited by disturbances, and a special commission. The picture drawn in these petitions of the state of Buckinghamshire is no less appalling. In one of them we are told, "that many persons commit depredations and misdemeanors to get into prison, thus to

preserve themselves from lingering starvation; that many have contracted *disorders by eating the flesh of animals that die naturally*, and other unwholesome food; that their health suffers from want of fuel; and that when they apply to the parish they are charged with insolence, because they cannot starve and be contented." Lord Nugent, who presented this petition, confirmed its statements from his personal knowledge.

The following is a representation from the owners and occupiers of land in some districts of Cambridgeshire:—"The labourers, now no longer able to maintain themselves by the sweat of their brow, are driven to the scanty pittance derived from the parish funds, which is doled out to them, not according to the labour received in return, but to the extent of their families: congregated on roads, in gravel-pits, their spirits have become broken, and they are constantly repining at their hard condition and *inciting each other to vicious courses*, while their employers are regarded as task-masters, and the ties of attachment to the land of their birth become gradually torn asunder." The petition from the county of Cumberland takes a wider range of complaint, and states that "the distress is not confined to one branch of productive industry, but at the same time, and with equal pressure, weighs down the landholder and the manufacturer, the shipowner and the miner, the employer and the labourer." The magistrates, landholders, and clergy of the county of Derby represent the state of that county as deplorable: "rents reduced and in arrear, tenants ruined, labourers unemployed, and farms

thrown out of cultivation." We could multiply these representations, which have all nearly the same features, from Essex, from Norfolk, from Hampshire, from Hertfordshire, and from every other county in England, but we shall only cite one or two examples more. In a petition from Lincoln, signed by ten thousand five hundred names, the petitioners declare, that "unless the present urgent distress be speedily relieved, it must produce disastrous consequences, hazardous to the peace and safety of the kingdom at large." In another petition, from Louth in the same county, it is stated that "labourers are without employment; crime increases; the bonds of society are loosened; and, from the peer to the peasant, all classes are rapidly approaching to ruin, misery, and starvation; which, if not arrested, must terminate in convulsion." A petition from the parish of Rendham, in Suffolk, pr ed what has subsequently taken place. It stated that "the poor-rates have been progressively increasing for some years; and that the petitioners are seriously afraid that sufferings so severe, although they have been hitherto borne with exemplary patience, *will end in general riot and confusion.*" In a petition from the freeholders, farmers, and others of Croydon, in Surrey, the petitioners state that they "can no longer endure to see their fellow-countrymen who are born to the lot of labourers starving under their eyes; that they shudder under the reflection that, without some timely aid, such will soon be their own lot." The last example of distress which we shall cite from this long list of grievances is contained in a petition from Frome, in Somersetshire, the cor-

rectness of which was vouched for by the bishop of Bath and Wells, who presented it to the house of peers. "That there is no disinclination," say the petitioners, "in the poor to labour during this inclement season: numerous men, women, and children may be seen dragging loads of coal up the steep hills on the road from the coal-pits to Frome, for a very small recompense." "I have been," said the right reverend prelate, "a witness to the most afflicting distress, and which I could not, if I would, describe. I have seen with my own eyes multitudes who could *obtain no work and were starving; others, yoked together like oxen, drawing coals from the pits in the neighbourhood.*

On the 25th of February a long discussion took place in the house of peers on the state of the country, thus described, on the motion of lord Stanhope for a committee of enquiry. His lordship dwelt particularly on the depressed state of the agricultural interest. He expressed his belief that there was not one occupier of land, from one extremity of the country to the other, who would not eventually be involved in difficulty and distress. He stated that rents were now paid in some places only, from profits, but in most from the capital, of the farmer. According to a statement, in which his lordship placed confidence, "the expense of cultivation, and the outgoings of the farmer, exclusive of rent, now exceed by six shillings the whole returns of an acre of land." In some parishes the proceeds do not suffice to maintain the poor, and they had been obliged to make application to the neighbouring parishes for assistance. The noble lord illustrated his view of

the depreciation of all articles by a statement of prices. In looking at the foreign trade of the country, he found it equally depressed; for the excessive exports which had been mentioned in the king's speech had been measured in the quantities of commodities sent out of the country, and not in the real value of the returns obtained for them. The state of the revenue was likewise alarming. "Such was the natural tendency," he said, "of distress in all countries to increase, that it would go on increasing, and the effects produced by it would become causes of its aggravation." "The country," he thought, "was rapidly advancing to a state of bankruptcy—to a state of general disorganisation, which will end in the total dissolution of the body politic." He called for enquiry to arrest the progress of these evils, or to ascertain whether their causes were beyond legislative remedy.

Lord Goderich, in answering the noble mover, objected to a committee as a useless instrument of enquiry in such a case, and its labours as calculated to excite hopes that could not be realised. At the same time, he thought that the evils, of which he admitted the existence, might be alleviated by an improvement on our system of banking. He had never disguised from himself that the change in the currency had been productive of distress, though he never doubted that the restoration of the metallic standard was necessary for the safety of the country. But he thought that the circulation was at present too limited, as proved by the high state of our exchanges; and that an improved system of banking on the Scotch plan would give considerable relief, by

increasing its amount. The charter of the bank should not be renewed but on condition of their giving greater facilities to joint stock companies for banking. His lordship's next suggestion for relieving the country was a reduction of taxes; and he mentioned as fit subjects for reduction, or modification, the duties on hops, leather, sea-borne coal, printed cottons, and beer.

The duke of Richmond supported the motion, and gave a dreadful picture of the distress of the labouring poor, whom he described as placed on the parish roads at only 4*d.* or 3*d.* a day. "Who has not heard," cried he, "and who having heard can have listened unmoved to the statement, of British subjects, of British peasants guiltless of any crime, harnessed in the waggons of Cheshire, degraded to the offices of the brute creation? Yet this is not a solitary instance. The same has occurred in other counties." At Blackburn there were 11,360 persons requiring assistance, whose entire incomes averaged only one shilling and seven-pence per week; and one third of Preston, namely, 10,000, were receiving relief from the soup committee.

Lord Rosebery ascribed our distress to the change in the currency — to the effect produced by the improvements in machinery — to a redundancy of population — to the unequal distribution of wealth, and to the pressure of taxation. The remedies which he proposed were, improved banking — the establishment of poor laws in Ireland, to prevent the influx of Irish labourers into this country — the reduction of some taxes, with a commutation of others — and a diminution of the scale of duties

on imported corn. The duke of Wellington opposed the motion for enquiry by a committee of the whole house, on the ground that it was inexpedient, and contrary to usual practice. At the same time, he admitted the existence of severe distress. His grace ascribed the distress of the manufacturers to an excessive production of articles beyond what the country could consume, or foreigners purchase. The successful application of machinery and steam to increase the efficiency of labour had enabled the manufacturer to dispense with hand labour, and had thus not only glutted the market with goods, but deprived the workmen of their employment. Over this cause of distress the legislature had no control. The manufactures of this country exported to foreign markets came there into competition with the productions of cheap labour, and must be governed by their prices. Nothing that could be done in this country could raise prices abroad; and till that was done our prices must keep on the same low level. His grace showed the fall in the cost of the raw materials used in our manufactures, as an evidence that the productions of our industry might be exported to other countries at a cheap rate, without being necessarily at a loss. Raw cotton sold in 1814 at 2*s.* 6*d.* per pound; in 1829, at 6*d.*: silk in 1814 sold for 1*l.* 4*s.*; in 1829, at 8*s.* 11*d.* per pound. Other articles had fallen in price, though not so considerably. The noble duke declared that government had given their attention to every suggestion of a practical remedy — the improvement of the banking system on the expiration of the bank charter, and the reduction of taxes. Though he admitted distress, he did not allow its

existence to the extent of those who demanded a committee of enquiry. The shipping interest was improving — traffic had been increasing in every direction, as was seen on our roads and canals — our towns were enlarging in size, and were every day improving in convenience and elegance; and he saw no reason to despair of our return to happiness and prosperity.

Among the other noble lords who addressed the house, lord Lansdowne expressed his conviction that the distress was mainly to be ascribed to the fatal perseverance with which the government had, during the war, continued to contract permanent money engagements in a depreciated currency, which had to be fulfilled in a currency of standard value. In saying this, he did not mean to insinuate that these engagements, though onerous, could be broken without destroying the honour and credit of the nation. The most obvious remedy was retrenchment of the public expenditure, as far as it was practicable. On the division, there appeared for the motion 25, and 118 against it; making a majority of 93.

Besides similar incidental discussions on petitions, which occurred almost every evening at the commencement of the session, the subject of the distresses of the country was again formally brought before the upper house, on the 18th of March, on a motion of the duke of Richmond for a select committee to take into consideration the internal state of the kingdom, as far as relates to the working classes, and the effect of taxation on productive industry. Nearly the same descriptions of suffering were given, and the same remedies recommended, as in the for-

mer debate. The noble duke produced returns from a great variety of towns and districts, showing the increase of the poor-rates, and the deteriorating condition of the labouring classes for the last four years. He declared himself in favour of poor-laws; but thought that such abuses existed in their administration as demanded enquiry and correction. He complained of the irruption of Irish labourers into England as a grievance, and thought that provision should be made for them at home. In five years, ending 1827, no less than 20,418 Irish were passed through Lancashire at the expense of the parishes. The expense of the removal of an adult Irish pauper from London to Liverpool was 4*l.* 11*s.* 6*d.*; consequently the irruption of such numbers was a great evil, and entailed a heavy expense — besides the effect of their competition in reducing the wages of labour. He recommended a reduction of taxes in some cases, and a commutation in others, to relieve the hardships of the labouring classes. The speakers in this debate were earl Bathurst, earl Mansfield, the earl of Eldon, the earl of Rosebery, the marquis of Camden, the earl of Winchelsea, the duke of Buckingham, the marquis of Salisbury, the earl of Wicklow, the earl of Radnor, the earl of Rosslyn, the earl of Carnarvon, earl Gower, the earl of Darnly, lord Holland, lord Ellenborough, the marquis of Lansdowne, the duke of Wellington, and lord Stanhope. No new light was thrown upon the question by the speeches of any of their lordships; and the appointment of a useless committee was negatived by a majority of 141 to 61.

The same subject was formally brought before the house of commons on the 16th of March, and debated

for four nights; namely, on the 16th, 18th, 19th, and 23d; during which between forty and fifty speakers delivered their sentiments, and uttered a body of doctrine and declamation which would occupy a space nearly twice the size of this volume. Mr. Davenport, who introduced the discussion by a motion for enquiry into the state of the country, addressed himself chiefly to the question of an alteration of the currency; and those who supported him took the same line of argument. A great body of facts was, of course, collected and methodised by the activity of the speakers, and laid before the country in the reports; but the debate presented nothing new in statement, and very little new in suggestion or reasoning. All the currency and small-note politicians repeated their theories as discoveries, and their nostrums as specifics, with as much emphasis of manner, as much expectation of effect, as if they had never been heard before. The motion was negatived by a majority of 225 to 87; chiefly on the ground, that by granting the committee expectations would be held out of unsettling the currency, in favour of which the house had already voted eight times; and thus increasing, instead of alleviating, the distresses of the country.

It is universally admitted, and therefore did not require to be again proved, that the alterations in our circulating medium, resulting from the bank restriction act, which, by making an inconvertible paper money, removed all checks to its unlimited issue; and from the bill of 1819, which restored the metallic standard, and limited paper issues by the necessity of keeping their value on a level with coin, have been the cause of great fluctuation in

the prices of commodities, and the source of terrible calamities to the country. By these enactments, the legislature and the government wantonly sported with the rights of property and the claims of justice. They introduced uncertainty into all the pecuniary business, and all the relative conditions of life. They have changed all contracts for fixed sums—have interfered between debtor and creditor, mortgager and mortgagee—have defeated the precautions of prudence, ruined the schemes of wisdom, and plundered the savings of frugality—they have encouraged gambling speculations—altered the distribution of property, and the wages of industry—they have encouraged an extravagant expenditure of the public resources during the war, and rendered intolerable at its close the burden of a public debt, contracted in a depreciated and now paid in a metallic currency; in short, they have destroyed or changed human fortunes with a force as irresistible, and by an operation as unforeseen, as any great convulsion of nature. These facts cannot be denied, nor can their causes be disputed. It is equally true, that, though the general principle of the depreciation has been understood for the last twenty years, the full effect of the change produced by Mr. Peel's bill did not enter into the calculations of those who passed the act; and that, if it had, it might then have been made a question, whether some alteration ought not to have been effected in the standard, or a longer time be given to the country to prepare for its restoration.

But, all this being admitted, why are we condemned, session after session, and year after year, to hear it proved and illustrated by persons who

know no more of the matter than the majority of their fellow-citizens? The only question of importance is, whether we shall again renew that cycle of lamentable fluctuations from which we are on the point of escaping? The alteration of contracts which took place by the bill of 1819 may have been effected through ignoranceor in advertence; but are we again to alter all pecuniary engagements when aware of their amount, and to assume as the justification of our conduct that injustice had been practised unknowingly in former instances? As repeated pledges have been given that no alteration would in future take place — as the nation in all its arrangements has been proceeding on that assurance — as new interests have arisen, and new engagements been formed on the faith of parliament — as the evil of the change is already in most cases consummated — and as we must now avow that our intention is to make one class benefit by the loss of another, would it be prudent, just, or wise, to hazard the dangers or to incur the guilt of such a change? In passing the bill of 1819, parliament interfered in the relations of debtor and creditor to an extent which they could not estimate. Their best apology was their uncertainty as to the amount of the sacrifice required for obtaining a secure currency. They professed to plunder no man; they did not remove the bank restriction to increase the fortunes of the fund-holder: but to use the experience which we have since gained to alter all contracts a third time, and to reduce the interests of the public creditor, would be an open, avowed, undisguised, and bare-faced robbery.

When we say that the framer and supporters of the

measure of 1819 were unacquainted with the full extent of the effect which it would have on prices, we mean no disparagement to their understanding or reflection on their industry. Mr. Ricardo thought that the rise in the value of the currency would be only four per cent, because he took the exchanges as the criterion of the depreciation. He forgot that, by our discontinuance of gold in currency, the gold had gone abroad,— that it had become abundant in other countries from not being required in this,— that its abundance had occasioned a rise of prices in those countries in the same way as the issue of so much paper with themselves would have done,— and that, consequently, when we required it back for our circulation, we raised its value in those places from which we derived our supply. This operation took place simultaneously with a diminution of paper money in Austria, in Russia, and other nations of the continent; and with a diminished supply of the precious metals from the mines of America, owing to their civil disturbances. The difference, therefore, in price occasioned by the return to cash payments was probably nearer twenty-five per cent than four per cent; but the completion of this great evil is no reason why we should commit another in attempting to reverse it. There can be no question, that the successive rise and fall of prices by the extension or contraction of the currency in 1816, in 1818, in 1820, in 1822, in 1824, and in 1826, created greater evils than could have been produced by a more steady adherence to our resolution of returning to cash payments at the earliest of those periods. Each successive renewal of excessive issues only called forth a greater degree of speculating enterprise, which, not

being supported by the real wants or regular consumption of the country, led to accumulated supplies of goods beyond demand, and gave a stimulus to industry, only to reduce wages by a glut of its products when that stimulus was withdrawn. We never, with any permanent security to the resources of the country, can allow our currency to be debased, or to fall below that of our continental neighbours, at the existing par of exchange. Unless we did so, and did so progressively, till we reduced our debt to the equity-adjustment level, by the depreciation of the medium in which it is paid, we could derive no advantage from an additional issue of paper, which would not be more than counterbalanced by the revulsion or panic consequent on a return to cash, when the exchanges warned us of the necessity of contracting the amount of paper. Thus we should be liable to rapid alternations of apparent prosperity and real calamity — of high prices and low prices, of stimulated industry and general stagnation of employment. Combined with our corn laws and our poor laws, as at present administered, a better receipt could not be given for promoting the misery and endangering the ruin of the greatest nation in the world.

The only speech which deserves to be rescued from the mass of common-places, errors, or prejudices, which compose the report of the four days' discussion on the state of the country in the house of commons, is that of a statesman whose loss the country will long deplore; who for many years guided its commercial policy; whose profound acquaintance with economical science kept him from attempting empirical changes, by enabling him to

see the ultimate effect of every measure which he proposed; whose comprehensive capacity enabled him to master the most perplexing details of business, and to apply ascertained general principles to the most intricate questions of practice; whose caution was equal to his knowledge, and who, moreover, possessed the rare faculty of being able in the senate perspicuously and eloquently to explain and defend the improvements in our commercial system, which his sagacity and long experience had suggested in office;—we mean Mr. Huskisson. This speech was afterwards published by the right honourable gentleman himself; and therefore contains his deliberate opinions on the great questions to which it refers. It represents the changes in the currency as the great though not the only source of our difficulties; but it opposes any new change as likely to produce greater derangement. In going further into the subject, the right honourable gentleman called the attention of the house to the following propositions, which our space will not allow us to develop:—

1. That there was *too* great a pressure, by taxation, on the springs and sources of productive industry; and that the portion of its fruits reserved for reproduction are less than they ought to be, either for the well-being of the labouring classes, or the due maintenance and growth of capital.

2. That the weight of the public burdens (their nominal amount remaining the same) must be severely felt in proportion as the money incomes derived from trading, farming, and manufacturing capital and industry are diminished by the change in the currency.

3. That in the distribution of the annual wealth of the country, according to its ordinary admitted division, into rent, profits of stock, and wages of labour, the two latter have not their just share, owing to taxation and other causes. The remedy for this would be, in changing the mode of imposing taxes, or diminishing their amount.

4. That the peace has diminished the profits of our foreign trade, by giving us competitors in foreign markets.

To this speech an anonymous and respectful answer has lately been published, which points out several inconsistencies even in Mr. Huskisson's speculations. The right honourable gentleman, for instance, speaks of the competition of foreigners being a cause of our distress; while our exports of manufactures were greater last year than at any former period, and while foreigners complained that they were ruined by our competition in their markets —he complains of a pressure on the sources of productive industry; and yet ascribes part of our present distress to improvements in mechanical and chemical science, which make that industry more productive — he speaks of the unparalleled sacrifices and exertions of the late war as a cause of our present sufferings, and yet alludes to the "enormous increase of the riches of the metropolis during the progress and since the cessation of the war"—he mentions that a "diminished portion of our income is reserved for reproduction," as one of the causes of our suffering; while he states that in London there are immense quantities of unemployed capital. The author of the reply to Mr. Huskisson ascribes the distress felt, not only in this country but over Europe, to the

transition from war to peace, "which, by diminishing consumption, and by returning a number of labourers into society, and so adding materially to its productive power, has the effect of lowering the rate of wages, precluding the labourers from demanding from their employers even the same quantity of commodities which they did before the productive powers of the class were increased; thus greatly deteriorating their condition, and producing what is called a glut of commodities."

A discussion which took place February 9th on the distressed state of our foreign trade, on returns of exports and imports moved for by Mr. Alderman Waithman, shows how little the general principles of economical science are understood by those who think themselves qualified to legislate on the great commercial interests of the country. It was mentioned in the king's speech, that the quantity of our exports had been greater than in any former year. This showed, at least, the increasing activity, if not the increasing profits, of trade. Its extent was measured in what is called official value, which, being an old rate of prices fixed upon commodities at the custom-house, does not show their real or declared value at the time of export. As the prices under this denomination remain invariable, returns of different periods merely indicate relative quantities of articles, and not amount of money receipts. Thus, for the seven years between 1801 and 1808, the average official value of our exports was 22,662,530*l.*, while their average real or money value for the same period was 37,327,990*l.*, showing an excess of real over official value of 14,665,260*l.*; while, on an

average of the six years between 1826 and 1830, the official value of our exports amounted to 48,929,23*l.*, and their real or declared value to only 35,713,824*l.*, making a difference of 13,215,405*l.* In the year ending January, 1830, the official value of our exports exceeded 55,000,000*l.* From these data it was inferred that we were trading at a loss, that we sent out goods for which we obtained no returns, and that there had been no beneficial extension of our commerce, since the real or declared value had fallen short of the official. Up to the year 1818 the real value exceeded the official; and from that time the official has exceeded the real. Therefore, according to this reasoning, we were always gainers on our foreign trade till near the time of the restoration of the standard currency; and losers ever since. In 1803, when the declared value was 45,102,330*l.*, and the official only 25,195,893*l.*, we put into our pockets the difference, which is 19,907,437*l.*; and in 1830, when the official value of our exports was 55,465,723*l.*, and the declared only 35,212,873*l.*, we must have lost 20,159,287*l.* The startling nature of these conclusions should have opened the eyes of the honourable alderman to their absurdity. We need not go to the custom-house to find that all the articles which compose our staple exports have fallen in price—from the diminished cost of the raw material, from the more extensive use of machinery, from the fall in the rate of wages, and other circumstances. As the same articles cannot have two prices, according as they are disposed of to the foreign or domestic consumer, the pecuniary amount of our exports must fall with the diminution of prices at home. Our foreign trade may thus be not only active

but profitable, consistently with a great fall in the declared value of our exports. Had the same ratio between the declared and the official value existed in 1830 as in 1803, the declared value of our exports last year would have amounted to more than 90,000,000*l.*: but cotton of some kind must have continued at 8*s.* a pound instead of having fallen to 1*s.*; and a yard of calico, which now costs 1*s.* 6*d.*, must have brought 14*s.* or 15*s.* Accordingly in cotton the chief fall has taken place. The official value of our cotton exports last year was 37,269,395*l.*, while their declared value amounted only to 17,394,584*l.* In trading with foreign nations, we are to estimate our profits, not by the amount of our exports in money, but by the value of the articles which we receive in exchange; and as these articles fall or rise in price when the market is free, along with the articles of export, the only object of importance in a series of years is to ascertain quantities. The quantities last year were greater than at any former period, and therefore afforded no evidence of a declining foreign commerce.

II. The measures by which the government proposed to alleviate the acknowledged distress of the country, and to meet those loud calls for economy and reduction of taxes, which had echoed in parliament from the commencement of the session, were explained in the house of commons, by the chancellor of the exchequer, on the 19th of February and the 15th of March. On the former day he stated reductions in the expenditure of the army, navy, and other branches of the public service, to the amount of 1,031,980*l.* The reduc-

tions in the army estimates were 213,000*l.*; in the army extraordinaries, 150,000*l.*; in the charge for the militia, 64,000*l.*; in the commissariat, 25,000*l.*; making a reduction in all branches of the army supplies to the amount of 453,000*l.* The reduction in the ordnance department he proposed at 29,000*l.* The saving on the navy estimates would amount to 273,000*l.*, and in the miscellaneous to 276,900*l.* This proposition was far from satisfying the expectations of the great economists of the house, one of whom (Mr. Hume) proposed a reduction of 9,000,000*l.*! But the present noble chancellor of the exchequer (lord Althorp), and the opposition generally, expressed no decided dissatisfaction. Several of them even declared that the ministerial reductions exceeded their expectations. Others did not object to the reductions on account of their insignificance; but expressed their conviction that even greater retrenchment than that now proposed would not extend relief to the labouring classes, who were now enduring such hardships.

The measure by which the government expected to extend efficient relief to the country was a reduction of taxes to the amount of 3,425,000*l.*; namely, 3,000,000*l.* of beer duty, 400,000*l.* of leather duty, and 25,000*l.* of cider duty. Though the revenue had only derived this amount from these duties, the chancellor of the exchequer calculated that the relief to the public would much exceed the loss to the revenue, as the manufacturer of the article, in each case, would be freed from the manifold expensive restraints and vexations which fiscal regulations imposed. Government preferred the repeal of the beer and leather duties, because they diminished

the comforts or increased the hardships of the labouring classes. They had preferred the repeal of a whole tax, in each particular instance, rather than a reduction of various taxes; because they thus saved the expenses of collection, which would amount to nearly the same sum whether the produce of the duty was great or small. And they preferred a repeal of the duty on beer to that on malt, because the former duty affected chiefly the labouring classes, who could not brew their beer at home; and the latter fell on all classes alike, whether they brewed for themselves, or resorted to the great manufacturers of the article.

But this boon to the poor would have fallen much short of the benefit which it was calculated to produce had it been counteracted by the licensing system, which creates and perpetuates the monopoly of the great brewers. An important alteration was therefore made in the course of the session on that system, exempting licenses for the sale of beer from the authority of the magistrates. Any householder, under certain regulations, may now open a shop for this purpose by obtaining a license from the excise. The provisions of this bill were debated as keenly as if the salvation of the country had depended on the particular locality where the poor man chose to drink his pint of cheap beverage. The magistrates contended that the morals of the lower orders were endangered, if they could drink their beer in houses which they had not licensed; and the publicans, joining with their patrons on the score of morals, insisted on their vested rights to the old monopoly. Amendments were proposed to allow shops for the

sale of the article, but to prevent it from being consumed on the premises, which would in a great measure have defeated the object of the bill: but government was firm, and the measure was carried. It cannot yet have produced its full benefit, or overcome the suspicions which were cast on its origin; it cannot have convinced the country magistrates that poachers may harbour as securely in houses for spirituous liquors, by securing a wholesome drink licensed by themselves, as in shops licensed by the excise; it cannot have changed entirely the taste at a cheaper rate, and presenting it at a more convenient station than the gin-shop or the public-house. It may have tempted more persons to enter into the trade on its first opening than can permanently live by it; and thus may have led to some ruinous speculation. Even the rage of competition for custom may have led rather to reduce the price than to improve the quality of the beer; but there can be no doubt that the measure must be ultimately beneficial, and that it gives the late administration a title to the lasting gratitude of the labouring classes.

In order to indemnify the treasury, in some degree, for the sources of revenue thus sacrificed, and at the same time to assist in directing the taste of the lower orders to beer instead of ardent spirits, the chancellor of the exchequer proposed an additional duty of 1*s.* on every gallon of corn spirits consumed in England, and 2*d.* on every gallon distilled in Ireland and Scotland; thus raising the duty on the former to 8*s.*, and on the latter to 3*s.*

This proposed increase, as it did not extend to rum, excited a great clamour among the corn distillers of the three kingdoms, who got the corn monopolists

and landed interest to support them, and compelled a modification of the measure into a sixpence on all spirits, whether colonial or home made. The saving of interest on the reduction of the four per cents into a stock of three and a half, which was subsequently effected, was an additional resource, and raised the revenue a little above the expenditure for the ensuing year.

The only other considerable measure of relief passed in this session was a reduction of 3*s.* on the hundredweight of sugar.

Sir James Graham, Mr. Hume, and others, pressed the necessity of retrenchment in several motions, which embarrassed the march and weakened the hands of government.

Committees of enquiry into the affairs of India, nominated by both houses at the commencement of the session, pursued their examinations with considerable assiduity, and printed voluminous reports. The president of the board of control, lord Ellenborough, in proposing that of the peers, did not disguise the inclination on his mind, that the charter of the Company should be renewed without any great change in the regulations of their trade, or the mode of conducting their political government; though he declared that the ministry were willing to assist in the enquiry, without having come themselves to any resolution on the subject. The committees of both houses directed their attention, during last session, exclusively to the subject of the trade with China, with the view of ascertaining whether, on a renewal of the charter, it ought to remain exclusively in the hands of the Company as hitherto, or be opened to the general enterprise of

the nation. The evidence which they took is printed, without any expression of opinion as to its tendency. The lords examined fifty-two witnesses, and have printed seven hundred and nine folio pages of evidence about the Chinese and the tea trade, which show little else than that the Chinese are, in their ideas of trade, not very different from other nations; that tea might be sold cheaper if it were not a monopoly; and that we should run no great danger of being driven from Canton any more than the Americans, though the trade were thrown open to all the subjects of the king as well as to the subjects of Leadenhall.

III. We have alluded to the proceedings on legal and parliamentary reform, as demanding notice in the history of the session, but have only room to mention that Mr. Brougham, in an elaborate speech, introduced a bill for the establishment of county courts, the discussion of which was postponed to another session; that sir Robert Peel introduced a bill to consolidate and mitigate the statutes of forgery, in which an amendment was carried to substitute transportation for death as a punishment for offences of this description; that the clause was lost in the house of lords; and that the bill, with some amendments, passed; and that the attorney-general carried a measure for the assisting the administration of justice by appointing three new judges, by abolishing the system of Welsh judicature, and extending the usual English circuits to Wales. With respect to parliamentary reform, we may mention, as a proof of the surprising change which we have undergone within the last few months in our ideas of this question, that the reformers in parliament

were unable to procure for Birmingham, or any other large town, the franchise which the borough of East Retford had forfeited; and that, after two years' discussion, it was only extended into the hundred to which the corrupt borough belongs. Had the anti-reformers yielded in time to partial changes, a more general and sweeping innovation might have been adjourned for years.

IV. The only topics relating to the foreign relations of the country which were discussed with animation, and at considerable length, in the session of 1830, was the conduct of the British government in the affairs of Portugal and Greece. The former was brought before the house of commons by lord Palmerston, and before the house of peers by lord Melbourne (both now in office), in elaborate speeches, demanding enquiry or papers, and received an ample discussion. On the part of the noble lords it was contended, that we had encouraged the Portuguese constitutionalists to rely upon the British government for support; and that, when, trusting to that support, they had made no opposition to the return of their tyrant, we had abandoned them to their fate. It might be true that the Portuguese charter was not the work of Mr. Canning's ministry; but it was brought to Europe by a British ambassador, and was recommended for adoption in Portugal by a British minister. When afterwards the absolutist party raised the standard of revolt against it and its imperial author, and received encouragement and protection from Spain, we sent a British army to Portugal to repel an aggression from that quarter. It is true that our army had orders to take no part in the internal quarrels of Portugal, and that our

expedition was not *ostensibly* sent to support the constitutionalists; but it so happened that the foreign factions which were our enemies were likewise the enemies of the charter, and that the faithful subjects of the monarchy whom we supported were likewise the supporters of the constitution. During the whole time that our troops remained in Portugal, the British embassy, under pretext of preventing a Spanish invasion, controlled the enthusiasm, and directed the policy of the constitutionalists, and thus prevented them from taking those measures which might have secured the success of their cause; lest, by doing so, they might commit us in a quarrel with Spain and France. At last the constitutional party, who had always resisted the return of don Miguel, from a perfect knowledge of his perfidious character, were induced to receive him for their regent, under assurances from us that he had given sufficient pledges and guarantees to the new order of things. He left Vienna under a treaty to which England was a party; he was received in London with a distinction which showed the favour and confidence of the English government; he was escorted to the Tagus by an English squadron; he was received in Lisbon by the English ambassador; he swore the charter before the assembled diplomacy of Europe, at the suggestion of the English government; he was protected in his capital by English troops; and every thing taught the constitutional party to believe, that, in agreeing to his return, they had the protection of the English government against the violation of oaths and engagements taken by him under the sanction of England.

He had not been many days in Lisbon when he threw off his constitutional mask, and commenced his career of usurpation and violence. Even then he might have been overpowered by the party whom we at first supported, had the British troops left the Tagus; but their presence paralysed efforts which, as directed against a part of the royal family, we must, according to recent precedents, have resisted: and thus the overthrow of a constitution, which was supposed to be our work, and the defeat of a party whom we had tempted to rely upon us, and thus stripped of all powers of independent action, were accomplished under the glitter of British bayonets. The subsequent conduct of the British government, in its zeal to acknowledge blockades directed against our former friends; in its cruel treatment of the refugees who had taken refuge on our shores after their defeat; and in its attack, contrary to the law of nations, on the party about to garrison Terceira, were all so many aggravations of our change of policy, and our abandonment of persons whom we had tempted to their ruin. The Portuguese constitutionalists could, indeed, claim nothing from us by the stipulations of treaties: but the honour and good faith of a government may be engaged without the formalities of a convention; and, in the case of the Portuguese, the faith of England had been morally violated.

Such is an outline of the speeches made in both houses in favour of our neglected allies, in debates where more eloquence and powerful reasoning were displayed by lord Holland, sir James Mackintosh, and other members, than had occurred during the session. The only answer returned was, that the

charter was not our work; that we never stipulated to support the constitutional party; and that in the affair of Terceira, as we had a right to prevent an armament from being fitted out from a British port against a power with which we were at peace, so, when that armament, by stratagem or deception, had got to sea, we had a right to prevent it from executing its hostile purpose. Though the discussion thus elicited no acknowledgment of past error, and led to no engagement of a change for conduct on the part of the government, it was not unproductive of good effects. It convinced Europe that the cause of justice was still upheld in the British parliament — it showed perfidious despots that they were not beyond the reach of its withering censure — it taught the unfortunate victims of freedom that they still possessed sympathising friends — and it strengthened the resolution of government in resisting a recognition of the contemptible usurper of Portugal, till he should agree to an effective amnesty towards his persecuted subjects.

The policy of the British government respecting Greece, as will be seen by the preceding chapter, was equally liable to objection, and exposed them to a defeat in argument equally signal. Lord Holland, whose knowledge of the political relations of Europe is as profound and extensive as his sympathies with nations, parties, or individuals struggling for freedom are warm and generous, brought the subject before the house of peers in an eloquent and elaborate speech at the very beginning of the session; and, in the other house, lord John Russell and lord Palmerston did a similar service to the cause of humanity and justice. These

noble senators showed that the policy of the British government respecting the final arrangement of the Greek question had been narrow, unwise, and inconsistent. They proved that it had hung like a drag on all the negotiations which had for their object any large and generous settlement of the Levant; and that its partiality to Turkey, which was repaid with ingratitude, had prevented it from seeing the expediency or exulting in the glory of restoring a celebrated people to freedom, and erecting a monument to modern civilisation, on the half-buried pedestal of ancient art and wisdom. The boundary line was proved to be injudiciously as well as unjustly drawn: it did not afford facilities of defence; nor did it include those districts which supply Greece with her best defenders. Lord Palmerston particularly contended for the necessity of bringing Candia or Crete within the Greek commonwealth. The Candiotes had shaken off the Turkish yoke in the early period of the insurrection, and had never since been re-subjected by their former masters. Without Candia, the tranquillity or independence of Greece would be again endangered by expeditions from that island: without this island, all the other parts of the arrangement would be liable to failure.

Towards the middle of the session, lord Grey and lord Durham took up the question in the interest of prince Leopold, whose chief adviser the latter became in all his negotiations and correspondence with the British government. The letters in which his royal highness gave his reasons for resigning the Greek crown were understood to have been written by his lordship; and lord Aber-

deen, the foreign secretary, must have seen that he was dealing with a different correspondent at the end and the beginning of the negotiation.

The reply given by ministers to the arguments of their opponents was, that by none of the many plans of arrangement which had ever been seriously entertained had Candia been included in the Greek state; that the boundary adopted was easily defensible; that, at any rate, the new principality would be under the protection of the allies, who would guarantee its integrity; that if the boundary line had been contracted, the Greeks were indemnified for the loss of a little territory by the complete independence of the rest; and that the sultan having yielded so far, it would be unjust and ungenerous to strip him of more of his dominions in his present state of prostration.

The session was interrupted at its busiest period, or at least when a great part of its business remained unfinished, by the death of the king, who expired at Windsor, at three o'clock on Saturday morning, the 26th of June. This event had been expected for some weeks. His majesty had been seized with indisposition towards the beginning of the year; but he had not been confined to his room, nor had the symptoms of his disease assumed an alarming aspect, till within about two months of his death. The first of the series of bulletins which continued till they made that fatal announcement was issued on the 15th of April, and stated that his majesty had had a bilious attack, and an embarrassment in breathing. With some intervals of freedom from pain, the king exhibited nearly the same symptoms to the end. Towards the middle

of May, he began to feel the difficulty of even going through any of the routine business of his high office; and had a commission appointed by act of parliament to affix his signature by a stamp to acts which required the sign manual. From that time, paroxysms of pain and difficulty of breathing continued till the 9th of June, when he became so ill, as to alarm his attendants with the prospect of an immediate dissolution. A few days before his death, violent coughing, accompanied with expectoration, prevented the royal sufferer from enjoying any rest; and on the 25th, he ruptured a blood-vessel, which, in his then weak state, led to his immediate dissolution. His majesty's death was occasioned by a complication of disorders: he was afflicted with dropsy; but his primary and incurable disease was an ossification of the vessels of the heart. He suffered great agony during the greater part of his illness, and bore it with exemplary patience.

On the political history of George IV. we have no room to dilate: and his personal history bears no proportion in vastness or interest to that of his reign. He has given his name to one of the most brilliant epochs in the annals of England or of Europe, as the saints give their names to the festivals in the calendar; but his name is almost all that he has given. Before he occupied the seat of supreme power he was not known for the performance of any public service. Subsequently, the valour of his troops, and the resources of his empire, contributed to grand results, which were neither illustrated by his personal bravery nor

directed by his personal wisdom. Nor is he on this account liable to any reproach. We have no desire to see our kings distinguished in fields of battle, or in congresses of sovereigns. We can easily dispense with military renown on the throne; and would be sorry to see any displays of personal self-will by our sovereign in his council, distinct from the settled policy of the country, or the understood views of his servants. It may be useful in despotic sovereigns to appear with their armies, or to join in royal conferences: but British troops require no such encouragement; and George IV., when, as prince regent in 1814, he entertained his brother sovereigns in London, could not feel humiliated that he had remained at home, while they had traversed half Europe with their generals and ministers.

His late majesty was born on the 12th of August, 1762, the anniversary of the accession of his family to the throne of England. When four days old he was created, by letters patent, prince of Wales and earl of Chester. He was baptised, on the 18th of August, by the names of George Augustus Frederick; and, when three years old, was invested with the order of the garter, and replied to an address from the society of ancient Britons. At the age of four he received his first military honours, in being appointed captain-general of the Artillery Company of the city of London, a post which he occupied till his death. To his education his royal parents applied great attention. In 1771, a governor and preceptors were appointed to him and his brother the duke of York, in the persons of lord Holdernesse, Dr. Markham, afterwards archbishop of York, and Dr. Cyril Jackson. Being a youth of quick

parts, and kept closely to study, the heir apparent made great progress under such superintendence. At the age of fourteen his first governor and tutors were exchanged for the duke of Montague and the celebrated Dr. Hurd, bishop of Litchfield and Coventry. The princes were subjected to rigorous discipline, and bound to close study; a system which was continued till they reached nearly the age of manhood. With the dead languages the prince of Wales became early familiar; he had learned likewise to converse in French, Italian, and German. The natural sciences were not forgotten; and his taste for literature and the fine arts was cultivated with considerable care.

But the severe treatment to which he was subjected, and the rigorous seclusion in which he was kept, in making these acquirements, were far from being judicious, and probably laid the foundation of many of the errors and domestic misunderstandings of his early life. Before his nineteenth year he rarely appeared in public; but his intimacy had already commenced with a few young noblemen, who initiated him into the fashionable vices and follies of the time. His acquaintance with the celebrated Mrs. Robinson then commenced, which, two years afterwards, was abruptly broken off by her royal lover, at the time that she thought her empire most secure. The follies and irregularities into which this connection led him, and the cruel neglect with which he treated the object of his early attachment, when she had excited his dislike or could no longer administer to his pleasures, forms perhaps one of the greatest stains on his youthful character. A pension of 400*l.* a year was settled upon her. This pittance,

wrung from shame, was irregularly paid; her applications for relief were treated with indignity and scorn, and she was allowed to die in poverty and wretchedness.

The allowance made the prince on becoming of age, though not extravagant for the heir apparent, was adequate, and even liberal. He received a grant of 60,000*l.* for outfit, and 50,000*l.* a year as an income. His friends proposed the larger allowance of 100,000*l.*, as more suitable to the style in which he ought to live; but, from his extravagance, not probably more likely to keep him out of the pecuniary difficulties into which he immediately fell. Nothing could exceed the splendour of his entertainments, the magnificence of his palace, the brilliancy of his equipages, or the profusion that reigned in every part of his establishment. This extravagant expenditure, together with horse-racing, and other modes of gaming, brought him into such a state of overwhelming embarrassment in the course of three years, that he was obliged to apply to his father for assistance. The same motive which made the king resist the larger allowance led him to refuse this application. His royal highness then adopted a resolution, which he thought magnanimous, of breaking up his establishment, abandoning the sphere in which he had hitherto moved, surrendering the greatest part of his income for the liquidation of his debts, and living upon a reserve of 10,000*l.* a year. His purpose was carried into effect with an affected display of firmness and self-sacrifice, which showed that he would not long maintain it; and that he had adopted it merely that he might act upon his father to relieve him from his diffi-

culties, out of respect for the honour of his family, or procure the sympathy of the nation in his favour from a belief that he was harshly treated. Hence he paraded his race-horses before his dismantled palace, travelled in a common post chaise, or borrowed the carriage of a friend. The obstinacy of the king's temper, and his want of indulgence for the prince's errors, were for a long time proof against this species of moral intimidation; and he not only ceased to have any intercourse with his son in private, but even declined to recognise him in public. His royal highness, being tired of living on the reputation of an injured prince and 10,000*l.* a year, was advised by his friends to appeal from his father's harshness and economy to the justice and generosity of parliament; an appeal which succeeded in obtaining for him 160,000*l.* to pay his debts, and 20,000*l.* to repair his palace, on a condition very unlikely to be observed, and which was, in fact, immediately broken, that he would be guilty of no farther extravagance.

We shall not here allude to the moral sacrifice at which this provision was purchased. By the application of the prince for assistance to parliament, an opportunity was afforded to those who opposed the grant to enquire into the rumour which had been spread of a clandestine marriage with Mrs. Fitzherbert; a fact which was solemnly denied by Mr. Fox, on the behalf and in the name of his royal highness, but which the truth of history will one day establish. By this he obtained pecuniary assistance, but lost the confidence of friendship. It happened singularly and unfortunately, that, in

order to relieve himself from the consequences of his extravagance, he was obliged to renounce one marriage with the lady to whom he was attached, and a few years afterwards to contract another with one whom he disliked; thus making the dearest affections of the heart, and the most sacred ties of domestic life, dependent on his pecuniary necessities, bartering solemn oaths and engagements for splendid establishments, or selling his hand for the benefit of his creditors.

Thus disencumbered of his debts, and replaced in the situation becoming his rank, he started anew in the race of dissipation, and resumed his former course of profligate pleasure and prodigal expenditure. The estrangement of his father, and the resistance of Mr. Pitt's ministry to his claims, naturally drove him to look for political associates in the ranks of opposition; and though his mind had not been at first seduced, or his principles corrupted, by the eminent men of the Whig party, their example rather encouraged than checked him in his career of reckless profusion and dissolute indulgence. He could not probably appreciate, at their full value, the splendid genius, profound sagacity, or extensive knowledge of its great leader, Mr. Fox; but he could see in his gambling and irregular habits a justification of his own, and found in the society, around which the intellectual vigour and brilliant wit of Sheridan and his associates threw a kind of dazzling lustre, an incitement to those vices to which he was already too prone, and of which he had given such scandalous examples.

If ever the plea of passion, incitement, or temptation could be set up to justify or palliate glaring

transgressions of duty, open breaches of decorum, and indulgence in the most dangerous and pernicious vices, it was in the case of the prince of Wales at the early period of his manhood. Endowed with great vivacity, prone to social amusements, and urged in search of pleasure by an ardent temperament, he was separated from his family, by his father's rigorous severity, at the very time when, without any experience of the world, he most required the reasonable guidance and indulgent control of parental wisdom. Possessed of such accomplishments of body and mind as might be flattered without falsehood, and born to such exalted prospects as no misconduct could forfeit, he was seized on his first establishment in life by the harpies of sycophancy — slavish, profligate, and unprincipled — who fixed their talons in his vitals, and never quitted their hold till, by their foul compliances and vile incitements, they had destroyed every remain of shame or virtue that opposed their vicious inclinations or his own. The high political characters with whom the prince became connected at the same time increased these moral perils, by gilding vice with the lustre of talent, and confounding in the admiration of his inexperienced youth their great fame as statesmen, orators, and wits, with a bad pre-eminence in the seductive excesses of gaming and debauchery.

In the question of the regency, which the illness of the king forced upon the nation in 1789, the claim of right to be unrestricted regent, which was set up for the prince by his political friends, whom his accession to uncontrolled power would have

brought into the cabinet, was opposed in parliament and discountenanced by the public, on the real, though not avowed, ground of his previous life, his associates, and his character. It does not appear that he himself urged the principle which was so powerfully, though unconstitutionally, pressed in his name; but, in accepting the regency, he testified, in a letter to Mr. Pitt, his sentiments of dissatisfaction at the unworthy suspicions which the cautious restrictions of the minister implied.

A time was now approaching in which his confidence in his political friends, and his attachment to Whig principles, were to be tried by a severer test than they had yet encountered. The French revolution occasioned a new division of parties, and a new exaltation of political opinions in this country. It was an easy and safe game for the heir apparent to head an opposition to his father's government in ordinary times; sure that he may gain in present popularity, without sacrificing any of his future rights: but when occasions occur in which the foundation of all thrones are supposed to be attacked by the principles which have subverted one, when king-cashiering comes to be talked of without exciting any loyal horror, and when the doctrine of popular sovereignty is proclaimed by the first nobleman in the land, a question arises of more difficult solution. The prince accordingly discovered that his Whig friends, in toasting the sovereignty of the people, had attacked his prospective rights; that, in continuing at their head, he was no longer maintaining a family difference or a party quarrel, but was opposing his own order, and endangering his own dynasty. In adopting this idea, he doubtless

forgot the principle which placed his family on the throne, and even the resolution which Mr. Pitt had made the basis of the restricted regency; but no reasoning could prevail against an alarm which he shared with many wise and great men, who, like himself, at this time deserted their party, if not their principles. After making a speech in the house of peers, in 1792, against revolutionary doctrines, he took leave of his Whig friends and voted with the ministry.

From that period his royal highness never again acted with the Whigs as a party, and was opposed by some of them with a bitterness and perseverance which showed that they had become indifferent as to his future patronage, that they distrusted his judgment or sincerity, and could not forgive his desertion.

This temper soon had an opportunity of displaying itself. Notwithstanding the solemn pledges of economy on which his former debts had been paid, he had again run a race of greater extravagance, and had become involved in greater pecuniary embarrassments than formerly, when he had the inexperience of extreme youth, and the delusions of ungratified passion, to plead in extenuation of his errors. After, therefore, trying ineffectually to negotiate a loan in Holland, he was obliged to relieve himself from his difficulties by negotiating a marriage at home. A matrimonial union and a domestic establishment, which the sober habits of the king taught him to believe the only means of reclaiming his son from his irregularities, were made the conditions of a discharge from past incumbrances, and a more liberal allowance for the future. A match was

therefore agreed upon,—not between the parties most interested,—but between their families; and Caroline Amelia Elizabeth, daughter of the duke of Brunswick, and consequently cousin of his royal highness, became princess of Wales, on the 8th of April, 1795. The prince's debts were again paid, to the amount of 600,000*l.*, and, besides the income of the duchy of Cornwall, an allowance was granted by act of parliament of 125,000*l.* a year, with a liberal outfit for his matrimonial establishment. The arrangement was zealously supported by the ministry, and opposed by the prince's former friends, particularly by Mr. now Lord Grey, our present premier.

Of this ill-starred marriage, which may be said to have been solemnised "in th' eclipse, and rigged with curses dark," the only issue was the princess Charlotte, born on the 7th of January the following year. Instead of answering the expectations of the king and the nation, it proved for twenty-five years the source of perpetual scandal and agitation,—entailed on the parties themselves almost tragic misery,—excited endless dissensions in the royal family,—became with political parties alternately the instrument of faction and of intrigue,—and, in the judicial proceedings to which it ultimately gave rise, exposed the king, the parliament, and the people of England to the ridicule or the scorn of Europe.

The marriage tie, which was no sooner formed than it was broken, did not lead the prince to alter his mode of life; but his growing difficulties did not force him to make any further demands on the nation till he became its sovereign. This event occurred in 1810, when the malady of his father

rendering necessary the appointment of a regency, his royal highness was created prince regent, and under that title conducted the affairs of this mighty empire during the most glorious years of his reign. As the precedent in the former regency bill was followed in that of 1810, the prince regent was at first subjected to certain restrictions on his power, till it should be ascertained whether the malady of his father was incurable. It was natural that during this provisional tenure of authority he should retain his father's servants, whatever were his own party predilections; but the nation was surprised to find, when those restrictions were removed, that he had resolved permanently to retain his father's counsellors.

This has been adduced against the prince as an evidence of inconsistency or insincerity; but the reproach may not be merited. It is true that, brought up among the Whigs, and maintaining till the commencement of his regency a connection with some of them, he abandoned entirely their standard when he might have planted it on the throne; and, if party in his mind ever represented principles, he abandoned both Whig principles and party. But the circumstances warranted a change. The nation was engaged in a war of which the public voice demanded the vigorous prosecution, and against an enemy with whom public opinion could see no chance of forming an honourable peace. The Whigs had always denounced the expense and charges of the contest, expressed despair of its object, and clamoured for its termination. They had tried, in 1806, to make peace, and failed; they tried to make war, and likewise failed: but their inclination was to seize every

opportunity of renewing attempts at the former, and to avoid every occasion of extending the latter; convinced that Great Britain ought to retire from continental politics — to refuse continental subsidies — "to husband her own resources" for a grand struggle, which might never occur — and to abandon that resistance or annoyance in detail, which could never, in their opinion, lead to any important or decisive result. The confidence of the king's ministers in the undiminished power of the country, and in the ultimate success of their enterprises, though perhaps not founded on better reasons than that of their antagonists in an opposite system of policy, had at least the appearance of being more generous, was supported with more patriotic enthusiasm, and has led to grander results. It need, therefore, neither excite surprise nor require apology that the prince regent, in deciding between the supporters of these opposite systems, should have chosen rather to retain his father's servants than to promote his ancient friends.

With a few dates more we must close this brief retrospect. Encouraged by British example, and assisted by British resources, the nations rose against Napoleon their general oppressor; and while their armies, increasing at every march with his revolted vassals, swept his power from the north and east to the Rhine, the British troops, under their invincible commander, drove his invading hordes from Cadiz across the Pyrenees, when the capital of the enemy became the rendezvous of the conquerors. In the peace of 1814, which followed, neither the interests of England nor the permanent welfare of Europe received their due consideration: but the prince regent had his full share of congratulation on the glories of

the triumph, during the visit of his august allies to London in the summer of that year. The second overthrow of Napoleon at Waterloo in the following year, by British troops and a British general, raised the military glory of England to a height which it had never attained during the reign of any former British sovereign. It is superfluous to say, that the subsequent years of his majesty's life were distinguished by no events like those of 1814 and 1815. In 1817 he lost his only daughter, princess Charlotte, who had been married the preceding year, and died in child-bed. In 1820 his father died; and he exchanged his title of prince regent for that of George IV., without any addition to his power. The queen, who had resided abroad as princess of Wales from 1814, and whose foreign residence and former title he was anxious to continue, returned to England, contrary to the advice of her own friends, and in spite of the threats of the court. In an unlucky moment a resolution was taken to charge her with adultery, and to strip her of her title and honours by a bill of pains and penalties, founded on the result of a judicial examination before the house of peers. After Europe had been scandalised by the filthy disclosures given before the British parliament, after faction had found a allying point round a royal standard to agitate the masses of our population, after the character of royalty itself had been blackened, the bill was abandoned; and her majesty died soon afterwards of a broken heart. On the two following years his majesty visited Ireland and Scotland; and found that the prosecution of the queen had occasioned no diminution of loyalty in those parts of his empire. From 1822 to the time of his death his health became

liable to more frequent assaults of gout, and his life was spent in greater seclusion.

The character of George IV. has, like that of every other prince living or recently dead, been drawn with very different colours by different hands; with some it has been made the subject of extravagant eulogy, and with others of undeserved censure. Those who are disposed to extend their indulgent connivance to the errors and vices of monarchs, and who reserve their prying criticism for vulgar station, hold him up nearly as a model of perfection; while he has been as unjustly mangled by another class of critics, who feel a particular predilection to apply their scalping-knife to crowned heads, and who, like the ancient priests, delight to select their victims from rare or consecrated races. But George IV. was neither much better nor much worse than the average run of princes brought up in the perpetual view of a throne, released from the restraints of prudence at the age when passion is strongest, and placed in all stages of his life beyond the sphere of the common motives of ambition or fear of degradation which actuate other men.

As a king, in the exercise of his authority, he understood his age and nation. With the professional proneness of his *caste* to exalt prerogative, he never ostensibly allowed it to interfere with the ascertained rights or settled opinions of his subjects. Though he was never known to suggest reform or repairs in the social edifice, and busied himself rather with questionable innovations in more vulgar architecture, he was too enlightened to oppose those changes in the national policy which the progress of knowledge had rendered necessary, and which

were suggested or supported by his responsible advisers. Accordingly, the latter ten years of his reign will always be memorable in the annals of England for ameliorations of our commercial code, for improvements in our criminal laws, and for the abolition of sectarian distinctions as qualifications for civil privileges.

In the domestic relations of life, or in the selection of his private associates, his warmest friends can say nothing in his praise. The great vice of his character seemed to be an intense selfishness, which could neither share nor excite strong sympathy,—which could make no sacrifice and incur no trouble for others,—which taught him to consult only his own humours, his own caprices, and his own ease as the supreme law for those about him, as well as for himself,—and which never calculated at what cost to others he purchased his own gratifications, whether of power, pride, taste, luxury, wit, or sensual indulgence, provided he secured them. Hence his extravagance in expenditure, and the careless indifference with which he applied to the national purse. Hence he is described as never knowing the value of money, because he never could conceive any thing too valuable to be spent in gratifying his desires—whether they took the direction of the turf or the gaming-table; whether they prompted him to entertain buffoons or to patronise the arts—to buy trinkets or to build palaces. Hence, for his amusement, he often tempted to familiarities which he resented, and reconciled his condescension with his dignity, by the merciless sacrifice of the hapless dependant, who in presuming upon the one offended

the other. Hence he selected for his ministers those public men who, in conducting his government, would give him least trouble; and passed a sentence of arbitrary exclusion against others, from personal pique or prejudice.

In making this last remark we by no means intend to insinuate that on any extraordinary emergency, during any great party conflict, or with any great national interest at stake, he would have allowed his love of ease or his feeling of personal partialities to influence his mind in the choice of his servants: but, happily such occasions seldom occur; and the propensity to which we allude may, in ordinary times, produce considerable mischief, though it would be overpowered by extraordinary circumstances — by the presence of great dangers, or the demands for great exertions. It probably was the secret cause of the dissolution of the Goderich administration, the formation of the Wellington cabinet, and the continued exclusion of lord Grey from any share of power.

As a part of the same character, it may be remarked, that he was incapable of disinterested friendship or constant attachment. In the early part of his life, he was cordial with those whom he admitted to his society, or who administered to his pleasures; but he never forgot the distance between the heir apparent to the throne and a subject, and, while he expected fidelity and submission, showed no return of lasting regard. The slightest cause of irritation, the least unauthorised encroachment on his kindness beyond the prescribed bounds, severed the frail tie. His connexion with Mr. Fox was one of politics, and not of friendship; but from the

terms on which they lived, a generous confidence in the great statesman whom he admired ought to have prevented him from making him the dupe of falsehood, in the case of his marriage with Mrs. Fitzherbert. His treatment of Sheridan, who was so long his adviser in difficulties,—the promoter of his pleasures,—the companion and ornament of his convivial hours, and whom he deserted in the last stage of wretchedness and neglect, when his wit was no longer required to enliven nor his talents to guide him, will for ever remain a proof of his heartlessness. It is, indeed, true that before his "evil days came on" Sheridan had been wanting to himself, to his brilliant talents, to his immortal reputation, but he had not failed in his duty to the prince: he had contracted no habits which the prince had not sanctioned by his example, or encouraged by his society; and a small pittance from that immense income, which was now squandered with more reckless profusion than his smaller allowance in the period of their common extravagance, might have rescued him a few years longer from the grave, or rendered his descent into it less gloomy, forlorn, and deserted.

Most of those who shared his familiarities or were admitted to his table at the early part of his life, had been discarded before its close; and not one man of brilliant parts or independent character was ever voluntarily invited to a continued intercourse, or could endure the terms at which it must be purchased.

On the other hand, it need not be said that his resentments and antipathies were less fleeting than

his friendships. His insulting treatment of his wife immediately on their marriage, and his continued course of persecution after their separation, must be censured by those who might not be disposed to break a lance in defence of the purity or prudence of his wife's conduct. Without alluding to any farther instances of this unforgiving disposition, it may be sufficient to say, that, for causes unknown to his royal highness, his aversion to his brother the duke of Sussex was not overcome even at the prospect of death.

That he was a man of cultivated understanding and varied accomplishments, his bitterest enemies cannot deny. His skill in music and his taste in pictures were universally acknowledged. His acquaintance with literature, science, and politics was, probably, greater than that of any contemporary sovereign; and none of his brother monarchs understood more profoundly the laws and mysteries of court fashion, or could exhibit in more finished perfection the polish and elegance of court manners. The eulogy on his character by the duke of Wellington, on proposing the address of condolence on his death, will not be contested so far as intellectual accomplishment is concerned; and, were it not that his flatterers have claimed for him every virtue under heaven, we might, probably, have spared the few harsh remarks which we have been compelled to make on his moral habits and general principles of action.

The death of George IV. had been so long expected, that it produced but a slight sensation when it occurred. The public had been allowed to know

so little about his malady or his sufferings,—he had kept himself in such strict retirement, and seemed so much to shrink from popular sympathy, that little regret was either felt or expressed at the event.

Very different was the strength of feeling with which the accession of his successor, William IV., was hailed. The lowest of the people seemed sensible to the contrast between the manners of the two monarchs. The new sovereign exhibited himself to his people, conversed with them, and shared in their tastes and amusements. He was understood to have contracted no habits of extravagance; and he showed no haughty disdain of popular approbation. Though he retained the ministers, and professed to act on the political system, of his predecessor, he immediately acquired a great share of popularity, which was peculiarly due to his own frank nature and affable deportment. His instant promotion of some of his old friends, such as sir Sidney Smith, his well-timed liberalities, and his total disregard of party distinctions in receiving the homage of his subjects, afforded the best omen of a happy reign.

The cordial manner in which the new monarch commanded the ministers of his brother to retain their offices, and the assurance which he gave them of his perfect confidence in their zeal and ability, were far from being agreeable to their opponents. It seemed like a sentence of perpetual exclusion from power, if, upon the presumption of such a sanction, the duke of Wellington should choose still "to rule alone." The partialities of the late king were known to stand in the way of any Whig infusion into the cabinet; but, as his successor did not share

his aversion for that party, with several of whom he was connected by the marriage of his children, the continued monopoly of office by the members of the late government could not but be regarded as an evidence of exclusive personal ambition. The opposition, therefore, became stronger and more exasperated in the short period of the session which remained. The message from the crown, therefore, announcing an approaching dissolution of parliament, and recommending a speedy despatch of the necessary business of the session, preparatory to such an event, did not prevent the introduction of a hostile motion, to settle immediately the question of a regency and the civil list. This proposition was defeated by a majority which rather emboldened than intimidated the ministry; and the result of the subsequent elections was necessary to prove to the duke of Wellington his frail tenure of power, even with the continued confidence of his sovereign, if he conducted the government on the same party system of exclusion, and with the same inadequate amount of talent, as he had hitherto done.

CHAP. IV.

STATE OF FRANCE BEFORE THE REVOLUTION. — ELECTIONS. — ALGERINE EXPEDITION.

WHILE the sceptre of England was thus quietly transferred from the hands of a monarch who was too exclusively devoted to the indulgence of his own humours and tastes, and kept too fastidiously aloof from the pleasures or pursuits of his subjects to command much of their sympathy during his life, or to excite much of their regret at his death, to those of a king whose frank dispositions and popular manners made him the idol of the people, the affairs of France were hastening to a crisis, notwithstanding the assurances of European tranquillity given by the English ministry at the closing of the session.

The war of party and faction which had been declared against the Polignac cabinet on its accession had never once ceased or relaxed for a moment. The winter and spring campaign was now conducted with greater vigour, and in a more hostile spirit, than that of the previous months. Opposition and contempt, disgust and alarm, expressed themselves through all the organs of public opinion. The saloons encouraged the violence of the periodical press; and the press justified the fears and resistance of the saloons. New political journals, such as the *National* and the *Temps*, had started up to share in the glory and dangers of the struggle; and

some journals, which had hitherto been devoted to literature and the arts, threw aside their philosophic mantle (which they wore somewhat quaintly and pedantically*), that they might enter the arena of politics with less incumbrance, and combat the ministry with more effect. Some new mode of annoyance, or some new subject of odium, was started every day. At one time it was said that the ministers intended not to convoke the chambers, but to dissolve them. On this charge were founded long trains of reasoning, to show that by a dissolution nothing could be gained, and warm exhortations to the electors to be on their guard against the sinister designs of the government. The ordinance of convocation issued on the 7th of January, appointing the opening of the session for the 2d of March, swept away the props from this scaffolding of gratuitous invention, only to make room for some other fabrication equally unfounded. The bugbear of a censorship of the press, and a change in the law of elections, were always at hand, when nothing else occurred. If the announcement of these anticipated infringements of the charter was to be pointed with a venom of peculiar intensity, they were charged upon prince Polignac as the subservient tool of prince Metternich and the duke of Wellington, who had placed him at the head of the French cabinet to gratify their hatred of liberal opinions, and to execute their views of malignant ambition. The nomination of prince Leopold to be chief of the Greek state was adduced as an irresistible proof of the in-

* *Le Globe*, for instance, in which M. Guizot and the duke de Broglie often wrote.

fluence of the English ministry over the councils of Charles X., and an instance of the prodigality with which the fruits of French victories and French sacrifices were thrown away by an anti-national cabinet. The liberal journals lived for a month upon the vituperation of this appointment of an English pensioner to the throne of Greece.

In the anticipation of a majority against ministers in the chamber, of which they made certain, the liberal papers entered with their antagonists into long discussions respecting the subsequent steps to be pursued; the nature and extent of the royal prerogative; and the right of the legislature to object to the king's choice of servants before these servants had done any thing objectionable. Should the address be hostile, were the ministers to resign, to dissolve the chambers, or to try the question of supplies in the face of an expressed censure? "The address," said one of the few journals which supported the ministry, "is of little consequence: if it is hostile, ministers will put it in their pockets, and pursue their course as before; they are not persons to retire because they are asked to do so. Let them hold firm; the address will be considered as nothing; and they will have the majority for the budget." This and other bravadoes of the same kind furnished texts for endless controversy, in which the ministers suffered as much from the violence of their advocates as from the talent and zeal of their opponents.

Hence, every day the public mind became more thoroughly impregnated with a distrust of the court, and more firmly impressed with the idea of the in-

compatibility between the cabinet and the country. The ministerialists accused their antagonists of conspiring against the king; and the liberals retorted the charge by accusing the court of conspiring against the charter. It was alleged in one of the journals that meetings of the deputies took place at the house of their president, M. Royer-Collard; and that gentleman felt himself under the necessity of denying the society of his colleagues, as if they could not meet without a plot to overthrow the monarchy.

The more violent articles of the opposition journals were prosecuted; but the only result of the prosecution was to extend wider the alleged libel, and to convert its author into a martyr for liberty. Towards the end of February a remarkable article was published in the *Globe*, headed "France and the Bourbons," in which the character of the reigning race, and their unfitness for ruling a country like France, were exposed with a truth and a boldness to which the proceedings before the tribunal only gave additional effect.

The only way of parrying these blows, and of gaining some hold over the nation, appeared in an attempt to gratify its vanity and its passion for military glory, by vigorously undertaking an expedition, which had been often before talked of, to punish the insolence of the Algerines. This expedition was announced about the beginning of February; and preparations for it commenced on a large scale. But the public still continued too much engrossed with their domestic affairs to have much attention to bestow on remote objects or barbarous conquests.

The people had learned likewise to distinguish between the services of their army and the merits of their ministers, and protested beforehand against the confiscation of the glory of the former for the benefit of the latter. The military spectacle, besides, was so evidently devised to divert their attention from their alleged civil grievances, that it was reckoned rather an insult to their understanding than a vindication of their honour, or a gratification of their pride. The liberal journals, therefore, had the art, by contrasting its risks with its results, and its expenses with its proposed advantages, to neutralise its influence, and even to convert it into an additional title to unpopularity.

In the midst of these discussions and this irritation, the chambers met on the 2d of March, when the speech from the throne brought on the national crisis sooner than could be anticipated. After announcing the termination of the Turkish war, and the settlement of the Greek question, — the progress of negotiations respecting Portugal, and preparations, for the attack on Algiers, — an intended project for reducing the rate of interest on the national debt, and for applying the savings thence accruing to internal improvements, — some changes in the judicial order and in the administration, it concluded by the following expressions: — "The charter has placed the public liberties under the safeguard of the rights of my throne. These rights are sacred; my duty towards my people is to transmit them entire to my successors. Peers of France, and deputies of departments, I doubt not of your co-operation in effecting the good which I wish to

accomplish. You will repel with contempt the perfidious insinuations which malevolence endeavours to propagate. If culpable manœuvres should raise up against my government obstacles which I cannot — (the king added, on recovering himself) which I do not wish to foresee, I shall find the power of surmounting them, in my resolution to maintain the public peace, in my just confidence in Frenchmen, and in the love which they have always shown for their kings."

The effect which this doctrine on the prerogatives of royalty, this reproof of the public animadversions on the designs of the ministry, and this threat directed against the party opposed to the government, produced on the minds of the deputies and the nation, was entirely different from what was expected. They could weigh in the balance of the political sanctuary the rights of the crown and the liberties of the people, and could see nothing more sacred in the one than in the other; they could appreciate at its just value the charge of "perfidious insinuations," while they were only conscious of reasonable suspicions; and they felt no alarm at the menace against the culpable manœuvres of the governed, while all their vigilance was directed against the culpable manœuvres of the government. Nothing could have manifested a greater ignorance of the state of France, or of the position of the court, than the use of such haughty language and such lofty menaces from so weak a monarch and such a tottering throne. Indignant passion and arrogant pretensions are always sure to provoke contempt when they cannot excite fear; and the

ministers, in looking around them, must have seen defiance and anticipated victory, rather than alarm or apprehension, painted in the looks of their antagonists.

The omissions in this speech revealed the system of the government as much as its disclosures or threats. The ministry, on their accession to office, had announced, as the rule of government, "no concessions" to the popular cause; and those measures for the establishment of municipal and departmental institutions, on the principle of popular election, which had been introduced and withdrawn last session, were not again promised, and would certainly be opposed. The demand of these and similar measures would be called, according to the doctrine of the speech, an attack on the rights of the throne, and a culpable manœuvre to overturn it.

The language of the government, commented upon with indignation by the liberal journals, spread additional anxiety and dissatisfaction through the kingdom. As might have been expected, it rather strengthened than shook the opposition in the chamber of deputies, which gave immediate indications on which side the majority lay, by selecting its president (M. Royer-Collard) and all its vice-presidents and secretaries from the ranks of the liberals. Bnt the discussion which took place on the address, and the words of the address itself, brought the question between the minister and the national representatives to a speedy issue.

The meetings of the chamber in which the project of the address was discussed were extremely numerous, not fewer than four hundred members

being present; and the debate was more animated and vehement than any that had occurred since the restoration. The royalists, though the minority, were as bold in their defiance and as extravagant in their pretensions as if they had been sure of victory. "The charter," said one of them, "is not a consequence of the revolution; it is a gift of royalty; it is a voluntary gift, and, let me add, an unexpected gift; for what power could at the restoration have demanded so much liberty? The counter-revolution was accomplished in France when the Bourbons returned. *The whole of France is counter-revolutionary;* it would feel indignant at being considered responsible for crimes whose apologists it has doomed to opprobrium." "A great task," said the same orator (M. de Conny), "is imposed upon the ministers, to consolidate the restoration, to combat and destroy the spirit of faction, to unite the elements of an aristocratic power, and to restore to the departments the moral life of which they had been deprived." The last ministry, in his opinion, had fallen because it grasped the helm of the state with a timid hand; and the present had his confidence, because it would execute its royalist mission with firmness and intrepidity.

Another royalist (M. de Sainte-Marie) assured the chamber that none but some dozen of liberal journalists, and a part of their readers, felt any anxiety about the present state of their country, or any dissatisfaction with the government. "The great majority of the population," he said, "the third party between the liberal faction and the cabinet, consisting of thirty-two millions of Frenchmen, enjoys the

present, confides in the future, loves what exists, is fearful of changes, and knows that a progressive system is a change, as well as a retrograde system: —they cherish their king—they love to be governed by him—they repose confidence in his wisdom, and in his love for his people. They wait for the acts of the ministers; and as the only thing that they now know is, that the king has chosen them, his choice is a presumption in their favour, and not a reason for condemning them." What a contrast with the events in progress!

The liberal party, on the other hand, boldly attacked the ministry, denouncing them as the enemies of the charter, and of the public liberties. The charter, they contended, was not a simple gift of the Bourbons; it was a compact between the king and the people, it was consecrated by treaties and by solemn oaths, and it was the basis on which the dynasty rested. The minister of public instruction (M. Guernon de Ranville), who afterwards signed the ordinances, defended the cabinet in a manner that provoked vehement remonstrances and calls to order. He contended that it would be a tyranny in the chamber—an attack on the royal prerogative, to summon the king to dismiss his ministers. The right with which the crown was invested in this respect was absolute: it could not suffer restriction, it could not be abandoned without danger. "Called by the will of the king," said he, "to enter his council, we shall not leave it without the orders of the king." The address, which was finally carried against the ministry, by a majority of two hundred and twenty-one to one hundred and

eighty-one, concludes in the following words:— "Sire, the charter which we owe to the wisdom of your august predecessor, and the benefits of which your majesty is firmly resolved to consolidate, consecrates as a right the intervention of the country in the deliberation of the public interests. This intervention must be—it is, in fact, indirect, wisely measured, circumscribed within limits exactly traced, and which we shall never suffer to be passed; but it is positive in its result, for it makes the permanent agreement of the political views of your government with the wishes of your people an indispensable condition of the regular conduct of public affairs. Sire, our loyalty, our dévotedness, condemn us to say, *that this agreement does not exist.*

"An anxious distrust of the sentiments and reason of France is now the fundamental idea of the administration. It afflicts your people, because it insults them; it excites their anxiety, because it threatens their liberties.

"This distrust cannot approach your noble heart. No, sire, France no more desires anarchy than you desire despotism. She deserves your faith in her loyalty, as she reposes faith in your promises.

"Between those who misunderstand a nation so calm, so faithful, and us, who, with a profound conviction, come to confide to your bosom the sorrows of a people jealous of the esteem and confidence of their king, let the wisdom of your majesty pronounce. Your royal prerogatives have placed in your hands the means of securing between the powers of the state that constitutional harmony which is the first and

necessary condition of the strength of the throne, and of the grandeur of France."

The adoption of this address, which rendered the co-existence of the ministry and the present chamber incompatible, was hailed as a triumph by the opposition and the country. Having left the king only the alternative of dismissing the former or of dissolving the latter, his majesty ought not to have hesitated for a moment. It was plain that an assembly which had declared so strongly its distrust of the administration would not confide to its hands the resources of the state by passing the budget. It ought to have appeared equally plain, that the strong national feeling which had acted on the majority of the deputies promised the king no advantage from an appeal to the electoral colleges. A change of ministry was, therefore, the only measure left in the power of the crown to calm the agitation of the people, and to restore force to the government. But his majesty, with that fatal mixture of indecision and temerity which has always characterised him, took a middle course: he neither dismissed his servants nor dissolved the chamber. After telling the latter, in answer to its address, that he was afflicted at the want of concurrence between his views and theirs, but that his resolution could not be shaken, he ordered it to be prorogued to the 1st of September; thus increasing the difficulties of his situation, by transgressing the laws which forbid the application of money to expeditions like that of Algiers without the consent of the legislature, and by leaving the country for more than a whole year without legislative deliberations. It

was well understood, however, that the same chamber would never again meet, and that the prorogation to so distant a day was only intended to allow time to make the most advisable preparations, and to seize the most favourable moment, for a dissolution.

The political quibble by which the Polignac cabinet justified their retention of office, in opposition to a vote of the chamber, involves a question of some importance, but of no great difficulty, which was agitated during the whole interval between the prorogation of the chambers and the end of the dynasty. They allowed that the legislature might constitutionally disapprove of their acts, reject their measures, or impeach their conduct, when, in carrying into execution the royal intentions, they had rendered themselves obnoxious to the laws of the state, or had compromised the public interests. It was not, however, alleged that they gave such grounds of opposition. They had done nothing but what was in the regular routine of office; they had announced no plan or project which could create alarm, or provoke censure; they had remained within the circle of the most complete inaction. To declare against such ministers, then, before they had taken one disputable step, was not to commence a constitutional opposition to the government, but to attack the royal prerogative which selected its servants. The attack began the day after their nomination in the *Moniteur*, and was continued till it was seconded by the chamber. Nothing had occurred in the interval but an exercise of the royal choice; and therefore, if the king yielded, he surrendered his prerogative, as much as if the

article which declares it were struck out of the charter.

To this reasoning it was replied, and the reply seems satisfactory, 1st, That though the ministers had done nothing objectionable since their accession to office, their principles and character out of office were well known, and gave reasonable grounds for objecting to their appointment. If they were now silent, their past words could be quoted; if they now were inactive, their past actions declared their future policy. The legislature and the public are not to wait till mischief is committed, to demand the dismissal of men whose characters afford the strongest presumption that they will be mischievous. 2d, Even a profession of inaction, at a time when so much was required of a ministry, was in itself a disqualification. And, lastly, the very flag which the ministers held out with the words "no concessions," and their appearance at the moment when concessions had been promised, and when great measures of liberty were in progress, spoke itself a system which the country had a right to denounce as much as positive infringements of the constitution, long-tried incapacity, or acknowledged misconduct in the management of public affairs.

Condemned by the chamber of deputies, the ministry, when they had got the Algerine expedition ready for sailing, and had corresponded with the prefects on the state of the country, thought that they might be acquitted by the electors. On the 17th of May, therefore, they issued an ordinance for dissolving the chamber, for convoking the electoral colleges on the 23d of June and the 3d of

July, and for assembling the two chambers on the 3d of August. This event had been long expected, and the popular party had been engaged in active preparations; but from this time, to the conclusion of the elections, a scene of political activity and paroxysms of political energy were exhibited which are seldom witnessed even in times of revolution.

The names of the two hundred and twenty-one who voted the hostile address had been published. Their courage and constitutional principles had been applauded to the skies for two months in almost every journal in the kingdom; and their re-election was now called for, not only as a reward for their patriotism, but as a defiance of their enemies. Manuals of the electoral laws were printed by a liberal association in all the liberal papers, and profusely scattered among all the electors of the provinces. The committee for managing the elections in Paris sent round their lists of candidates for all the electoral colleges. Committees were formed in every department or electoral district to watch the proceedings of the prefects and other agents of government, to examine the published lists of electors, to restore the names of persons who had a right to vote, to detect fraud or imposition in those who had not, and to prosecute before the tribunals all infractions of the electoral laws by the aid or through the connivance of the administration. The ministry, on their side, were equally active; but their efforts were totally inefficient against the overwhelming force of their adversaries. By an almost inconceivable act of infatuation, prince Polignac had again recast his cabinet, and exchanged its only

two moderate members, M. de Chabrol and M. Courvoisier, for M. de Peyronnet and M. Chantelauze; the former the most odious name in France, and the latter an active candidate for unpopularity. The royal ordinance for effecting these changes, and for bringing baron Capelle into a newly created ministry of public works, was published on the 20th of May, only three days after the dissolution of the chamber. M. de Montbel was transferred to the department of finance, and M. de Peyronnet obtained the seals of the interior. The cabinet was finally formed to overturn the monarchy.

Nothing could equal the astonishment and indignation of the public at these nominations. It could not be contended for M. de Peyronnet, as for his colleagues, that his political principles or official conduct ought to escape censure because they were unknown. He had been for seven years a member of M. de Villèle's cabinet; and, whether from his own choice, or from the malicious dexterity of his chief, had become the instrument in bringing forward, or the advocate in defending, every hateful measure of that administration. Against him not only stood the vote of the deputies which branded his ministry with the stigma of "deplorable," but a proposed impeachment, and a refusal to pay certain expenses which had been charged to the public accounts for the improvements of his official residence. Though he had been less obnoxious on account of his principles, his browbeating and overbearing insolence in office, his audacious defiance of public opinion in the chambers, and in the intercourse of life, would have rendered it impolitic in any govern-

ment, not desirous of creating unnecessary obstructions to its progress, to accept his services.

His new position in the ministry, placing him in correspondence with the prefects and agents of the interior administration, immediately suggested the idea that he was called in to manage the elections, and to secure a ministerial majority, by the unsparing employment of fraud, terror, and violence. His zeal, energy, and capacity, which might have been useful in any other circumstances, were thus defeated by the vigilant resentment and determined resistance which his alleged intentions provoked. As, by his promotion under a chief so inferior in talent and knowledge of business, he had now not only gained a victory over his former enemies, but over M. de Villèle, who had kept him in the most galling subserviency, his whole soul was devoted to the task of procuring a triumph to the administration.

The ministers issued their circulars to all the *employés* in their different departments, commanding them to vote for ministerial candidates on pain of dismissal; thus violating every principle of electoral freedom, and declaring that the ballot, intended to conceal the vote of the elector, is no longer a protection. They likewise put a proclamation, addressed to the whole nation, in the mouth of their sovereign, to influence the voice of the country in the same unconstitutional manner. Never was any step more imprudent or dangerous than bringing forward the king as a party in an electoral struggle. If his majesty could command, where was the professed freedom of election, or the use of an appeal to the

people; if he could not, were not his name and prerogative exposed to insult when his recommendation was despised and his exhortations disobeyed?

All these arts, however, failed before the resolute purpose or exasperated feelings of the electors. By the returns of the great and small colleges, which held their meetings on the days originally fixed for the election, three hundred and twenty deputies were nominated; and out of these one hundred and eighty-six belonged to the opposition, and only one hundred and thirty-four to the ministerial side of the chamber. In the operation of the law which allowed third parties to interfere in demanding the correction of the electoral lists, and authorised an appeal from the council of prefecture to a royal court to enforce such correction, the ministerial authorities had encountered great difficulties. The government was, therefore, obliged to postpone the election of one hundred and eight deputies, in departments where such opposition occurred, from the 19th of June and the 3d of July, the periods fixed by the first ordonnances, to the 12th and 19th of July. The success of the liberals had been so decided in the first series of trials, that the postponed returns afforded the ministers no hopes of recovering the ground which they had lost. One victory led to another; and when, on the 24th or 25th of July, all the nominations had been received, the liberals could reckon on a majority of two hundred and seventy to one hundred and forty-five, without including their share of fifteen who remained doubtful. Upwards of two hundred of the two hundred and twenty-one who had voted the hostile address were

re-elected, notwithstanding the denunciations of the ministerial journals, the active interference of the government agents, and the warning of the royal proclamation. The same opposition, which the king had already dispersed, was again placed before his throne: the same deputies who had been sent to their constituents came back with a double mandate of resistance, escorted by a new levy of zealous partisans whom the country had sent to their aid; and, as if to prove that the resolution which his majesty declared *immutable* must be shaken, this overwhelming majority was pledged to the same principles as that which voted the address.

In order to appreciate the power of the instrument thus wrought with effect against the government, it is necessary to recollect the materials of which it was composed. The French electoral system was based entirely upon property, and was uniform over the whole kingdom. It admitted of no distinction of town and country voters; it had no corporation privileges, no universal suffrage, and no sham freeholders. The electoral qualification was the payment of 300 francs (or 12*l.*) a year in direct taxes, representing an income arising from real property of at least eight or ten times that sum. The number of electors was thus extremely limited, compared with the general amount of the population, not exceeding ninety thousand in a nation of more than thirty millions of inhabitants. Originally, every man possessed of this *minimum* qualification had the same right of voting as persons of the largest fortunes; but afterwards, in order to give large property a greater weight in nominating the

national representation than small property, one hundred and seventy-six members were added to the chamber, to be nominated by a fourth part of the electoral body paying the highest census. The electoral colleges thus formed were called colleges of department, or greater colleges; and the species of electoral aristocracy of which they were composed had not only a vote in this wealthier college, but retained likewise their vote in the colleges of arondissement which previously existed. Thus two fifths of the deputies were exclusively returned by persons of large incomes, who likewise had a vote in returning the rest; and the remaining three fifths, or two hundred and fifty-four members out of four hundred and thirty, were sent to the chamber by persons in the middle ranks of society. In order to free this body from the influence which government or power might exert over its suffrages, the ballot was rigidly enforced. Such a limited body of electors, deriving their qualification from property, may not always express the popular feelings or measure the political intelligence of a country; but they were not likely to favour a wild democracy, by which their influence would be destroyed, or to promote revolutionary violence, by which their estates might be sacrificed: and nothing indicates more strikingly the total breach between the governing authority and the national interests, than the fact, that with all the patronage and all the places belonging to the crown, and with all the terrors of anarchy connected with resisting it, the ministers incurred such a defeat, both at the great and small colleges.

From the meeting of the chamber to its dissolution, and from its dissolution to the termination of the elections, the public were continually reminded, by the accounts of military preparations, or the publication of official despatches, that a great accession to the national glory was about to be gained from the conquest of Algiers. And as this expedition, which was an election or party manœuvre, will be remembered long after all the other election manœuvres of the period will be forgotten, it deserves a more extended notice in the retrospect of the year.

It will for ever be a remarkable fact in history, that an unpopular cabinet and a struggling dynasty should have accomplished, in the capture of this regency, and the abolition of Barbaresque piracy, an enterprise which would have ennobled the most brilliant era of French power. It is almost superfluous to describe the provocations which these barbarians have given to Christian Europe, or to enumerate the various attempts made to check their excesses. Ever since Barbarossa established the Turkish power in the north of Africa, more than three centuries ago, the subjects of Christian states have felt themselves humiliated by the insults which they have been obliged to endure, or the recitals of Algerine atrocities, which they have been condemned to hear. The highway of nations continued to be infested by maritime banditti, at war with the human race, and alike dangerous to property and liberty,—who considered the Mediterranean as their legitimate domain, piracy as their political system, and the capture and sale of

Christians as their ordinary traffic, or regular source of state revenue. Commerce and navigation exclaimed in vain against the frightful perils to which they were subjected; and Christian charity, unable to provoke a crusade to extirpate the pirates, was obliged to form associations and to raise funds to ransom their captives. The smaller states of Italy, and the trading powers of the north, were condemned to see their ships plundered and their subjects murdered or enslaved, or were compelled to flatter the insolence and purchase the forbearance of the corsairs, by presents and tribute. The great maritime powers of England, France, and Spain always resisted their pretensions, but were sometimes subjected to their outrages. In such cases they inflicted individual vengeance, and obtained individual redress for wrongs or indignities, but did nothing for the common cause of law and humanity. They "fluttered" the vulture, but neither clipped his wings nor tore down his nest. At different congresses since 1814, projects were proposed and discussed for putting an end to African piracy, by a united expedition; but, though the holy alliance could agree about the policy of extinguishing constitutional freedom in the Peninsula and in Italy, they could not form any concerted plan for extinguishing the power or checking the barbarities of the dey of Algiers.*

* Sir Sidney Smith presented a memorial to the congress of Vienna on the necessity and the means of putting an end to Barbaresque piracy. "Whilst," says he, "attempts are made to civilise Africa by abolishing the slave trade, it is astonishing that no attention is paid to the northern coast of that

France has at last executed, alone and unaided, an undertaking which no single power has been able to perform, and which no united expedition could be brought to attempt. And though in this, as in most other instances of national exertion, the vindication of her own honour, and the interests of her own ambition, have been the motives of her conduct, the result of the conquest must be beneficial to Christianity and civilisation.

The origin of the quarrel between France and the dey is appropriately to be traced to a commercial speculation which the latter probably made

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continent, inhabited by Turkish pirates, who not only oppress the natives in their neighbourhood, but carry them and purchase them as slaves, to employ them in corsair vessels; to drag from their homes the unoffending cultivators or peaceable inhabitants of the coasts of Europe. This shameful brigandage does not only revolt humanity, but fetters trade in the most mischievous manner, as no merchant-ship can sail in the Mediterranean or the Atlantic without danger of being boarded, and having its sailors carried off as slaves." The gallant admiral enters into a description of the kind of government which exists at Algiers, of the robberies practised on merchant vessels by the pirates, of the cruelties inflicted on captives, of the interruption to trade experienced by the smaller states, and of the insults which Christian princes submit to to avoid the hostility of the dey. The barbarian thus lays Europe under contribution to his ferocity, and compels the nations to pay tribute, that their subjects may not be enslaved. The gallant admiral, having exposed the shame of Europe in submitting to such a state of things, offers himself as the chief of an expedition, which would protect the seas from piracy. He does not propose to conquer Algiers, or to colonise the country, but to blockade the Barbaresque ports, and to capture the corsairs wherever they appeared.

with the fruits of his plunder, Two Algerine merchants, the bankers of the dey, had supplied, partly from the magazines of the regency, corn and other articles to the French during their expeditions to Italy and Egypt; and the accounts between the regency and the French government remained unliquidated till the return of the Bourbons. About ten years ago, a commission was appointed to enquire into the validity and extent of these claims; and this commission awarded to the Algerine creditors of France the large sum of seven millions of francs, or about 280,000*l.* This would have satisfied the dey, had it been given him; but the greatest part of it was retained to answer the demand of French creditors against the bankers, or the regency of Algiers. The dey, who could not be made to comprehend the justice of this award, had repeatedly urged the French consul to procure from his government the payment of its acknowledged debt. The delays always interposed, and a misunderstanding with the consul respecting the rights of the French to the coral fishery at Bona, had exasperated the dey against him. He had, therefore, written to the king of France, through the Sardinian consul; and received no answer to his application. When the French consul came to wait upon him, in April 1827, on some other business, on a day of ceremony, the dey asked him in full divan why his most Christian majesty did not answer his letters? "My master," replied the consul, "has no answer to make to a man like you." This was too much to be borne. The dey could not, in circumstances similar to those of Louis XIV., throw

his fan, as that monarch threw his cane out of the window, and struck the consul. Reparation was immediately demanded by the French government, on hearing of the insult. As his highness could not consent to the humiliating terms required,—namely, the sending all the grandees of the regency on board a French ship to ask pardon of the consul, hoisting the French flag on his palace and all the forts, and saluting it with a round of one hundred cannon, agreeing that no ship under the French flag should be visited at sea, and that all the former treaties between France and Turkey, for establishments on the north coast of Africa, should be put in immediate execution;—as he could not, we say, agree to these terms, war was declared against the regency, and a blockading squadron immediately despatched to Algiers. This blockade had lasted for three years; and though it had effectually interrupted the trade, and restrained the piratical operations, of the corsairs, it had produced no effect on the pride and obstinacy of the dey.

The question at last came to be discussed with the Polignac ministry,—whether it was better to continue indefinitely an expensive and dangerous blockade, or to exchange it for a brilliant attack and a permanent conquest. The latter flattered the vanity as well as the religious feeling of the king; gave him an opportunity of shedding a ray of military glory on his falling crown; and inspired him with the idea that he was conferring a benefit on Christianity and Christendom.

When the expedition was resolved upon, a commission was appointed, consisting of naval and mili-

tary officers, to examine its chances of success, and the preparations necessary for undertaking it. About the middle of February, admiral Duperré, who afterwards commanded the naval part of the armament, was called from Brest to give his opinion, and to discuss with the commission all the questions connected with the enterprise. The admiral pointed out its difficulties, and was answered by other officers, who contended for its practicability and certainty of success. The influence of the latter, among whom was general Bourmont, the minister of war, prevailed. Orders were immediately issued to collect the military and naval forces necessary for the expedition; and France and Europe rung for two months with accounts of its preparations.

The difficulties of success where so many armaments had before failed, and the dangers of failure where only a certainty of success could warrant the attempt, produced their full influence on the promptitude of the preparations, and the grandeur of the force. The ablest men in France were consulted on the former, and the ablest officers were employed in the latter. All the resources of money, experience, and military skill were put in requisition to secure victory. Nothing was left to accident, in the preparation and equipment of the expedition; and if it escaped the elements, nothing was left to the dey but submission. The minister of war placed himself at the head of its army; the first naval officer in France, admiral Duperré, was selected to command the fleet.

By the 20th of April, 37,000 men, consisting of all arms — infantry, cavalry, artillery, and engineers

—with 4,000 horses, were assembled at the port of Toulon. The marine was ordered to collect a squadron of proportional force at the same port, consisting of ships of the line, frigates, and smaller armed vessels of all kinds, with 400 large transports, for conveying troops, horses, provisions, and forage. The following is an official list of the amount and kind of force despatched on this African conquest, with the horses belonging to each class: —

	Men.	Horses.
Staff officers - - - -	110	244
Infantry - - - -	30,420	219
Cavalry - - - - -	539	493
Artillery - - - -	2,815	1,246
Engineers - - - -	1,345	117
Train of military equipage -	882	1,302
Workmen of the army administration - -	688	
Gendarmerie - - - -	113	31
Officers of the commissariat, &c.	424	354
Total	37,331	4008

The commissariat in its preparations proceeded on the advice of admiral de Rigny, who desired its chief, baron Deniée *, to remember, that "the sterile coast to which they were going would not supply litter for their horses; and that the sea was so capricious along it, that it would more than once swamp their boats in disembarking." Provisions were made for four months, on the most ex-

* See the baron's account of the expedition, entitled, "*Précis Historique et Administratif de la Campagne d'Afrique*," &c.

tensive scale of comfort; and, in order to guard against the accidents of disembarkation on a sandy coast, and during a stormy season, the 78,645 packages, sacks, tons, or barrels in which they were contained were covered with a double water-proof envelope, by which they would be preserved from damage if dropped into the waves and washed ashore. Hospital equipments of a new kind were provided; and new covered waggons of a lighter construction, with two wheels, were made, for passing more easily through the sands.

About the beginning of May, all the transports and ships of war were collected at the isles of Hieres, and in the roads of Toulon. On the 12th of the same month the embarkation began; and by the 18th, 64,000 men and 4000 horses, composing the naval and military force of the expedition, only waited a favourable wind to set sail for the coast of Africa. The vessels of the royal marine composing the expedition consisted of 9 ships of the line, 25 frigates, 6 corvettes, 25 brigs, besides bomb vessels, smaller craft, and 8 steam boats; which latter baron Deniée calls so many naval aides-du-camp, to carry the order of the admiral.

On the 25th of July, at four o'clock in the afternoon, the wind having become favourable, the fleet set sail in three lines, in the presence of immense crowds, who had assembled on all the neighbouring heights to witness the spectacle. Probably a grander sight was never presented to the eye than this magnificent fleet of five hundred ships, filled with arms and armed men, proudly breasting the waves, and covering the ocean with its sails. The effect of its

magnificence was heightened by the impressive associations connected with its anticipated operations and final object. Bearing within its moving ramparts more than the thunder of the elements to which it was committed, it was carrying to the burning coast of Africa the fortunes of a Christian monarchy, or the fate of a barbarous power which had resisted Christendom for centuries. It required little imagination to conceive, in the distance, the tempest scattering its proud array, and burying beneath the waves more than the population of a great city; or the overthrow of a piratical state, and a way opened for the civilisation of a great continent.

On the 30th of May the first division of the fleet descried the coast of Africa; but, as the sea was high, and the ships had been separated by the storm, orders were given by the admiral to return to the Spanish port of Palma, which had been appointed its rendezvous in the contingency which had happened. The greatest part of the ships reached that port on the 2d of June, where, having collected and re-victualled, they remained till the 9th. On that day the fleet again sailed, and reached the coast of Africa on the 13th. Having passed before the town, batteries, and fortresses of Algiers, at a distance, it proceeded to the bay of Torré Chica, or Sidi Ferruch, about five leagues to the west of the city. The officers of the expedition were persuaded that all the coast would be covered with batteries, and every eye was directed to discover them; but they saw nothing but a few Turks riding along the sands. On the 14th, early in the morning, the disembarkation of the first division began, and, as well

as that of the two other divisions, was effected without resistance from the enemy. The French heard from an authentic source, that the dey was so full of confidence in the superiority of his force, that he had given no orders to oppose their landing, being assured that, if he once got them on shore, not a man would be left to carry to Europe the news of their destruction.

The place of disembarkation presented a kind of amphitheatre, rising gently towards the south-west, where the slope was rendered unequal by an infinite number of small hills covered with brushwood. A force collected on this rising ground, with batteries at proper distances, might have disputed the landing of the French with considerable effect, or rendered it very dangerous. The disembarkation of the provisions was continued, without any serious molestation or obstruction, for three days; when, on the 17th, a tempest arose, which endangered the existence of the army by threatening its means of support. The wind blew a hurricane on the coast — the rain fell in torrents — the largest ships could scarcely ride at anchor; and the embarkations of provisions were buried beneath the waves, to be thrown out on the coast, where, from the mode of preparing them, they were afterwards obtained undamaged.

On the 19th the French army attacked the enemy, who occupied an entrenched camp at Staonli, about midway between the bay of Sidi Ferruch and the city. The camp was taken, with a rich booty; and the Turks, Arabs, Bedouins, and Cabyles, who composed the army of the dey, fled in all directions.

In this battle the French loss was considerable.

they had fifty-seven killed and four hundred and seventy-three wounded. They remained in the position of Side Kalef from the 19th to the 24th, waiting their battering artillery, which was landed on the 20th, 21st, and 22d. On the 24th they were attacked by the troops of the dey, who were repulsed with little loss on the part of the French, the only officer wounded being the son of general Bourmont, the commander-in-chief, who afterwards died of his wound, and to whom his father touchingly alluded in his despatch.* The continued firing of the enemy from the broken ground and brushwood in front of the French position, between the 24th and the 29th, caused them a loss of between five and six hundred men, killed and wounded. On the 29th of June the army, having now got its battering train, advanced on the castle of the Emperor, a fortress which commands Algiers, and on the 30th opened the trenches of the siege. On the 1st, 2d, and 3d of July they continued their operations and erected their batteries. In the meanwhile an attack was made by the fleet on the forts of the sea-side and the mole, in order to withdraw the enemy's attention from the army, and to prevent the cannoniers in the city from joining those who defended the château de l'Empereur. By three o'clock in the morning of the 4th, the batteries, which had been constructed with astonishing rapidity in the face of the enemy's sharpshooters, were all ready. The artillery mounted

* "One officer has been dangerously wounded: he is the second of four sons who have followed me to Africa. I hope that he may survive, to continue his services to his king and country."

upon them consisted of 10 twenty-four pounders, 6 of sixteen pounds, 4 mortars of ten inches, and 6 of eight. The fire from the batteries opened at four o'clock. The enemy returned it with great vivacity for four hours. At eight o'clock the enemy's fire was nearly extinguished; and the French continued to batter the defences of the castle. A breach was opened at ten o'clock, when a terrible explosion took place, which blew into the air a part of the fortress. Volumes of flame, clouds of dust, and showers of stone, rose to an astonishing height from this artificial volcano. The spectacle was seen, and the shock was felt with terror, by the city and by the fleet in the bay, and the explosion is described by admiral Duperré as being heard at sea to the distance of sixty miles; yet no serious accidents happened to the besieging troops, who almost instantly proceeded to take possession of the smoking ruins. The explanation of this terrible catastrophe was, that the Turkish troops, thinking it a useless waste of life to continue the defence of the fortress after the French batteries had opened upon it, had fled to the city, and that the dey had given orders to blow up the powder magazine.

As the fortress thus occupied commanded the city, which could now be bombarded both from the fleet and from the heights, the dey saw that it was vain to continue the struggle. He therefore sent a flag of truce both to the general-in-chief and to the French admiral, to propose a cessation of hostilities and terms of peace. The terms proposed, at first, were an indemnity for the expenses of the war, and the restoration of the French possessions in the

east which had been destroyed. The French general, who received the secretary of the dey on the ruins of the château de l'Empereur, made the parley very short. He required the surrender of the Casauba, or palace of the dey, of the forts, and of the port, to French troops, as a preliminary. He pointed to the French batteries, and assured the Mussulman that a hundred pieces of cannon would soon be ready to play upon the Casauba and the city from the fort of the Emperor and the neighbouring heights, unless there was an immediate surrender. He, however, promised, on submission, to spare the life of the dey. During this interval of suspense, the terror of the inhabitants and of the Turkish militia lest hostilities should be renewed was every moment increasing. After a good deal of negotiation, a capitulation proposed by general Bourmont was accepted; and the dey only asked till twelve o'clock on the 5th, that he might have it confirmed on the advice of his council, and its terms explained. This was granted him. The firing was suspended till the following morning, when two Moors arrived at the French head-quarters with the convention ratified. By two o'clock in the afternoon the French flag waved from all the towers of the city, and from the palace of the dey. The dey himself retired to a private house which he had occupied before the commencement of the war, when he established himself in the Casauba.

The following are the chief terms of this convention. The general-in-chief of the French army engaged towards his highness to allow him his liberty, and the possession of every thing which personally

belonged to him. He was left at freedom to retire, with his family and his property, to any place that he might choose, out of Africa; and, as long as he should remain in Algiers, was to be under French protection. The same engagement was made to all the troops or Turkish militia of the dey, with the same advantages and protection. With regard to the other inhabitants of Algiers, they were to enjoy the free exercise of the Mahometan religion; their persons, property, trade, and industry, were to be protected. The French general engaged, upon his honour, to respect their women.

The success of the expedition was now complete. The seat of pirates, which had for ages been an object of indignation with Europeans, was in the hands of a Christian power. The dey and his Turkish militia were prisoners of war, who were to be allowed as a favour to transport themselves out of the country. Fifteen hundred pieces of cannon, all the corsair vessels, and all the treasures of the regency, were the fruits of the victory, or the indemnification for the expenses of the expedition.

The reports which had been current respecting the magnitude of these treasures had been exaggerated; but the amount actually found showed that it was not entirely an oriental fiction, though previously alleged to be so by the adversaries of the expedition. Authentic accounts had been received of its existence before the arrival of the troops; and perhaps the eclat of its capture constituted one of the motives for the enterprise. To see waggons loaded with ingots of gold drawn from Toulon to Paris, was no trifling temptation to ministers, who had a design

to dazzle the minds of the people, in order the more easily to abridge their liberties.

On taking possession of the Casauba, an immediate search was made for this treasure, which had been said to amount to 200,000,000 of francs, or 8,000,000*l.* sterling. The dey had kept no account of his treasure; there were found no exchequer receipts,—no registers of revenue or expense. The money, which was the fruit of taxes, tribute, or plunder, was thrown into a room by the treasurer of the regency without being counted. It was deposited in different boxes or coffers, and taken out on an order signed by the dey and his council. The French found, in all, the large sum of 48,684,527 francs, or nearly 2,000,000*l.* sterling, in ingots of gold and silver. Of this sum upwards of 43,000,000 of francs were packed up in boxes, nailed, and sent home by the ships of war. Upwards of 5,000,000 of francs, or 200,000*l.* sterling, consisting of coins current in the country, were reserved for the expenses of the army. This sum, though large, had fallen so much short of what had been expected, that the treasurer of the dey was put to the strictest examination. He, however, swore that the regency had no further pecuniary resources; that he would engage to lose his head if any money was concealed; that the people had been always deceived respecting the treasures of the palace; that for the last twenty years the expenses of the government had exceeded its receipts; and that during the three years of the blockade these receipts, either from prizes or commerce, had been reduced almost to nothing.

Besides this treasure in the precious metals or

hard cash, the merchandise in the magazines of the government, which fell into the hands of the captors, amounted in value to more than 5,000,000 of francs, or nearly a quarter of a million sterling: these consisted of wool, wax, lead, brass, and other articles, which were shipped off to Marseilles and Toulon, to be sold for the benefit of government. All these prizes were independent of the shipping and the cannon, which may be valued at several millions more, — the vessels being upwards of a dozen, and the pieces of artillery amounting to 1,512. Thus the whole booty obtained at Algiers, in money, merchandize, shipping, and munitions of war, may be valued at more than 60,000,000 of francs, or 2,500,000*l.* sterling.

The extraordinary expenses incurred by the army have been estimated at 29,500,000 francs, and those of the navy to about as much; so that the war has fed itself, and, besides the indemnity, a pecuniary advantage has been obtained by asserting the national honour, and overturning the government of a piratical barbarian.

The French government was now, therefore, put to the proof respecting its intentions as to its new conquest. The object of the expedition had been obtained: the dey had been deposed, — the national honour had been vindicated, — the expenses of the enterprise had been indemnified, — and it only remained for the French to say, whether they intended to retain Algiers as a colony, or to throw down its fortifications and to return home. Various publications had appeared in France which pointed out the advantages of African colonisation: which showed

how much France would add to her power and resources by establishing a settlement on the coast of Algiers; which required the French government to retain the conquest as a counterpoise to the influence of England in the Mediterranean; which showed the advantages of a colony within two or three days' sail of the French coast, capable of yielding all the productions of the West Indies, and which might be so useful as a station for convicts, or a retreat for the supernumerary population of the mother country. The saying of Bonaparte, "that the Mediterranean ought to be a French lake," was quoted with praise and supported with zeal; and even those who had objected to the expedition, because it was undertaken by unpopular ministers, now desired to retain the conquest, because it was the fruit of French bravery, and was supposed to have excited the jealousy of England.

A greater alarm was, perhaps, entertained by the English government, at the proposition of a French settlement on the north coast of Africa, than the possible danger to English interests could warrant. They therefore pressed Polignac and his colleagues to explain themselves on this point, and received only vague or evasive answers. The general engagement, however, of the French government was, that no permanent settlement would be attempted, although no time could be fixed for the evacuation of the regency, and no conditions determined on the manner in which it should subsequently be governed. General Bourmont proceeded, however, as if the conquest was to be permanently retained. He sent the dey to Italy in a French ship of war; he

transported the Turkish militia out of the country; he ordered the different beys, or local governors, to pay the same tribute and to do the same feudal services to the French commander-in-chief which they had done to his highness; and he prepared expeditions to reduce the different districts of the regency, where the natives showed a disposition to maintain their independence. Various commissioners were likewise nominated for settling the government, for administering justice, and for collecting the revenues in the capital, which showed the design of forming it into a permanent settlement.

The same policy has been pursued by general Clauzel, who was despatched to supersede general Bourmont as commander-in-chief, after the revolution in July. The general has organised courts of justice at Algiers, before which causes are to be tried between Mussulmans and Europeans, between the Jews and the other inhabitants of Algiers, and between Frenchmen and the natives. These courts of justice are authorised to apply French laws, or those of the regency, as well as the usages and customs of each country, as they may find most advisable. A tribunal of correctional police has likewise been established, under the presidency of a commissary-general of police and two French assessors.

An experimental farm has likewise been established in which cultivators from the interior are employed, in order to acquire a knowledge of husbandry which may be useful to their countrymen. This enterprise has been commenced by a body of shareholders, who expect the happiest results from

their undertaking. Every exertion is made to increase the confidence of the natives in the French government. Balls and other entertainments are given, by the commander-in-chief and other French officers, to the natives and to foreign residents. The bey of Titery having shown a refractory disposition, an expedition was sent against his capital, at the foot of mount Atlas, which succeeded in overthrowing his army, and in taking him prisoner. The bey commanded in person an army of six or seven thousand men, a third of whom were Turks. On his overthrow another bey was appointed, and he himself sent as a prisoner to France. General Clauzel thus enumerates, as the result of this expedition, the capture of the bey,—who had been a rallying point to the disaffected,—the occupation of his capital by a French garrison, and the passage of the mountain of Atlas, which had before been thought impracticable; all of which results, along with the tenour of his despatch, indicate a design to keep possession, not only of Algiers, but of the territories which belonged to it.

Had the French intended only to destroy the fortifications of Algiers at some future time, or to keep possession of the capital,—as the Spaniards occupy Ceuta, or the English Gibraltar,—there would have been no necessity for these expeditions into the interior, and no motive for the establishment of experimental farms. When, towards the end of the year, the recal of the troops from Algiers gave rise to a suspicion that the conquest was to be abandoned, great dissatisfaction was expressed by all the organs of public opinion. The government was

called upon to retain it as a colony, to declare Algiers a free port, to make it an asylum for all those people in Europe who are proscribed or banished for political opinions, and a receptacle for the poor or supernumerary population of France herself. It is calculated that more than twenty thousand people, whom the late events of the revolution had put in movement, and who are now destitute of employment, might be sent to the coast of Africa at less expense than be maintained at home. The climate is not warmer than the south of France; the soil is fertile, and capable of yielding all the productions of temperate or warm climates; and a French colony would become a nucleus of civilisation for the whole of that barbarous and neglected, but celebrated region.

The news of the capture of Algiers reached Paris on the 9th of July. It was brought to Toulon from the coast of Africa in about sixty hours, or two days and a half; thus showing how easy and rapid the intercourse is between France and its new conquest. The king did not wait for the arrival of the detailed despatches, but on the faith of the telegraphic communication, which stated no loss or drawback on the glory of the victory, ordered *Te Deum* to be sung all over France, and went himself in solemn procession to *Nôtre Dame* to attend the service.

CHAP. V.

FRENCH REVOLUTION OF JULY.

The time of crisis now approached, and it was necessary to adopt a resolution. The nation had been polled, and had polled against the system of ministers. The fate of the cabinet, or of the dynasty, had been drawn from the electoral urn. The country waited the result of the scrutiny, and the execution of the sentence. The victory of Algiers had given confidence to the court, and audacity to its secret advisers. If they had not the nation on their side, they made sure of the army; and absurdly believed that by the army they could subdue the nation. They were called upon by their imprudent friends to strike a blow at the factious demagogues of the chamber, as they had done at the infidel barbarians of Africa; and were assured that the liberals could be as easily dispersed by the royal power, as the Bedouins of the desert by French artillery. To act more powerfully on the king, he was reminded of the fate of his brother, Louis XVI., who was alleged to have lost his crown and his life because he had made too many concessions to republican violence, and had at too late an hour chosen the moment of resistance. He was told that his only choice lay between an act of unconstitutional vigour and the scaffold; and was reminded, amid the fumes of flattery which darkened the little judgment and

caution which bigotry had left him, of his own saying, that "he would sooner mount his horse than enter the fatal cart."

It appears, from the admission of all the ministers on their trial, that their meditated act of unconstitutional violence, or the intended *coup d'état*, which had been resisted at one time by all the ministers except prince Polignac, and till after the result of the elections by M. de Peyronnet and M. de Guernon Ranville, (the only two of the cabinet who were attached to the system of legislative discussion, because they could rely on their power of public speaking,) was finally resolved upon between the 10th and 15th of July, and that the parts of the drama were then distributed among the performers. M. de Chantelauze undertook to draw up the report to the king, which was intended to justify the ordinances, and to convince the country that it ought quietly to part with its liberties. The ordinance for changing the law of elections, and depriving the people of their electoral rights, was entrusted to the wisdom of M. de Peyronnet; and another member of the cabinet agreed to fabricate a muzzle for the press. As if conscious of being engaged in a real conspiracy, they veiled their operations in the most profound secrecy. They even drew out and copied the report and the ordinances with their own hands, lest by employing any secretary, clerk, or amanuensis their secret might transpire. This striking fact was mentioned by prince Polignac to lord Stuart, on the Monday after the publication of the ordinances, as an excuse for keeping the ambassadors of his master's allies in the dark; and was sub-

sequently confirmed in the examinations on the trial. Fire-damp is not more concealed from the miner before the fatal lamp occasions its explosion, than these decrees were from the country till the *Moniteur* of 26th July kindled the mine which blew up the throne, and scattered the supporters of the Bourbons.

While the ministry kept their ordinances a secret, no preparations for enforcing them betrayed either the existence of their plot, or their apprehensions of resistance. The garrison of Paris was not increased, and no additional troops had been drawn round the capital. It appears, from an admirable history of the military events of the revolution of July, published by an officer of the guards, that the whole troops in garrison at Paris on the 25th of July amounted only to eleven thousand five hundred and fifty men, including infantry, cavalry, artillery, fusileers, and gendarmerie: whereas, if measures had been taken a week or a fortnight before, according to the same authority, between thirty and forty thousand might have been assembled, with fifty pieces of cannon. Thus, while an appeal to military force must have appeared to sensible men inevitable, no additional military force was provided, and no accommodations were made for that on the spot. Even the commandant of the military division in which Paris is situated was absent; and the formal appointment of marshal Marmont as his successor had not been completed till he was called upon to act. Precautionary measures of a civil character seemed to be as much overlooked, in the confident system of the government, as those of a military.

Thus every thing went on in its regular course till the morning of the 26th. Letters of convocation had been sent to the peers and deputies for the royal sitting on Tuesday, the 3d of August. All apprehensions of a *coup d'état* had been for the present dissipated; and the solution of the problem involving the existence of the cabinet was supposed to be adjourned till after the meeting of the chambers. The ministers every where gave out that they meant to rule according to the charter, and to submit to all the conditions of a representative government. A great levee was held at St. Cloud on Sunday the 25th. The ministers, foreign ambassadors, and a brilliant court, assembled to pay their homage to the monarch. Some persons, accustomed to such scenes and characters, thought that they discovered an unusual appearance of anxiety in the king and his servants, beneath an affectation of more than usual satisfaction. This feeling was said to have been evinced by his majesty in a conversation with the brother of the king of Wirtemburg, who, having told him that the German sovereign had been gratified by seeing the ceremony of the prorogation of the British parliament by William IV., and was coming to see the opening of the French chambers by his majesty, thought that Charles X. gave a kind of start, like a detected conspirator, well knowing that he did not intend to open the chambers, as had been publicly announced, but not having yet any awful forebodings that he would never again open any other legislative assembly. It ought, however, to be recollected, that appearances like this, which can only be interpreted by the event, are sometimes

created after the occasion by the influence of the event itself upon the imagination.

After the levee the ordinances were signed; and the ministers returned to town with the fate of their master and their own in their portfolios. At eleven o'clock at night, M. Sauvo, the chief editor of the *Moniteur*, received an order to repair to the hotel of the keeper of the seals, and found this minister along with M. de Montbel, the minister of finance, who was one of the opponents of the ordinances, sitting in a melancholy manner, resting their heads on their hands. The former delivered the ordinances for publication; and might have learned, from the alarm and consternation of M. Sauvo on examining their contents, an indication of the manner in which they would next morning be received by an astonished and enraged people. "I am fifty-seven years of age," said the editor of the *Moniteur;* "I have witnessed all the days of the revolution; and I withdraw with deep terror to publish these decrees."

The nature of the ordinances fully warranted these alarms in every friend of constitutional rights and public order. They entirely changed or overturned the most important institutions of the state, and involved principles subversive of every security of freedom. The chamber, which had been convoked for the 3d of the following month, was dissolved before it could meet. As its approaching convocation was the great source of alarm to the court, it was necessary to begin the assault upon the constitution by depriving its members of the trust which they had just received from their con-

stituents, without waiting to see how that trust would be executed. The ordinance, therefore, which was issued on the 26th could not be called an exercise of the prerogative for the dissolution of the chamber, which had not as yet been constituted, but an attack on the rights of the electors. It was, in fact, an annulment of the choice which the electors had just made; and admitted the fact in its preamble, which declared, that in returning these deputies the electoral colleges had been misled and deceived. "Being informed," says the king, "that manœuvres have been practised on several points of our kingdom to deceive and mislead the electors, during the late proceedings of the electoral colleges," we have ordained that the chamber of deputies is dissolved.

As the last appeal to the country had only returned a more hostile chamber, it would have been absurd to convoke another legislative assembly under the same laws, and through the medium of the same colleges, as that which had been so prematurely dissolved; and the time had not yet arrived for attempting to dispense entirely with the forms of a representative government, in the face of associations determined to resist taxes if imposed by the sole authority of the monarch. It was necessary, therefore, to alter the constitution of the electoral body, so as to make the national representation a mockery; or to bring together, in the name of the people, a collective instrument of taxation formed against the people by the agents of government, and disposed to sanction all government measures. For this purpose a second ordinance annulled the

existing electoral laws, and substituted in their place another system, which nothing but infatuation could suppose that the country could endure. The chamber, composed of four hundred and thirty members, was, by a dash of the royal pen, reduced to two hundred and fifty-eight; and all the electors who had returned the members of the arondissement colleges, consisting of three fourths of the electoral body, were stripped of their electoral franchise. The departmental electors, or aristocratic colleges, who under the existing system enjoyed a double vote, were not only left in possession of their rights, but enriched with the plundered qualifications of their disfranchised brethren. The latter, composing the arondissement or popular colleges, were only allowed to present candidates to these lordly assemblies; and thus the constituent body of the whole of France was reduced to the very manageable number of about twenty thousand wealthy proprietors. Nor was this all. The ballot, which the French have always regarded as their security against power, was virtually abolished; while all security for the purity of the electoral lists was annulled, by the repeal of the law which took the decision on litigated electoral claims out of the royal courts, and placed it in the hands of the administration.

It was evident from the power which the periodical press had acquired, and to the perversion of which was ascribed all the opposition which the government had encountered, that violations of the law so outrageous, and attacks on established institutions so dangerous to every remaining right, could not be quietly endured, unless the journals were

silenced, and the expression of opinion by books or pamphlets enchained. Another ordinance, therefore, re-established the censorship of the journals, which had been abolished by law; deprived the proprietors of newspapers of the right of publishing them without an authority from the government; and ordered the presses and types of those published without such previous license to be seized, destroyed, or put out of service by the police. No publication under twenty sheets could be published without the previous authorisation of the minister of the interior, or the prefects of departments. The authority to publish journals might be granted or withdrawn at the pleasure of the crown. Thus, not a vestige of freedom was left to the press. Every stricture on the conduct of power was forbidden. Every unauthorised communication of thought or knowledge was interdicted. The property vested in periodical publications and political works of a graver class was confiscated; and France was placed, in respect to the action of government on literary productions, or the expression of political opinion, in the same situation as Turkey or any other despotic state.

Of the two remaining ordinances published on the 26th of July, one convoked the electoral colleges, modelled on the new system, for the 6th and 13th of September, and the chamber elected by them for the 28th of the same month; and the other added insult to injury, by restoring to office or honours the most obnoxious agents of the Villèle administration.

The first feeling excited by the publication of

these ordinances was that of astonishment at the audacity, and indignation at the criminal purposes, of the cabinet. The people could scarcely believe their senses in reading them. Their minds were confounded by the blow; and their personal reflections or conversation could only run upon vague ideas of their immediate and remote consequences. To submit, appeared to sanction despotism for ever; to resist, was immediate civil war. Had the ordinances appeared at different periods, and at considerable intervals, after a preparation had been made for one encroachment by the endurance of another, the insult would have been less sensibly felt, and the policy of resistance at each successive step would have become more doubtful; but to abolish the constitution in one day, — to destroy every security for national rights, and to arrest at once the intellectual movement of a great people by a page in the *Moniteur*, — seemed such an undisguised and excessive outrage on the part of the court, as left no alternative but resistance or slavery on the part of the people.

This flagitious attempt could scarcely have been made at a more favourable season for the people of Paris. To conduct the elections which had recently been concluded, committees and associations had been formed in the interests of the different candidates; and a great proportion of the liberal inhabitants of the capital, of a certain rank and influence, had been accustomed to assemble in their different quarters to discuss their political interests, and to concert their common projects. This electoral machinery remained after the work had been com-

pleted for which it had been made. About eight or ten thousand of the chief proprietors, manufacturers, bankers, merchants, professional men, artists, and great retail dealers of Paris, with an almost unlimited power over the lower orders, whose industry they employed, and whose opinions they directed, were ready to enter into a combined denunciation of the ordinances, or to second any movement of resistance that might be made to their execution. Other more zealous and compact bodies, who now boast that they have been conspiring against the Bourbons for fifteen years, were prepared to enter the lists. We allude to the popular and political societies, whose operations and influence have only become fully known since the police of the Bourbons has been withdrawn, under which they were forced to plot in secret. Mixed with these parties, or forming societies of their own, appeared the great body of persons who live by the exercise of their talents in the arts, sciences, and literature, all of whom the agitating interests and discussions of the period had converted into politicians, and the great majority of whom the arbitrary principles and religious bigotry of the court had converted into liberals. The class of journalists, who in Paris are more numerous and powerful than in any other capital of Europe, were all partisans of the charter by profession, and nearly all enemies of the Bourbons from ambition or conviction. The same political tendencies were impressed on the numerous and influential portion of Paris society, who, as members of the Institute, or of the different academies,—as barristers and officers connected with

the tribunals, — as writers for the stage, or men of letters in general, — are to be found in almost every company, enjoying the credit and exercising the power incident to their position. Of the newly elected deputies, too, a considerable number were already in Paris; and, thanks to the letters of convocation, a greater number were on the road.

The appearance of the *Moniteur* with the fatal ordinances on Monday sent all these persons to confer with their friends on the course of their future conduct, or to concert means of rousing their fellow-citizens to a sense of their danger, and inspiring them with sentiments of resistance. Nothing, however, was determined at any of these meetings, beyond general protestations against the illegality of the ordinances, and plans of hypothetical opposition. The ministers remained at their hotels, and received their visits as usual. The *Institute* held one of its ordinary sittings in the forenoon, and was attended, among others, by marshal Marmont, who expressed to his friend M. Arago, the astronomer, his indignation at the infatuation of the court, and the folly of those decrees, which, on the following days, he was to support by massacre and bloodshed. The exchange was crowded, and the funds fell more than three per cent — less than might have been expected. It was universally believed that no government could long survive its deviation into such violent and illegal courses; but nobody foresaw the peculiar obstacles which would arrest its career, or the precipice into which it would fall.

At this moment, and among the higher classes

of society, there appeared no prospect of an immediate revolt. The barricade and the *tricolour* did not enter into the conception of the most sanguine or inventive partisan of revolutions. It was only when the shell was thrown into the manufactories and workshops of the fauxbourgs, or into the busy quarters of Paris, and menaced the haunts of industry with an undefined and immeasurable calamity, that those classes of society were roused who must be the instruments, whoever are the leaders, of revolutions.

As the *Moniteur* alone contained the ordinances, and as that official journal is little read except among official people, it was late on Monday before the news of their publication was generally known. The industrious quarters of the capital were not made generally acquainted with the fact till the following morning. The first day did not, however, pass over without great activity among political people, and some disturbances by riot. Despatches were sent off by their friends to several of the deputies within a day's journey to Paris; among the rest, to general Lafayette, who was at his country seat of La Grange, and to M. Lafitte, who was at the distance of forty leagues. Those deputies who were in Paris assembled in the evening at the house of M. Puyravau, one of their number. Mobs collected in the Palais Royal and some other parts of the town; and the hotel of prince Polignac, on the Boulevards, and of the minister of finance, in the rue de Rivoli, suffered some damage. Nothing, however, happened to give any decisive omen of the events of the following three days, or to alarm

the court at the fatal step which it had taken. The king, as was seen in the court circular of Tuesday morning, believed every thing so much in the ordinary course, that he went on a hunting excursion to Rambouillet, along with the dauphin—both destined to visit that residence on the following Monday in very different circumstances and characters. The conduct of this infatuated prince, both immediately before and after the issue of his fatal ordinances, affords a surprising proof of his profound ignorance of the feelings, opinions, and character of his people. The Egyptian hermit standing on his solitary pillar in the desert was not more isolated from the knowledge and sympathies of his countrymen, than Charles X. on his divine-right throne was from all acquaintance with the state of France.

By the morning of Tuesday the 27th, the news of the virtual abolition of the charter was generally spread, and angry crowds began to collect in the forenoon at all the places of public resort. If the people had not learned the overthrow of the freedom of the press on the first day, through the medium of the official paper, they knew it on the second by the non-appearance of almost every other journal. None of the journals could, by the ordinance for establishing the censorship, be published without an authority from the minister of the interior. Some of those journalists whose property was of most value, and whose timidity increased in proportion to the amount of their threatened loss, had solicited the requisite permission; while others, with more courage, and playing for a smaller stake, resolved to publish

in spite of the prohibitions of the ordinance. The former did not appear, because they had not obtained their permission in time; and the latter did not appear, because they were prevented by the police. Nothing could better afford to the inflamed minds of the people at once an indication of the ruin of a branch of business maintaining a great number of persons, and an evidence of the darkness of despotism into which the government had resolved to plunge the nation, than the cessation of the printing press. The printers and compositors, therefore, employed at the journals, being told that their "occupation was gone," by the tyrannical and illegal violence of the administration, were turned into the streets as rioters or insurgents. But this was not the only trade which supplied heroes to the revolution, by ceasing to employ its workmen on account of the invasion of the constitution.

Paris is not only the capital of a great country, but is a great manufacturing town. Besides the fauxbourgs on the north and east, nearly altogether occupied with manufacturing workmen, several quarters of the city are chiefly inhabited by them. The masters and employers of nearly all this very numerous body are liberals, and consequently gave permission and encouragement to their men to testify against the acts of government, and to swell the crowds destined to resist its bravest defenders. Thus was an insurrectionary army, ready made, thrown out on the streets of Paris, and prepared to make up by courage and resolution what it wanted in union and discipline.

As the periodical press was first attacked, the re-

sistance, which was to end in the most marvellous victory of liberty over despotism, began on the part of the liberal journalists, who showed on this occasion that the taunts of their enemies could be verified, and that *journalisme* was really a new power, with belligerent as well as political rights, and, like the Minerva of the ancients, possessing the attributes of wisdom and war. Forty-four editors of the daily papers issued on the morning of Tuesday a protest against the ordinances, which, had the contest ended in a different result, would have been visited with the penalties of treason. In this bold manifesto they tell the people, that "to-day the government has violated legality, and that their obedience is thus dispensed with." "We shall endeavour," say they, "to publish our papers without asking the authorisation required of us. We shall endeavour by every means in our power to secure their delivery in all parts of France. This is our duty as citizens; and we will fulfil it." This uncompromising and energetic declaration concludes in the following words, well adapted to form the motto on the rallying standard of revolt: "*The government has lost to-day that legal character which commands obedience.* We *shall resist* it, therefore, in all that relates to us; and it rests with France to judge to what extent her own resistance is to proceed."

This paper was extensively circulated, and gave to all the proceedings which followed its publication a political object and a patriotic direction, which raised the minds of the mob above the low aims of rapine or pillage,—converted the rioter of former times into the champion of liberty,—taught the most

disorderly rabble that they were acting in a great drama of public right,—and engaged their pride and ambition to respect private persons and property, by pointing to the armed forces and tyrannical ministers of Charles X. as their only enemies, and to the conquest of the crown as their only reward. Hence every stone that was thrown, and every shot that was fired, on the part of the populace, entitled the actor to consider himself as an instrument of freedom and the charter, whose glorious cause would be disgraced by any admixture of dishonesty, cruelty, or rapacity. Those whose works they every morning read and admired had given the signal of combat, and stood behind to award the palm of victory.

This protest, which was read to crowds in the Palais Royal and other places of public resort, was received with shouts of applauding patriotism at every sentence. The attack made on the offices of two of the journals, *Le National* and *Le Temps*, for persisting in their publication, in defiance of the ordinance, was the first practical display of force in support of the new regulations, and afforded the first opportunity of trying the spirit which had dictated the protest. A commissary of police, with some police agents and gendarmes, proceeded to the houses where these journals were printed, and demanded admission to seize the printing-presses and types, according to the provisions of the ordinance. The admission was refused, and the publication proceeded in the presence of the armed force. The journals containing the protest were thrown out of the windows in great profusion, eagerly snatched up

by the groups which had collected to witness the outrage, and distributed among the coffee-houses, or the crowds at a distance from the scene of action. As the commissary, with his myrmidons, could not break open the door, they sent for various blacksmiths in the neighbourhood to pick the lock; and all these persons refused to act. In the case of the *Temps*, the director of this odious attack was obliged to send for the wretch who rivets the chains of the galley slaves, before he could accomplish his purpose. "The mechanics," says the journal alluded to, "had learned from the magistracy to respect the laws; and one of them listened to the reading of an article in the code, but refused to assist the police commissary in breaking into the domicile of a citizen." An entry was at last effected, and outrages perpetrated on the premises proportioned to the resistance offered. The types were scattered, the presses broken, and all the machinery of the establishment rendered unserviceable. But this struggle of the journalists against the police—of law against illegal violence—though it ended in an apparent victory to the latter, was, from its circumstances, a real triumph to the former. The scene lasted several hours. The conduct of the journalists brought the question to an issue before enraged crowds, who applauded their courageous resistance; the tendency of the ordinances received its best commentary in the eloquent protestations of those who defended their property against these illegal enactments; the invasions of the police were regarded by great assemblages in the light of housebreaking or burglary: and so strong was their sympathy with those whom

they regarded as robbed or outraged, that many of the spectators offered their addresses, to appear as witnesses, when the agents of government should be brought before the tribunals of the country for trial. It was easy to foresee how a struggle of this kind must end, when the law which is attempted to be violated by power is supported by the citizen.

With the exception of these endeavours to resist the ordinances by the journals above mentioned, nothing important took place on the forenoon of Tuesday. Immense crowds of the working classes, thrown out of employment, collected from all quarters towards the Palais Royal and the adjacent streets, towards the Tuilleries and the hotels of the ministers, and filled the squares, gardens, and public walks, where they usually assembled for conversation or curiosity. The feeling by which they were universally actuated was the same—a deep-rooted hatred of the government, and a vague determination of resistance. As the police authorities could not see these elements of disturbance increasing without alarm, the gendarmes rode through the most crowded thoroughfares to disperse them, without effect. Towards three in the afternoon, the Palais Royal and other enclosed public places were cleared; but the assemblages in the streets every moment increased. The gendarmes were every where treated with insult—their orders were every where disregarded. The most treasonable and violent language and proposals were pronounced with confidence, and adopted with enthusiasm; while the defenders of the government were limited to the small number who wore its uniform, and who on

this account were regarded as the enemies of the people. It was evident that the usual means of repressing tumult would not now suffice, and that a larger force than the corps of infantry and mounted gendarmes, to whom the guardianship of the public peace had been entrusted, must be called in to drive back to their homes the overwhelming assemblages which had inundated the chief thoroughfares of the capital. The hotels of some of the ministers had been already attacked; and the official residence of M. de Polignac, who that day gave a grand dinner to his colleagues, was only protected by a garrison in its court-yard or rooms.

It was not till this time that the military force was called to resist a power against which it was destined to be shattered to pieces. So confident had the infatuated authors of the ordinances remained in the unaided success of their enterprise, — so little did they contemplate resistance to their violations of the charter, that, as we have mentioned before, they had made no provision for deriving an effectual support from the troops at their disposal. Marshal Marmont, who commanded them, did not receive his commission till the morning of Tuesday; and did not send any orders to the barracks of the garrison to put the troops under arms till half-past four o'clock in the afternoon of that day. The staff-officer of the guards, who has published an account of the military events of the revolution, states this fact with precision; and his testimony is confirmed by the depositions of witnesses examined on the trial of the ministers. The garrison then consisted of three regiments of infantry Swiss guards, having

eight battalions, and three thousand eight hundred men; of two regiments of cavalry, guards, cuirassiers and lancers, consisting of eight squadrons, and eight hundred men; of four regiments of the line, the 5th, 50th, 53d, and 15th, with eleven battalions, four thousand four hundred strong; of eleven companies of *fuseliers sédentaires*, eleven hundred strong; and of the infantry and cavalry *gendarmerie*, the former seven hundred, and the latter six hundred strong; with an artillery force of eight guns and four howitzers, served by one hundred and fifty men. This force, afterwards increased by about five hundred men of a regiment of the guards from St. Denis and Vincennes, and three squadrons of grenadier guards from Versailles, was, we are assured by the staff-officer, all the military array which took part in the events of the revolution.

We have thus a force of about twelve thousand men, not one half of whom could be trusted, to resist the movements of a great capital, with an excited population, the most brave and warlike in the world,—a considerable portion of which had been in the army, and fifty or sixty thousand of which could be immediately armed.*

* M. le baron Capelle, one of the ex-ministers, who has printed a pamphlet entitled, "La Vérité sur le Revolution," tells us that the troops only amounted to eight thousand men; and that on Wednesday morning the insurgents had a force of forty thousand armed with muskets, and a much greater force armed with sabres, pikes, hatchets, and other instruments. The baron adds, with wonderful simplicity, "Such an organisation, such a development of force, executed with such rapidity, only proved too strongly that the conspirators were prepared long beforehand; that they had collected their means,

About five o'clock on Tuesday afternoon, eight battalions of the line, six battalions of the guards, four squadrons of cavalry, and four pieces of artillery, were marched to the *place du Carousel* in front of the Tuilleries, to the place de Louis XV., and to the Boulevards, the crowds having increased in the rue St. Honoré, the rue Richelieu, and about the Palais Royal, to such an extent as to render the streets impassable, and to defeat every attempt of the gendarmerie to clear them. As yet the populace had no arms, but sticks or stones; but it was apprehended that they would break open the shops of the gunsmiths near the Palais Royal, and supply themselves. The national guards, when they were disbanded in 1827, had retained their arms; and it was imagined that thirty or forty thousand muskets were thus in the hands of the citizens: but as yet no armed or organised resistance had been offered to the gendarmerie or the troops. The immense and tumultuous population which had inundated the streets, and interrupted communications or business in this busy part of the town, had as yet created no alarm but by their expressions of disaffection, — no inconvenience but by their numbers. On the St. Germain side of the river all was tranquil. The Boulevards were clear, except about the hotel of prince Polignac, on which repeated attacks had been made; and the only act of violence yet

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and waited the favourable moment for the explosion." If the people had made such preparation, how had they escaped the vigilance of the police; and what can excuse the government for not being better prepared itself, when it gave occasion to such an explosion?

committed, which could be considered a prelude to the war about to commence, was the disarming of the guard and the burning of the guard-house in the square of the Exchange.

The scene immediately changed on the appearance of the guards to reinforce the gendarmerie, about six or seven o'clock in the evening. Detachments of infantry, preceded by lancers and gendarmes, advanced from the *Carousel* to the rue *St. Honoré*, and were hailed with insults and cries of *Vive la charte!* The cavalry are said to have replied to these shouts with brutal outrage, trampling on the people who could not get out of their way, and striking them with their sabres. Showers of stones, tiles, and other missiles, avenged the people on their assailants. A fowling-piece is said to have been fired from the English hotel in rue *St. Honoré*, and to have provoked the first volley from a detachment of the guards, which killed an Englishman of the name of Foulkes, and two servants who were in the room with him. Another more powerful detachment, in advancing along the same street, encountered the first barricade, formed by one of the long coaches called an *omnibus* thrown across the street. Protected by this barricade, which stopped the advance of the cavalry, the people showered pavement stones and all sorts of missiles on the soldiers.

It is proper to remark here, that, as it appears from the trial of the ministers, no peace-officer, no civil force accompanied the troops; that the usual proclamation, summoning mobs to disperse, similar to our riot act, was not read; and that the troops

were at once committed in a murderous contest with the people, without any interference of the magistrate, or the observance of any of those formalities which should precede the employment of arms. This has justly been made a cause of reproach to the minister of the interior, or the prefect of police; though it is not likely that any summons would have had the effect for which such forms of warning are intended. The fermentation was so great and general, that the action of the police was paralysed; while the prefect, along with his commissaries, were so odious, that by their appearance they would have exposed their lives to danger, without having any power to overawe or disperse the mob. It appears from the evidence of persons connected with the police, delivered on the trial of the ministers alluded to, that the orders of arrest issued against the forty-four or forty-five journalists who published the protest could not be executed, from the universal resistance of the moment.

The summons made to the people behind the barricade to desist from hostilities was only answered by additional showers of stones. The officer commanding the detachment ordered the troops to fire volleys, by which one man was killed and several wounded. The detachment sent to assist the gendarmerie in the place of the Palais Royal, and the adjacent streets, was still more precipitate and sanguinary in its attacks. The crowds shouting "*Vive la charte!*" were attacked without provocation, and sabred without mercy, by squadrons of cavalry. At the corners of the streets of *Valois*,

Chartres, *Lycée*, and *St. Thomas du Louvre**, two detachments of the third regiment of Swiss guards fired repeated volleys on the people, by which a great number of persons were wounded, and one woman was killed, whose body was taken up and carried through the streets, to excite the people to insurrection and vengeance.

At this early stage of the contest, the troops of the line evinced that reluctance to act against their fellow-citizens which ended in their refusal to support the government, and left the defence of the ordinances to the guards or household troops alone. A detachment of the 5th regiment, being marched into the place of the *Palais Royal*, was hailed with applause by the mob; and, as appears in the evidence of one of the witnesses at the late trial, engaged not to fire on it, though they should be ordered. The early manifestation of this spirit of defection, and the sympathy with the feelings of the people manifested by the troops of the line, should have warned the ministers and military authorities of the inevitable failure of their enterprise.

By the repeated attacks of the guards on unarmed citizens in the open places, and the formidable charges of cavalry through crowded streets, the multitude, though not intimidated, was dispersed towards night-fall. The great body of the troops were marched to their barracks; and the people hastened to prepare for the terrible struggle, by which they were to secure the national liberties,

* See the statement of three witnesses on the trial.

and avenge the excesses of military violence on the following two days. The success of this first day's operations, and the comparative facility with which the streets had been cleared by charges of cavalry and volleys of musketry, seemed to have produced on the minds of marshal Marmont and the ministry effects and impressions apparently contradictory or inconsistent. The former wrote to the king in terms of congratulation and confidence; while the latter held a council at the hotel of prince Polignac, defended only from popular invasion by pieces of artillery and squadrons of horse, to declare the capital in a state of siege. The confidence of the marshal is said to have been shared by the prime minister, though compelled to take this extraordinary measure to secure their common triumph.

It seemed but a small sacrifice to those infatuated men, for the enforcement of their illegal decrees, and the establishment of their violations of the constitution, to suspend the operations of all law and justice at once — to deprive the chief seat of the monarchy of its magistrates and its tribunals — to treat its inhabitants as foreign enemies — to subject them to military violence, and execute them by military commissions! The cruel ordinance for effecting these objects was drawn up at this cabinet meeting, and ordered to be carried to St. Cloud, for the king's signature, the following morning; the last ordinance which the ministers were ever destined to draw up, or their master to sign, against their country.

This was the day of preparation; and though little had been done, a great deal had been learned, for the

ultimate success of the popular cause. Persons of all ranks had seen that the instinct of resistance was general and irrepressible; that the military atrocities which had been perpetrated to put it down had only exasperated resentment, without producing intimidation; that the character of treason or sedition had been effaced from the efforts of insurrection, by the universal conviction of the illegal conduct of the government against which it was directed; that a fit instrument had been provided for checking or overturning the ministry, in the spirit of the immense multitudes who shouted *Vive la charte!* under the fire or sabres of its only supporters, provided arms could be put into their hands; that while those who in ordinary tumults would be called the rabble exposed their lives from passion, instigation, or vengeance, the upper classes of society would convert them into patriots, by applauding their principles and seconding their exertions; and that the minds of the lower classes having got only one idea and one impulse—to maintain legal order against the perfidy and violence of power—the institutions of the country would come out safe from the apparent anarchy of the conflict. The accidental erection of some barricades in the rue St. Honoré, and adjacent streets, had shown the people the benefit which they could derive from similar ramparts against the advances of cavalry; and the facility with which the military posts were taken gave them the command of arms, and opportunities of making their preparations without interruption.

The operations of Tuesday terminated by the destruction of all the lamps of the town; so that, during

the few brief hours of a summer night, the citizens could not be molested in their movements by the patroles of the gendarmerie or troops.

Imagination cannot picture a more awful or interesting situation than that of Paris on the night which intervened between Tuesday evening and Wednesday morning. The whole force of the garrison had been displayed, and was found not sufficient for a less extensive service, though the citizens were not aware of its amount, and none of its battalions had yet declared for their cause. Martial law had been decided on, but had not yet been proclaimed. The troops had only been victorious because the people were not yet armed. The civil authorities had ceased to act, and the tribunals had been closed. A considèrable portion of the deputies had, in their protest, erected their standard against the executive in the midst of a city declared in a state of siege. The directors of public opinion had boldly proclaimed that the social compact was broken, and that obedience was no longer a duty. The national guard had begun to look for their arms and uniform. The people were providing themselves with the best weapons they could find. Councils were held to concert measures of resistance; and in the darkness of this terrific night the fauxbourgs of the French capital decided the problem of a revolution, to overthrow the dynasty of the Bourbons, and to shake many of the thrones of Europe.

On the Wednesday morning all was activity and agitation at the dawn of day. It was evident that the question of war had been decided by the citizens. The crowds who appeared in the streets were armed.

The gunners' shops had been broken open, and their contents distributed among the people. It was announced that stores of arms might be found in the theatres: thither the people repaired, and were supplied. The different posts of the gendarmes had been overpowered, and their muskets placed in the hands of the captors. The arsenals and the powder magazine were likewise in the hands of the people. All those who possessed arms either used them themselves, or gave them up to persons who required them. Small parties of the national guard appeared in uniform; and the tricoloured flag—so long proscribed but so fondly remembered, the symbol of revolution and military renown, at once the monument and the prophecy of national independence—was raised amid shouts of adherence to that charter which was granted to the nation as an indemnity for the glory which their colours had lost, and which was now to be defended under these colours against the monarch who had resolved by perfidious violence to abolish both. The appearance of the national guard and the national flag, like the publication of the protests of the journalists and deputies, gave to the contest the character of a legal resistance in the eyes of those whose courage might have been shaken at the thoughts of rebellion.

It was late in the morning before the troops were marched from their quarters, and formed in order of battle. The citizens had therefore time to arm in safety. The crowds collected were soon more formidable than on the previous evening; and the class of the people who composed them was somewhat improved. Nothing like combination, however,

appeared in their plans, or discipline in their movements. Each man seized the warlike instrument which he could best use, or which came most readily into hand. Some bore fowling-pieces; others military muskets; others, pistols, pikes, or swords. Their enthusiasm for the preservation of their institutions was their only common feeling, and the military supporters of the Bourbons their only object of attack. Many of the most active combatants were very young, the most distinguished being often under twenty. Their families did not restrain their courage from fears of their safety. Their mothers excited them to the conflict, and their fathers or relatives accompanied their movements and shared their dangers. They went forth as on a hunting excursion, and considered the king's guards as the game at which to fire. The shops had begun to be partially opened in the morning; but the increasing confluence of armed multitudes soon caused them to be shut, and put an end to all business except that of arms. Large detachments from the fauxbourgs St. Antoine and St. Marceau proceeded to occupy the place before the Hôtel de Ville, that before the Palais Royal, the quays, and other open spaces. A party took possession of the towers of Nôtre Dame, and hoisted on their top the national colours.

A little before nine o'clock, marshal Marmont, who had now got his ordinance declaring Paris in a state of siege, led forth his forces to execute the functions with which he was entrusted; but before he actually engaged, he wrote the following letter to the king:—

"I had the honour last night of giving your ma-

jesty an account of the dispersion of the groups which disturbed the tranquillity of Paris. This morning they have again formed, more numerous and menacing than before. *It is no longer a riot, but a revolution.* It is urgent that your majesty should take the means of pacification. *The honour of the crown may yet be saved. To-morrow, perhaps, it will be too late.* I take the same measures to-day as yesterday. The troops will be ready at noon. I wait with impatience your majesty's orders." No orders came, no pacification was proposed, and the work of slaughter went on. Six battalions of the French guards formed in order of battle in the Carousel, along with three squadrons of lancers, and the whole of his artillery. Two battalions of Swiss guards were drawn up in the place de Louis XV., on the other side of the gardens of the Tuilleries. Three regiments of the line, the 5th, 50th, and 53d, received orders to occupy the place Vendôme, and to extend along the northern Boulevards, as far as the Bastile, communicating with the cuirassiers of the guard stationed between the Bastile and the bridge of Austerlitz. The remaining regiment of the line (the 15th) was ordered to occupy the place of the Pantheon and the Palace of Justice on the south, and the place de Grève on the north of the river.

It seems to have been the object of the marshal, as it subsequently appeared, to occupy the whole line of the interior Boulevards, particularly on the north; to retain possession of the squares or open places of the Pantheon, the Palace of Justice, the Hotel de Ville, the Palais Royal, the Louvre, the place Vendôme, and the rue de la Paix; and to

keep open the communications between these posts, by the great thoroughfares of the rue Richelieu, the rue St. Honoré, the rue St. Denis, from the porte St. Denis on the north to the rue St. Jacques on the south side of the river. As many of his troops as he could spare were destined for that service. His own head-quarters continued at the Tuilleries during the whole of the contest; while strong detachments occupied the Champs Elysées, and kept free his communications with St. Cloud and the barrière de l'Etoile. What object he could propose to gain by extending his line so far, and leaving his central position almost unprotected, does not very plainly appear. He must have imagined that the mere demonstration of an armed force, in the different quarters through which it was to traverse, would be sufficient to disperse the terrified multitude. If he had not been deceived in this respect (as it appeared that he was, from his confident letter to the king on the Tuesday evening), he would never have ordered his troops to march through narrow streets, where, unable to defend themselves, they were exposed to an incessant fire from windows, courts, and passages; where their advance was every moment interrupted, or their retreat cut off, by barricades, erected as if by enchantment; and where, though they had been successful, and passed, in the phraseology of Mr. Wyndham, through an "unresisting medium," to the place of their destination, nothing could have been gained but a fatiguing promenade, amid the insulting shouts of the populace, the frightful noise of the tocsin, and the rattling of the artillery carriages. The posts of the town had been already dis-

armed; the arsenal taken and pillaged; but neither public nor private property, beyond that consisting in ammunition and arms, had as yet been threatened.

After having despatched the four regiments of the line on the service which we have mentioned, in which they did nothing to support the guards and gendarmerie, marshal Marmont ordered the following movements with the rest of his forces; a statement which we copy from the luminous work of the staff officer to whom we have already alluded, the accuracy of whose descriptions appears as unquestionable as their perspicuity and ability:—

"I. A column of one battalion, two guns, and two squadrons of horse grenadiers, were to move from the Champs Elysées to the church de la Madelaine, and thence follow the Boulevards as far as the rue de Richelieu, and return to the Champs Elysées.

"II. A second column, consisting of a battalion of guards, two guns, and three squadrons of cavalry, was to follow the rue de Richelieu to the Boulevards; then, turning to the right, follow the line of the Boulevards to the porte St. Antoine; and thence return back by the rue St. Antoine to the Hôtel de Ville; of which another column, marching by the quays, would be already in possession.

"III. Two other battalions of guards, two pieces of cannon, and thirty gendarmes, were to proceed to the Marché des Innocens; thence one of these battalions was to diverge to the left up the rue St. Denis to the porte St. Denis, and return to the Marché des Innocens; where the second battalion, which in the mean time was to diverge to the right as far as the place du Châtelet, should have returned to meet it:

this whole column would then have waited in that position for fresh orders.

" IV. And finally, a fourth column, consisting of one battalion of guards, a half squadron of lancers, and two pieces of cannon, supported by the 15th light infantry, were to maintain the Hôtel de Ville, under the orders of a major-general.

" Thus the marshal would have involved all his troops at immense distances from each other, and without the possibility of mutual co-operation and support, and involved them, too, in the most intricate parts of the city, in narrow and crooked streets, between rows of houses of the greatest height, whose population was at once the densest in number and the most daring in spirit; and he left ungarrisoned, and, if I may so say, dismantled, the Louvre, and the Tuilleries, and the Champs Elysées, in all which, during this operation, hardly the amount of a single battalion remained. Dispositions so absurd, and so contrary to all possible rules, created suspicions of treachery on the part of the marshal—but unjustly: there is not a shadow of reason for such a suspicion; the truth is, he had *lost his head.*"

The first column performed the service entrusted to it without any advantage to the royal cause, but without any loss to its own numbers. It had not to pass through narrow or crooked streets, nor to enter a quarter inhabited by the lower orders.

The second advanced through the rue Richelieu, and along the Boulevards, through a dense crowd, without encountering much opposition till it reached *porte St. Denis,* where it was fired upon, both from

the streets, from the houses, and from the top of the arch. As it advanced towards the Bastile the firing became brisker; and, in order to repel their assailants, not only the infantry and lancers, but the artillery also, were compelled to fire. The citizens in this quarter had begun to erect barricades, which impeded the advance of the cavalry; and, when they passed, continued the work so effectually as to render the return of the column by the same route perilous, if not impossible. The numbers of the insurgents multiplied, and their boldness increased, as the troops approached the Bastile and the street St. Antoine. The open space called the *place de la Bastile* was the scene of a sanguinary engagement. The people fired upon the troops from the windows of the houses, and from the corners of the streets, with unremitting perseverance; while the officer who commanded the division could neither advance by the barricaded street of St. Antoine to the Hôtel de Ville, nor return by the Boulevards, through which he had passed from the Tuilleries. He was therefore obliged to proceed onwards by the Boulevards of the east, to cross the bridge at the *Jardin des Plantes*, and to return by the other side of the river. This second column, therefore, after encountering considerable loss, and surmounting great obstacles, had entirely failed in accomplishing even the intelligible object on which it was sent. It had paraded the weakness and inefficiency of the Bourbon guards and artillery before the civic battalions of the suburbs; it had taught them the advantage of the barricades, as the ramparts of liberty; and

having relieved them by its retreat from all fear of another visit, enabled them to go and support their brethren struggling in the interior of the city.

The third division of Marmont's army, which pursued its route, with its two pieces of cannon, through the rue St. Honoré, to reach the Marché des Innocens, in the heart of the poorest and bravest population of Paris, encountered greater losses. It was exposed to a brisk fire from the windows of the houses, from passages, alleys, and corners of the streets. Paving-stones, taken up to the first and second floors, were showered down on the heads of the soldiers, while barricades impeded their advance. The military force, being obliged to observe discipline and to keep together, presented a broad mark to the civic sharp-shooters; while the latter escaped from the aim of those whom they had assailed. The battalion of this column destined to proceed to *porte St. Denis* accomplished its order with difficulty, and after severe losses, but was unable to return by the Boulevards of the north to the Tuilleries, and was obliged, in order to get back, to proceed to a line of road beyond the barriers. The other part of the column remained in the market-place for several hours, exposed to the fire of the populace, hemmed in by rising barricades, and almost enveloped in gathering masses of armed citizens. From this position it could only be extricated by fresh assistance from the Tuilleries. This was the most sanguinary part of the conflict which took place on Wednesday, with the exception of the twelve hours' struggle at the Hôtel de Ville. The slaughter of people was

great: the guards had exhausted all their cartridges before they effected their retreat. A monument of the courage of the people, and of the deadly effect of the military firing, is found in the graves of seventy persons who fell in the streets and houses adjacent to the market-place, and are interred near the fountain. When we visited the place, in the month of August, numerous crosses, garlands, and inscriptions, watched by the relatives of the victims, pointed out the patriotic cemetery and told the tale of blood.

But the most destructive scene of warfare between the guards and the citizens, and the most glorious field of victory for the latter, was the *place de Grève*, or the square of the Hôtel de Ville. This place had been taken possession of by the people early in the morning. They had sworn to defend their position, and they kept their oath. Differing from the armed citizens in other quarters, they acted here under leaders, and advanced on their enemies in masses. The regiment of the line, which had been sent early in the morning to take possession of this quarter, had not obeyed their orders. The column of guards which was marched to fulfil this duty at noon, instead of proceeding directly by the quays on the north of the river, all the way to the place de Grève, crossed the Pont Neuf, passed along the quay d'Horlage and the Marché aux Fleurs, and was attempting to recross by the pont de *Nôtre Dame* to the quay Pelletier, which extends to the *Place*, when it was met by a battalion of citizens, who advanced to the bridge with drums beating, and in something like regular array. The officer who

commanded the troops, seeing his passage would be disputed, ordered his cannon to be brought to the middle of the bridge, and advanced himself under their protection to parley with the enemy; but neither his cannon nor his speech could terrify these intrepid men. They fired upon the troops, and killed the adjutant accompanying the officer who had addressed them. This attack was answered by a discharge of grape-shot from the cannon on the bridge, which cleared the quay, and enabled the guards to pass the bridge. On entering the *Place*, the troops were received by a deadly fire from the windows of the houses, and the corners of the streets which ran out of it. The cannon were planted towards the suspension bridge, which is immediately in front of the *Place*, and were of little service. The quay on the opposite side of the river at the suspension bridge, not being guarded by the 15th regiment of the line, according to orders, became a station for the insurgents, who kept up an incessant fire from behind the parapet wall, nearly in perfect security. A barricade had been erected across the *rue de Mouton*, issuing from the *Place* to the north, from which the guards were assailed with murderous effect. This barricade was taken by the troops, but was soon retaken by the citizens. From every window, and even from the tops of the houses, a deadly fire was kept up, as from the loop-holes or the embrasures of a fortress. From time to time the citizens charged *en masse*, or rushed upon the troops from all the openings into the square, and drove them back on the Hôtel de Ville. The battle raged with unintermitted fury for five or six hours,

till the ammunition of the troops was exhausted.* The artillery, having no more grape and canister shot, were obliged to employ balls, which did less execution among the people, but had nearly brought to the ground some of their houses. Never was greater intrepidity or more astonishing perseverance displayed in any civil conflict. Citizens who had never before breathed in the smoke of gunpowder advanced upon the guards like veteran troops. Though often repulsed, they returned to the charge. When driven from the barricades on the Place, they took refuge behind walls, and fired from the corners of the streets or the parapets of the quays. Heroes of twenty, fighting in the name of the charter, mingled their blood with the most warlike and determined partisans of despotism. The roaring of the artillery, followed by the platoon volleys of the infantry, heard at short intervals amid the melancholy ringing of the tocsin from the neighbouring churches and the irregular firing of the citizen sharpshooters, mingled with the piercing cries of

* It has been stated in all the accounts hitherto published by the friends of the revolution, all of which are disgracefully inaccurate, that the Hôtel de Ville was taken and re-taken several times by the troops and the citizens. The fact is, it was never taken at all by the citizens. When the troops entered at five o'clock on Wednesday, they found it empty: they kept it till midnight, when they retreated. On the other hand, the statement of the staff-officer, so often alluded to, differs from the evidence taken on the trial, or by the commission of the chambers, as to the evacuation of the place de Grève. M. Delaunay, an officer of the guards, who was present, mentions that the Place was evacuated and re-entered thrice by the guards.

the multitudes who shouted for liberty and the charter in the sight of death, and who called to arms and vengeance from among the smoke by which they were enveloped or over the bodies of their slaughtered friends, with whom they were surrounded, formed probably one of the most terrific as well as the most glorious scenes which the annals of history present.

The guards received a reinforcement of cavalry along with the 50th of the line, about five or six o'clock in the afternoon; but the latter refused to fight, and being marched into the court of the Hôtel de Ville, were of no further service to the real combatants than by supplying them with cartridges.* Another battalion of the guards arrived a little after, to assist or relieve the column who had been engaged all the morning; but, after continuing the murderous conflict a little longer, the united force was overpowered, and compelled to take refuge in the Hôtel de Ville, from the windows of which they fired on the people.

The slaughter of the people was dreadful in the Place itself, and in the adjacent streets. Cart-loads of the dead are said to have been carried off. Many bodies were thrown into the river, and great numbers of the wounded were carried to the hospital. It is not stated, by the officer who records the military events of the revolution, how many of the military were killed; but he allows that the column in its retreat was impeded by the necessity of car-

* This is the statement of the staff-officer so often alluded to; but M. Delaunay, another officer, expressly states, that this regiment of the line fired on entering the Place.

rying off between fifty and sixty wounded, many of whom died of their wounds.*

This column, which had been engaged for twelve hours, and which, after being repulsed from the place de Grève, was obliged to take shelter in the Hôtel de Ville, made good its retreat to the Tuilleries about midnight, and with difficulty escaped over the barricades, which had been erected since the morning. Had it remained for a few hours longer, not a man could have escaped.

In the course of the day a great deal of irregular skirmishing had taken place between the populace and the gendarmerie, or smaller parties of the guards, in the rue St. Honoré, in the *place* du Palais Royal, the place de Victoire, and the adjacent streets. Marshal Marmont had himself visited the post at the Bank, and narrowly escaped the muskets of the citizens in his passage from and to the Tuilleries.

All the troops of the garrison had now been engaged, and a signal failure had attended their efforts on all points. They had returned exhausted and dispirited to their quarters, unable for a similar service on the following day. No provisions had been prepared for them; and, after a day of unparalleled exertion under a burning sun, during which they could obtain neither food nor drink to support or to refresh them, they were nearly left as destitute as before. On

* M. Delaunay estimates the wounded at from one hundred and fifty to two hundred. He probably included those slightly wounded, whereas the "staff-officer" included only such as were obliged to be carried away by their comrades in their retreat.

the other hand, every door was open to shelter their antagonists; every table was ready to supply their wants; and every hand was held out to relieve their necessities.

It was evident that the commander-in-chief had long despaired of success, and had only continued the contest in obedience to higher authority. He had written to the king about mid-day, that his opinion of the resistance offered by the people was entirely changed since the preceding night, and that the disturbance was no longer a "riot, but a revolution." To M. Arago, the astronomer, who waited upon him to press upon him the necessity of doing something to stop the effusion of blood, he had declared his regret at being employed on such a service, and his eagerness to seize any opportunity of reconciling his duty to his feelings. When the five deputies, as a commission from the body of the national representatives assembled at Paris, who had signed the protest against the ordinances, arrived at head-quarters, the marshal expressed similar sentiments. He concurred with M. Lafitte, who was employed to speak on the occasion, and to demand an armistice on behalf of the people of Paris, in thinking that, as a condition of the cessation of hostilities, the ordinances should be repealed and the ministers dismissed; but did not see how his military obedience could permit him to enter into any terms with the insurgents, or to cease acting against them, without permission from the king or his ministers.*

* The staff-officer, who gives an account of the military events of the revolution, fixes a different time for this interview from the five deputies themselves who composed the

On his part, Polignac, the prime minister, was either inflexible in his own obstinacy, or was assured that his master was so. When he heard, therefore, what were the claims of the deputies, he thought it useless to see them, and continued the sanguinary experiment amid the roar of cannon, and in sight of the tricolour streaming from the towers of the cathedral.

Paris was then in a state of siege. The ministers had fled from their hotels, and were holding their councils at head-quarters, under the protection of the only troops who could be spared from more active service against the citizens; yet so infatuated were they with the idea of the royal power, or so ignorant of the general resistance of the people, that one of them ascribed the movement to a conspiracy of the *Fédérés*, which a few charges of cavalry would disperse; and another, the minister of justice, had issued an order summoning the judges of the royal court to the Tuilleries, in order to prevent or punish the legal resistance which they might make or had made to the execution of the illegal ordinances. The king had been apprised of the state of Paris, and of the dangers which surrounded

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mission to the duke of Ragusa. He says, that they arrived *about mid-day*, or before the troops had been despatched to their different destinations, consequently before the commencement of the slaughter at the Hôtel de Ville and other quarters. They, on the contrary, state on oath that they arrived between two and three o'clock in the afternoon, and consequently after the carnage had begun and had been continued for some hours. The discrepancy is important, and the mistake of the officer can scarcely be accounted for.

his guards, so late as five o'clock in the afternoon, by the marshal; who not only wrote with his own hand his opinion of the danger incurred by the monarchy, but ordered his aide-de-camp, M. de Komierouski, who carried his despatch, to instruct the royal mind on all points. But, after being obliged to comply with all the rules of etiquette, as on ordinary occasions at a frivolous court, the only answer which this officer received was an injunction to the marshal "to persevere; to assemble his forces on the place de Carousel and the place de Louis XV., *and act with masses.*" This word "masses" was repeated twice; so anxious was his majesty that it should be understood, and so much was he disposed to censure the conduct of the marshal, who had scattered his troops, to no purpose, and at great risk, over the greatest part of Paris. Nothing but the result of the next day's combat could overcome the inconceivable obstinacy or madness of such persons.

The troops, on returning to the Tuilleries after this day's hard fighting, naturally expected that the king or the dauphin would have made their appearance to thank them for their services, and to encourage them to a renewal of their efforts on the following day; but their hopes were disappointed, and their disgust could not be disguised. His majesty, who had spoken so much before of "mounting his horse," never thought of leaving St. Cloud; and the dauphin only appeared to review his defeated guards flying from the enemy, after his father's crown had been lost.

The night between Wednesday and Thursday

was a period of busy counsels and active preparations—of triumphant recollections and confident hopes. In the darkness of the night, or during the early hours of the morning, all the streets of Paris by which the king's troops had entered, or were likely to enter, had been broken up at intervals, and heaved into barricades. Immense mounds of the pavement, surmounted or strengthened with barrels full of stones, with large planks or household furniture, blocked up the chief thoroughfares. Carts or carriages with armorial bearings, waggons, cabriolets, hackney-coaches, and stages, had been indiscriminately seized, overturned, and converted into ramparts of defence. The trees of the Boulevards had fallen, as if by magic, and were laid across the broad highway which they formerly shaded and adorned; and, beyond the lines of posts still occupied in the neighbourhood of the royal residence, no street, square, or alley was passable for cavalry or artillery. Every age and sex had laboured at this astonishing work, which would have set the advance of the most numerous army at defiance, and has taught a new lesson to governments on the inefficiency of troops when directed against opinions. So impassable was the capital rendered for horses or vehicles, that the streets at noon-day, from the total absence of carriages, had all the stillness of midnight.

Nor were other preparations neglected for the ensuing conflict. Additional bodies of citizens looked out for their arms, and resolved to join the array of their brethren. The youths of the Polytechnic and other schools, who, being restrained by

their professors, had only made their appearance in small numbers and in particular quarters on the preceding day, came forth in greater force, and spread themselves round the whole space occupied by the enemy. The young men of the Polytechnic school, whose education was partly military, showed great skill in directing the populace, and by their intrepidity gained an instant hold over their confidence. Wherever they appeared they were hailed as leaders, and thus were enabled to establish a kind of discipline in the midst of anarchy.

The tocsin had not ceased during the whole night to mingle its alarming and melancholy sounds with the noise of the parties unpaving the streets, hewing down the trees of the Boulevards, or constructing the wood-work of the barricades. A restless and anxious interval of darkness was followed by a glorious morning. But though the success of the preceding day had warranted anticipations of ultimate triumph, nobody imagined that a few hours more of time, and an additional body of undisciplined assailants, would suffice to overturn a throne of ten centuries, supported by a powerful military force. Reinforcements from Versailles, Ruel, and other stations in the neighbourhood of Paris, to the amount of about seventeen or eighteen hundred men, consisting of cavalry and infantry in nearly equal proportions, had nearly compensated for the losses of Wednesday. The line occupied by the marshal on the morning of Thursday was nearly the same as on the previous day; while he very wisely resolved, in the words of the king, to keep his troops more together, and "to act in masses." We tran-

scribe the following account of the positions occupied by the different battalions and detachments of the garrison on the morning of the 29th, from the work of the staff-officer to whom we have more than once alluded.

"One battalion occupied the Ecole Militaire. In the barrack of La Rue de Babylone, in the same neighbourhood, was a depôt of from fifty to sixty Swiss recruits, under the command of the major of the regiment (the 7th). The vast space of the hotel and garden des Invalides was left to the defence of the school for staff-officers. The Palais Bourbon was guarded by the line; the Louvre by two battalions of Swiss; the Bank by one hundred guards; the Palais Royal by a battalion; the rue St. Honoré by a battalion; the streets de la Paix and Castaglione by the 5th and 52d regiments of the line. On the place du Carousel was a Swiss battalion, which had arrived the preceding evening from Ruel; in the garden of the Tuilleries were the 50th of the line, and the 15th light infantry, and three battalions* of guards.

"In the Champs Elysées, the rue Royale, and the Boulevard des Caprienes were two battalions of guards, which had arrived from Versailles the evening before. There also was placed the light infantry, which had marched on that very morning from country quarters. These, with the Swiss battalion from Ruel, and about eight hundred cavalry,

* It must be recollected, that when I use the expression *battalion*, I mean from two hundred and twenty to two hundred and forty men in the outside, except the Swiss battalions, which were four hundred men.

made an addition to the garrison of about seventeen hundred men; which, however, did not compensate the losses of the preceding day in killed and wounded, and the still greater number disarmed and dispersed in the multitude of local detachments, small posts and guard-houses, which, as I have already stated, had been so inconsiderately scattered throughout the town on the morning of the 28th, before the troops had left their barracks. What remained of the gendarmerie (for numbers had been discovered the day before in their barracks or on their posts) was on the place du Palais Royal, and at its own head-quarters in the place Vendôme."

The force thus posted was pressed upon by an enraged and armed population, now directed by a superior class of leaders. An incessant fire was kept up upon it from the quays on the St. Germain side of the river. Bodies of sharp-shooters, sheltered by the columns which adorn the front of the chamber of deputies, or the parapet walls of the quays, did execution among the troops in the *place de Louis XV.* Others, squatting below the line of parapet which extends to the *Pont des Arts*, opposite the Louvre, or concealed behind the pillars of the façade of the Institute, levelled their muskets in safety at the troops occupying the Louvre. The detachment which occupied the palace planted its cannon at the gate opening on the wooden bridge, and endeavoured to dislodge its assailants with grape-shot. This kind of shot having failed the artillery employed ball, a few discharges of which must have demolished the building, as one of them has made a deep impression on one of the pillars.

But the attacks were more fierce and destructive on the other side of the Louvre, facing the church of St. Germain l'Auxerrois, and in the place and streets adjacent to the Palais Royal. One of the battalions of Swiss which occupied the Louvre was posted at the balcony, and in the gallery of the grand façade, fronting the place of St. Germain l'Auxerrois. From the windows and behind the pillars, where they were completely sheltered, they kept up a murderous fire on the people in the place, who returned it with spirit, though not on equal terms, and attempted to break into the palace. The invading crowd repeatedly rushed to the gates, but were repulsed with great carnage. Parties of them got into the towers and on the roof of the opposite church, whence they assailed the Swiss. This warfare continued till the final retreat of the army, and was more destructive to the lives, as well as more honourable to the courage, of the people than any part of their glorious service during the three days, except the attacks on the Hôtel de Ville on Wednesday.

But the victory of the people had been long decided before the final retreat of the Swiss, or the final attack of the Louvre. The guards, who had sustained the whole shock of an exasperated and heroic capital, had become disheartened at the privations to which they had been subjected, and disgusted with the odious service in which they were engaged. The troops of the line had, from the beginning, refused to act against their fellow-citizens, and were on the point of declaring in their favour; and the marshal, participating in the feeling

of the community so powerfully, as nearly to be thrown into convulsions at every order to fire, which his sense of military duty compelled him to give, was eager to find some excuse to warrant a cessation of hostilities. In this state of things the marquis of Semonville, grand referendary of the chamber of peers, proceeded to the Tuilleries at seven o'clock in the morning, to insist, in the name of the body to which he belonged, on sending a representation to the king on the state of Paris, and procuring from his majesty conditions of accommodation, to stop the effusion of blood. The interview between this energetic old nobleman, the marshal, and the ministers, which, as described by himself, in his evidence on the trial of the ministers, will compose one of the most striking pages in the annals of this eventful period, ended, first, in a proposition to put the ministers under arrest, if they refused compliance; and then, in their consent, to proceed to the king with their resignations. Though the negotiation occupied some time, the decision, once taken, was immediately carried into effect; and the whole cabinet reached St. Cloud by eleven o'clock in the morning, where the king, with reluctance, and only after an appeal to his humanity in behalf of the dauphiness, who, being on her way from the south to join her family, might be massacred if he resisted, consented to change his councils, and to withdraw his ordinances. The marshal, who commanded the troops, received no authority to announce these resolutions, or the adoption of any plan of pacification; but, in waiting for an answer from St. Cloud, he had endeavoured, by the intervention of

as many of the mayors as he could assemble, and by the distribution of a pacific proclamation, to obtain an armistice. "Out of humanity," says this paper, "I consent to suspend hostilities, in the hopes that good citizens will retire to their homes, and resume their affairs. I earnestly conjure them to do so."

The "good citizens" engaged in the struggle could not hear such exhortations, and, though they had, were too near the attainment of their own terms to listen to the conditions of an armistice. Two regiments of the line in the place Vendôme took off their bayonets about noon, and in a body joined the people. The marshal, who had been acting on the defensive, and who saw his troops surrounded and attacked on their whole line, felt the momentous importance of this defection, and tried to repair it, by ordering a battalion of guards to occupy the street which joins the place Vendôme to the rue Rivoli, and opens on the gardens of the Tuilleries. This battalion was ordered from the palace of the Louvre, assailed all the morning with fury, and already insufficiently garrisoned. To this reduction of the guards in the palace to one battalion, and the departure of the battalion which occupied the colonnade and the galleries, whence the people were most successfully resisted, has been ascribed the almost immediate irruption of the citizens into the Louvre, the panic of the Swiss, and their precipitate retreat upon the Tuilleries, and the total defeat of the royal army. The citizens, having got into the picture gallery, fired upon the lancers and infantry in the Carousel and court of the Tuilleries. The

people, seeing these troops waver, advanced upon them from the other side of the *Place;* and the marshal, with his staff, had scarcely time to escape by the great arch of the palace into the gardens, from which his troops were pursued to the Champs Elysées, and through the avenue de Neuilly towards St. Cloud and the barrière de l'Etoile.

The capture of the Louvre had been so unexpected, and the retreat of the troops in the Carousel so precipitate, that no step could be taken to apprise the detachments in the streets adjacent to the *Palais Royal,* or in the posts on the south side of the river, of the disasters which had happened, or to relieve them from their frightful position. Parties of Swiss posted in the corner house of the rue *de Rohan* and the rue de l'Echelle — the former opposite the rue Richelieu, and the latter opening into the rue St. Honoré — continued the fire after the retreat of their brethren, and, compelled at last to yield, were some of them massacred. The riddled surface of the corner wall, opposite the *Théâtre François,* still testifies the numerous discharges made from the streets and the portico of the theatre to dislodge the first party, whose firing on the citizens was well sustained and destructive. A detachment of the Swiss in the barracks of Babylon, on the south side of the river, and near the *Ecole Militaire,* was likewise needlessly sacrificed after the general retreat.

Before three o'clock in the afternoon of Thursday, the 29th of July, at the end of a part of three days' fighting, Paris was completely evacuated of the royal troops, and an impassable gulf fixed between the nation and the Bourbons. By the astounding

rapidity and efficacy of the movement in the capital, and the simultaneous sympathy of the nation in the feelings of its heroic inhabitants, a civil war in the provinces became impossible. No blood was to be shed beyond the Paris barricades. Three days had done the work of campaigns. The victory of the people was as complete as it was glorious. Power dropped from the hands of the partisans of the court, as if they had been struck with a preternatural paralysis. The troops ordered from a distance to support the contemplated *siege*, as if fascinated by an irresistible influence, halted on their march, and hoisted the colours of patriotism.* The royal authority was every where trampled in the dust, like the royal arms, without provoking resistance from its agents. The restoration, with its ancient prejudices, divine-right pretensions, and obsolete bigotry, imposed upon France by foreign bayonets, dropped off as harmlessly as the serpent from the hand of St. Paul; and the infatuated monarch was allowed to conduct the funeral procession of anti-

* The troops of the camp of St. Omer had been ordered to march on Paris. Five regiments advanced as far as Poix, a village between Abbeville and Beauvais, which they reached on the 2d of August. They there halted two days, to wait farther orders. They received orders from general Gerard in the name of the provisional government, and marched back to St. Omer, under new colours, on the 4th. The soldiers had previously sent by the diligences for an assortment of tricoloured cockades from Paris, and wore them under the white flag. Their officers had not changed their cockades when they received the order to retrograde. The tricoloured flag was flying on every steeple, and almost from every window, on their road back to St. Omer.

national royalty to the coast, with as little molestation, and amid as much indifference, as the obsequies of his late brother to St. Denis.

If the courage of the Parisians was admirable in battle, their moderation was still more admirable in victory, inasmuch as it is easier to fight an enemy than to subdue a passion. Property was every where respected, in the midst of disorders which might have tempted pillage, by the certainty of impunity; and the cries for mercy were never heard in vain, when vanquished opposition implored compassion. The people saw their enemies only in the uniform of the king's troops firing upon their fellow citizens, and looked not for victims either among his disarmed or unarmed friends. So deeply were they engaged with the public question, that private interests and personal feuds were neglected or suspended. Poverty saw wealth in its power, and refused to profit by a compromise of duty or an act of dishonesty. In fighting for the charter, they refused to break the code. The sounds of liberty and public right, which seemed to have a talismanic effect in rousing their courage and nerving their arm, were equally powerful in allaying their revenge, or restraining their cupidity. During the whole struggle the poorer classes of citizens, or the labourers and the workmen of the fauxbourgs, to whom a few francs would have been an acquisition, were the chief combatants; and yet they entered places where they could have acquired untold treasures, without committing an act of robbery or theft. They never thought of the treasures of the bank, and did not avail themselves of the booty of the palace. The only shops which they

rifled were those of the gunsmiths, and from these they took nothing but arms, to secure the rights of the proprietors as well as their own. They considered these depôts merely as the arsenal of freedom. A few instances even occurred of the infliction of summary justice, by the poorer citizens, on miscreants who, in the midst of the confusion, found their love of picking pockets stronger than their love of the charter.

But, probably, the most astonishing circumstance in these astonishing events is the docility of the people to their superiors during the contest, and the promptitude of their submission to legal order at its close. The government and administration had done every thing to produce anarchy. At the first strong appearances of tumult the prefect of police and his officers had fled. Their only substitute, the gendarmes, had been overpowered. Paris had been declared in a state of siege, with no police but the Swiss guards, no magistrates but a field-marshal, and no tribunals but military commissions. The latter, it is true, had not been organised, owing to the rapidity of the popular movement; but the cessation of all civil authority was not the less real. Yet never was Paris more free from private disorder as on the third and last day of this terrible warfare. The troops had scarcely retired, when the ordinary influences of society resumed their spring. Reverence for the authority of law had never been suspended, or had instantly returned. The ranks and masses of the social body had been violently agitated, but had not for an instant changed their places. Every citizen returned to his house, profession,

business, or workshop, as if no extrardinary convulsion had happened; and the mists of fear which surrounded timid minds were dissipated nearly as soon as the sulphurous smoke of the fire-arms used in the battle. The following morning found the people walking securely in their barricaded streets, or engaged in their usual avocations. The national guard had re-appeared under their ancient chief, and order was restored, like the calm after the storm by the word of *Prospero.**

* When men are engaged in a cause which engrosses their stronger passions, their personal feelings lose their hold. We have examples of this in all great political agitations. The riots which took place at Madrid in 1766, to compel his catholic majesty to dismiss his Italian favourites, and to allow the Spanish people to follow their old customs, were distinguished with the same moderation during the commotion, by the same disinterestedness in action, and the same rapid return to order at its close. Large bodies of the populace surrounded the palace, kept the guards in their quarters, and even mastered the city. The king fled from Madrid to Aranjuez. The rioters sent a deputation to that residence: their petitions were granted, and they dispersed. "Not a single individual," says the history of the time, "suffered in his person or property by the lawless assembly of so many thousand people, except the Walloon guards, who had violently opposed them, and those particular persons whose obnoxious conduct made them objects of the people's resentment. On the contrary, they *refused money from all those that offered it,* and said that they wanted nothing but the blood of Squillace. When the affair was over, the people went of their own accord, and, shaking hands with the soldiers, returned their arms to those from whom they had taken them. *It was a rare example, that an enraged, tumultuous, and numerous populace, during so many days' disturbance in a great city, should preserve an order, conduct, and attention to justice, which could scarcely be equalled by the best disciplined army*

As no property had been destroyed, and no industry perceptibly interrupted, the only loss to be deplored on the part of the people was the blood which had been shed in the commotion; and on this subject there has been great exaggeration. Life, indeed, was profusely sacrificed on the two last days,—prodigally thrown away on the part of the people, and mercilessly destroyed by the hands of the guards; but the number of victims has been ridiculously magnified by wondering ignorance or factious prejudice. Accounts have been published, in which more of the troops are slaughtered than came into action, and in which thousands of the people are represented as killed who have probably swelled the crowds of subsequent riots. When we hear of grape-shot sweeping a street in an instant, of cart-loads of dead being carried from the field of battle after a discharge, we naturally imagine that the slaughter of forty or fifty hours' fighting must have been immense. But this is a wrong view of the case. Except at the Hôtel de Ville on Wednesday, and before the colonnade of the Louvre on Thursday, the citizens never presented themselves in a compact body before the troops. They fired from windows or corners — from behind pillars or parapets, but never uselessly exposed themselves to the discharges of the guards. On the other hand, the troops on the Tuesday and Thursday suffered little; because, on the former day the people were not armed, and on the latter the soldiers were protected by the interposition of large spaces between them and their assailants. When scattered through the streets on Wednesday, their loss was considerable; but would

perhaps, be overstated at five hundred men killed and wounded.

On this subject we have fortunately a statement of facts, on which considerable reliance can be placed, from the pen of doctor Prosper Meniere, surgeon in the hospital of the Hôtel-Dieu at Paris, who details the history of what passed in that great infirmary and other hospitals "*pendant et après les trois grandes journées*," with apparent good faith and knowledge. He states that the number of dead bodies deposited at the Morgue amounted to one hundred and twenty-five; the number interred under the colonnade of the Louvre, to eighty-five; the number buried on the other side of the Louvre, at the end of the street Fromenteau, to twenty-five; in the Marché des Innocens, to seventy; in the vaults of St. Eustache, to forty-three; in the vaults of the quai de Gevres, to thirty-four; and in the Hôtel Larochefoucault, to eight; making a total of three hundred and ninety. The number of citizens who were wounded, and brought to the different hospitals, or attended to at their own houses, the doctor estimates, from the best authority, at about two thousand. To these he adds three hundred of wounded soldiers in the military hospitals. Of those who were brought to the hospitals, three hundred and four died in the course of a few weeks. The number of deaths, therefore, amounted to about seven hundred; and the whole number of killed and wounded to about three thousand, including soldiers as well as citizens. The number of killed and wounded of the guards, gendarmerie, and other troops, exposed during the three days to the attacks

of the people, is stated by official accounts at three hundred and seventy-five, of which the killed were about a fifth part, or about seventy-five. Of these the Swiss composed about a fourth.

This loss is no doubt too great to be incurred in fighting for the folly, or resisting the despotism, of such a monarch as Charles X.; but if the revolution which it has bought permanently secures the liberties of the nation, as it has overthrown the pretensions of the court, the French may congratulate themselves on the cheapness of their purchase. They have often lost more in a single hour, in struggling to rivet their own chains, or to impose a yoke upon the neck of their neighbours.

CHAP. VI.

TRANSFER OF THE FRENCH CROWN. — SETTLEMENT OF THE KINGDOM.

THOUGH the success of the popular cause was now complete, the people had only pulled down a dynasty, without erecting a government; they had only effaced the Bourbon arms, without substituting any other badge of authority in their stead; they had only exchanged the lilies and the white flag for the tricolor. The rabble of Paris had expelled the king's troops, but the power of the rabble ended with the tumult and the victory. Had the upper classes of society, the members of the legislature, of the magistracy, and of the military aristocracy, not been ready for a change of dynasty, the frightful scenes which took place in the streets of Paris would have produced no other effect than a change of ministry; the royal colours would have been immediately restored; the acts of the government would have been disavowed; a popular cabinet would have been chosen, and, for *a short time* at least, France might have been saved from revolution. But the previous excitement of the upper classes, of the owners of the wealth, rank, property, and intelligence of the country, rendered this impossible. It occurred to them nearly universally, and at the same moment, that a more thorough change was necessary; and though they had en-

tered into no previous conspiracy to accomplish it, any more than into a conspiracy to eat and sleep after the same intervals of fasting and labour, they arrived at the same conclusion on its expediency.

It was necessary, therefore, to organise an administration with all despatch, to prevent the disorders which might result from the temporary abeyance of supreme power. Happily a considerable proportion of the national representatives had arrived at Paris; and now neither timidity nor prudence could prevent them from acting as the necessity of the circumstances required, and disposing of the new power, which their constituents had *not* given, but which accident had thrown into their hands. Those who had signed the protest against the ordinances, together with others who had since acceded to it, held at M. Lafitte's a meeting on Thursday afternoon, at which they drew up a congratulatory address to the Parisians on their glorious victory, and nominated a provisional government to secure its fruits. This government consisted of three members, the duke de Choiseul, general Lafayette, and general Gerard. The first had been nominated, in the hurry of the moment, from a knowledge of his sentiments, and without his consent; but he nobly suppressed any contradiction till the danger of acquiescence was over: the two latter accepted their high functions with readiness and zeal.

It was lucky for the public tranquillity that, among the persons now ready to take the lead, there was a man like Lafayette, who enjoyed the full confidence of the victorious party, — whose name had been known to the people for upwards of forty

years as their warm and consistent friend; whose reputation had been identified with the national glory; and who already represented in his person two revolutions, in the new and the old world.

The popularity of the venerable chief was great and undisputed. Generous, affable, and kind-hearted in private life, adored by a patriarchal family of three generations, he enjoyed a national reputation as a patriot and a lover of freedom, which had been accumulating without a drawback for fifty years. As an ardent champion for liberty and national independence, he drew his youthful sword in the cause of America, and shared the friendship as well as the toils and renown of Washington. The principles for which he then fought were afterwards his guides in all situations of life, and amid all vicissitudes of fortune. This invariable consistency and entire devotion to the popular cause, constituted the charm of his character, and gave him an influence over the minds of his countrymen, which neither his rank, his abilities, nor his services could have commanded. Exiled from France as the enemy of liberty because he was the friend of order, and arrested in Austria as the enemy of order because he was the friend of liberty, he continued equally faithful to his principles in the prison of Olmutz, as in the command of the national guard of France. At the head of the first revolution, as long as it was unstained with atrocities, he never deserted its principles in their disgrace; having the good fortune to escape the honours of the empire, and to incur the hatred of the restoration, he brought an unsullied glory and long-tried virtue to strengthen and

direct the second. General Gerard and some of the other permanent deputies were likewise objects of public confidence, as being always opposed to the court. The general took the command of the regular troops. Lafayette, who had been the founder of the national guard in 1789, and who was always looked upon as their father, was now invested with the command in chief of this effective instrument of national security and public order, and repaired to the Hôtel de Ville at the head of a great body of guards, and surrounded by an immense assemblage of citizens in a high state of excitement and enthusiasm.

From this place he issued animated proclamations for encouraging the people, regulating the service, and organising the formation of the civic militia, to whom the protection of life, property, and liberty was now exclusively intrusted. Sentinels and patrols from this force were sent to all quarters of the capital. Towards the evening a deputation from St. Cloud arrived at the Hôtel de Ville to propose an accommodation, on the conditions of forming a liberal ministry and recalling the ordinances.* But, as Mar-

* The duke de Mortemart, who was in service at St. Cloud on Thursday, as captain of the guards, had been nominated prime minister in the morning of Thursday, on the resignation of Polignac, and received the king's commands to form a cabinet. He had selected, as two of his colleagues, M. Casimir Perrier and general Gerard; and it is a curious fact, that these nominations are to be found in the *bulletin of laws*, though they never reached the Moniteur. The duke himself, according to his appointment, ought to have come to town immediately, and to have tried negotiations; but he probably was convinced that all was lost, and did not make his appearance at the Hôtel de Ville till a new government was formed.

mont had predicted, it came too late. New rights had been created by victory. The sovereignty of the people was now triumphant over the sovereignty of the throne. The Hôtel de Ville was more powerful than the Tuilleries; and the municipality of Paris, instead of acknowledging a portfolio, had a crown to give away. No reliance could be placed on the faith of a man who had already broken his oath, or the mercy of a prince who had swept the streets of his capital with grape-shot;—and Charles X. had ceased to reign.

His kingdom was now limited to the castle and park of St. Cloud, to which the royal guards had retreated. His only dependence was on the fidelity of these troops, through whose exhausted and flying squadrons the royal deputation must have passed on their way to the Hôtel de Ville. The consternation which the arrival of the marshal and the tale which he told occasioned, was unbounded. It had never entered into the mind of the king or his courtiers, that the crisis was so terrible or so near. On the weak mind and obstinate disposition of the dauphin, it produced a kind of fury, which vented itself in an attack on the marshal, whom he denounced as a traitor, and insulted by ordering him to be deprived of his sword and put under arrest.* The return of the deputation from the Hôtel de Ville revealed the whole extent of the king's calamity, and in a few hours the court was thinned of its ranks of flatterers, and of its partisans of *coups d'état.*

* It is an undeniable fact, that the dauphin seized the marshal's sword, and doing it precipitately, cut himself. The staff-officer, who gives an account of the "military events," admits the fact, but assigns it to a different period.

On Friday morning, the 30th, order was restored, and the service of the national guard universally organised. The joy of the inhabitants was unbounded at the change in the situation of their city from yesterday; at the sight of the national colours; at their complete freedom from Swiss and gendarmes; at the union of the troops of the line with the people; at the patriotic activity of the deputies, and the association with the popular cause of every thing that was eminent in rank, or distinguished for wealth, or renowned for military glory. Though no strong apprehension was entertained of any renewed attack on the side of St. Cloud, the people continued to strengthen their barricades on all the avenues leading into the capital from that quarter.

In the *Moniteur*, which was again published under new auspices, appeared the nomination of a municipal commission, consisting of M. Lafitte, M. Casimir Perrier, count de Lobeau, M. de Schonen, M. Audry de Puyraveau, and M. Mauguin. Baron Louis, who had been minister of finance under Louis XVIII., was appointed provisional commissioner of the department of finance; count de Laborde was nominated prefect of the Seine; and M. Bavoux prefect of police.

The deputies now met in their own chamber, and resolved to take such measures as should guarantee to France the full execution of the charter. A considerable number of the peers who happened to be in Paris likewise met at their hall of assembly, and having taken into consideration the intended measures of the deputies, agreed to support them. No conference was, however, demanded between

the two chambers, during this or any of the important proceedings which followed.

The first step taken by the deputies, consisting of eighty-nine, was to invite the duke of Orleans to undertake the executive power, now abandoned to a municipal commission, with the title of Lieutenant-general of the kingdom; a nomination which was intended at once to secure order, by giving force to the laws, to prevent the agitation of rival schemes of government, and to prepare the way for the accession of his royal highness to the throne.

Public opinion had long pointed out his royal highness as the presumptive heir of a revolutionary throne. He had early fought in the ranks of the revolutionary army, in defending France against aggressions which the revolution had provoked; and he had subsequently refused to combat usurpation, when, in putting it down, he must have wounded the pride or shed the blood of his countrymen. He had thus acquired a reputation for liberal ideas and patriotic sentiments, which none of the other branches of the Bourbon family was ambitious to earn. In the depressed state of his fortunes he was never known to declare against those principles of freedom from the abuse of which he had suffered. Having preferred the endurance of severe privations, and the performance of humble duties, to the sacrifice of his independence at the shrine of absolute power, he never ceased to cultivate the duties of a citizen, when the revolving wheel of fortune placed him on the steps of the throne, and restored to him his princely domains. His family was educated in the principles which he himself professed; and, like

the children of one who had been a schoolmaster, were sent to contend for the honours of learning, or the prizes of diligence, with their equals in age, at the ordinary schools and colleges of the capital. Thus, though he never ostentatiously encouraged dangerous comparisons between himself and the elder branch of his family, the contrast between his conduct and theirs was too striking, and his vicinity to the throne too marked, not to suggest the idea of his elevation on every hypothesis of their fall. Parallels had been published in the journals between the English and French restorations, and between the English revolution and the anticipated counterpart to it in France, in which Charles X. was made to play the part of James II., and the duke of Orleans that of the prince of Orange. These articles had been prosecuted to conviction and punishment, the author of one of them being in prison at the revolution in July; but the nation was only the more struck with the resemblance, the longer it examined the features of the portraits, and therefore as much prepared to find a successor to Charles X. in the duke of Orleans as if he had been his next heir.

It was seen, therefore, as soon as victory had declared against the violator of the nation's rights, that the duke of Orleans must ascend the vacant throne. He, in fact, was the necessary *man* for the occasion; his name, and the reputation of his constitutional principles, was the only talisman which, at that dangerous crisis, could evoke the spirit of anarchy, and prevent the horrors of a civil war.

It is due, however, to the loyalty of his character to say, that he had not provoked the insurrection by which he gained a crown; that he had not sur-

rounded himself with partisans hostile to the Bourbons, and that his ambition had never led him to plot against his relatives. Indeed, to have plotted effectually against Charles X., he must have conspired with his confessor to make him a bigot, with his ministers to make him sign the fatal ordinances, and with his troops to massacre his subjects with musketry and grape shot. On the Sunday previous to the issue of these ordinances, he knew no more of them than any man in Paris; and in dining with his relative, the prince of Condé, at St. Leu, expressed his satisfaction that, from the issue of the letters of convocation, the chambers were to meet, and no *coup d'état* was intended. On the three days of the war in Paris he remained at his country seat of Neuilly; and, whether from fear of an arrest by order of the court, or of a crown from the favour of the insurgents, kept himself concealed from all but his family. Several confidential messengers were sent to his residence on Wednesday and Thursday morning, from the liberal deputies; but he could not be found. The natural caution or timidity of his character, his affection for his numerous family, and the great stake of fortune which he would have to play against a doubtful chance of supreme power, kept him from mingling in the strife, or treating with the combatants. But when the revolutionists had completed their work, by the expulsion of the guards and by the capture of the Tuilleries, he had no longer any motive for doubt or hesitation as to the part which he was bound to act. He felt that in submitting to the necessities of the moment, and in vaulting into the vacant seat of power, he was not robbing his relative, whose cause was lost,

but preventing anarchy, by which he would lose his own. Having received pressing entreaties on Thursday night and Friday morning, to come to Paris and place himself at the head of affairs, and seeing that there was neither danger nor dishonour in complying, he walked over the barricades on Friday evening, and reached the Palais Royal about eleven o'clock.

But though he did not conspire to obtain power, he accepted the revolution under all its conditions, and engaged to all its consequences, with a ready and firm resolution to execute his duties and to keep his place; it never having once entered his mind that he was to be the delegate of Charles X. or the lieutenant of the duke of Bordeaux. This resolution appeared immediately in the conduct of his government. He unhesitatingly declared himself for the revolution, and staked his existence on its issue, whether it was to end with a mere change of dynasty, or was to run the race of republicanism, with a king to hold the reins. He ordered letters to be republished, and placarded on the walls of Paris, in which he had expressed his refusal to fight against France during the second usurpation of Napoleon; he intimated his desire to recal the regicides, and gave himself the signal for making the Marseillois hymn the test of loyalty, by singing it himself, and by giving a pension to its author, under the title of his old revolutionary comrade.

The royalists are naturally indignant at the conduct of the duke of Orleans for not exerting his influence to preserve the throne for Henry V.; and accuse him of treachery and ingratitude, as well as

usurpation, for not proclaiming his young relative. But, in expressing their feelings on this subject, they take their own wishes and sentiments for those of the victorious party. The young duke of Bordeaux if he inherited the sovereign rights of his family, inherited likewise the hatred and contempt with which they were surrounded. The same organs of public opinion which had acted so powerfully against the occult government of Charles X., had cast the most odious imputations on the education of his grandson. Every time that his name was mentioned, it was connected with tutors and governors of Jesuitical or counter-revolutionary principles. Even though this objection could have been removed, the heroes of the barricades, and their political leaders in the chamber, could never have agreed to *continue* the restoration, or to sanction the principle of divine right, on which the title of the young prince was founded. The duke of Orleans might have thrown away his own chance of reigning, therefore, in favour of a republic or of anarchy, by proclaiming Henry V., but he could never have secured the throne for a grandson of Charles X. The revolution, in fact was complete before the duke of Orleans was placed at its head; and his royal highness had probably as little power as any man in France to counteract its principles, though his name, influence, and services were the main conditions of its tranquil termination. Had Charles X., however, abdicated at St. Cloud on the 31st of July, instead of doing it at Rambouillet on the 2d of August, and had he sent the young duke of Bordeaux in person to Paris, with the act of abdication, and the appointment of the duke of

Orleans as regent in his hands, the step, whether successful or not, might have been very embarrassing for the new lieutenant-general.

The first official intimation which the public received of the accession of their new governor, was in a proclamation issued by his royal highness on Saturday morning, in which he announces, that being invited by the deputies at Paris (no mention is made of the peers throughout all these preliminary proceedings) to accept of the place of lieutenant-general of the kingdom, he had not hesitated to place himself at the head of the heroic population of Paris, to preserve them from the calamities of civil war and anarchy; that he wore with pride the glorious colours which they had reconquered, and which he himself had before worn; that the chambers were to meet, to assure the reign of the laws and to maintain the rights of the nation; and that "the charter henceforth was to be a reality."

By his prompt assumption of the national colours, and his unqualified engagement that the charter was henceforward to be "a reality," he at once threw himself into the arms of the revolution, and cut off all chance of compromise or accommodation with the Bourbons. He, in fact, annulled the fifteen years of the restoration, to reach the epoch of the tricolour; and declared that the compact which the Bourbons professed to execute, had hitherto only been a lie or a deception. Yet this was not sufficient to satisfy the leaders of the party who had sprung up in forty-eight hours from behind the barricades, and who pretended that the political change, effected by their arms, had established their many-headed sovereignty.

A great ferment was therefore excited among the clubs and the schools, and crowds collected around the Hôtel de Ville to demand explanations. In the existing circumstances such assemblages, directed by leaders of such pretensions, could not be despised. The royal troops were still in the neighbourhood of Paris; no constitutional army had yet been organised; and the friends of order, surprised at their own success, were uncertain of the strength of their internal enemies.

The deputies, to the number of ninety-four or ninety-five, met in order to deliberate on the best course to pursue in these extraordinary circumstances; and agreed to issue a proclamation to the people, embodying the most important of the national rights which had been secured by the revolution, and which the duke of Orleans would engage to guarantee. "He will respect our rights," said the proclamation, "because it is *from us that he will derive his own.*" The rights and guarantees here alluded to were, the establishment of the national guard, with power to elect its officers; the popular formation of municipal and departmental councils; the jury in trials of the press; ministerial responsibility; and, in short, the other securities contained in the new charter. With this manifesto in their hands, the assembled deputies hurried off to the Palais Royal in a body, amid the applauses of the multitude. The prince received them with cordiality, and agreed to their bill of rights with eager assent and lively sympathy; showing, by his gestures, his language, and his features, at the reading of every sentence, how completely he had identified

himself with the revolutionary cause. His royal highness had been preparing to set out to calm the effervescence at the Hôtel de Ville before the arrival of the deputies. Their opinion confirmed his resolution, as their presence would give effect to his representations. They therefore proposed to proceed thither in a body, to proclaim at the seat of the provisional power the accession of his royal highness, and the principles of his government embodied in the proclamation. The old recollections of the Paris *commune*, established in the same quarter, and the knowledge of the republican principles of the present municipal commission, had inspired not a little alarm into the friends of monarchical institutions and national tranquillity.

This meeting, between his royal highness surrounded by the national representatives, and the members of the provisional authority in the midst of their partisans, forms a memorable event in the history of this extraordinary revolution. Explanations were demanded and given, which, though not written or formally announced, are often appealed to as conditions of the new social compact. His royal highness engaged to adopt the principles of the proclamation of the deputies, which was again read in the hall. It may not be true, as has been asserted, that a proclamation for forming France into a republic was ready; but it is certain that the prince and deputies promised to the more ardent supporters of popular rights, that the government should be a *republican monarchy*, or a *monarchy* surrounded by *republican institutions*. With this engagement the municipality was satisfied, and

the popular ferment allayed. His royal highness, having displayed from the window of the Hôtel de Ville the tricolor, as the symbol of glory and liberty, returned to his palace amid the enthusiastic applauses of the people. The municipal commission for conducting the general government was of course dissolved, when the lieutenant-general of the kingdom accepted of his high appointment, and was acknowledged by the authorities created by circumstances.

The lieutenant-general appointed commissioners to the different departments of administration, to conduct the public business till a permanent constitution of the monarchy should enable him to select a more stable ministry. M. Guizot was nominated provisional commissioner to the department of the interior, baron Louis to that of finance, M. Dupont de l'Eure to that of justice, general Gerard to that of war, and M. de Reinhart to that of foreign affairs.

The chambers, which had been convoked for the 3d of August by the late government, met on that day, by an ordinance of the new chief of the state. The usual forms of the royal sitting were observed, as far as they could be in the altered condition of affairs. Never did a crisis more momentous or more urgent occur in the history of any people, and never was any met with more promptitude or vigour. The royalist deputies and peers, who had hitherto taken no part in the proceedings of the revolution, now came forward in considerable force. The number of deputies amounted to more than a half of the chamber, and that of peers to about

sixty. The effect of the revolution was seen in the trifling etiquette of the sitting, where the peers and deputies were treated with equal respect—the consequence of a positive regulation.

The speech of his royal highness was fully impregnated with the spirit, and expressed in the language, of the revolution. Every phrase seemed purposely designed to expose the jargon of the restoration, and to establish the doctrine of popular sovereignty. He claimed no rights from his relation to the throne, or from any compact with the higher orders of the state. "The wishes of *my fellow-citizens*," says he, "were turned towards me: they thought me worthy of co-operating with you for the safety of our country, and they called me to execute the functions of lieutenant-general of the kingdom." The enthusiastic terms in which he spoke of the exertions of the people of Paris, were as flattering to their pride, as his adoption of the national colours was to their patriotism. "I have hastened into the midst of this valiant people, *wearing the colours which, for the second time, have marked the triumph of freedom.*" In recommending attention to some of the most important reforms and guarantees required by the country, he assured the assembly that, attached himself by heart and conviction to the principles of a *free government, he accepted all its conditions.*

But the part of his speech which excited the greatest curiosity was that in which he alluded to the fallen dynasty. "The past," said he, "is to me painful: *I deplore the misfortunes which I would have wished to prevent.*" His royal highness con-

cluded by announcing a piece of information which excited general surprise; namely, that, as soon as the chambers should be constituted, he would lay before them the act of abdication of Charles X., and the renunciation of his rights by the dauphin. His royal highness did not state, nor probably was he bound to announce, that this abdication and renunciation of power were made in behalf of the young duke of Bordeaux, under the title of Henry V.; and that he himself in the same deed was ordered to proclaim the young sovereign. Half the truth was enough for the occasion. This first essay of royalty was hailed by the applauses of the assembly, and the popularity of the lieutenant-general "out of doors" increased in extent and intensity.

The chambers immediately proceeded to business. The deputies declared their sittings permanent, till they had concluded the verification of their powers, settled the necessary modifications of the charter, and supplied the vacancy of the throne. In two days (the 4th and 5th of August) they had completed their preliminary labours, nominated their president, who was M. Casimir Perrier, and were ready to enter on the momentous question of their future government. At two sittings (on the 6th and 7th of August) they declared the deposition of the Bourbons and the vacancy of the throne, made a new charter, and called to the sovereignty the duke of Orleans, by the title of Louis Philip I. King of the French.

If this has the appearance of precipitation*, it

* The right of the chamber of deputies to make this hasty constitution, was contested at the time, and is still violently

ought to be recollected that the situation of France, at this moment, was one of peculiar urgency and peril. Charles X. was still in the country, and a party which had been for fifteen years in possession of office might be supposed to have, after its fall, the means of disturbing the new government. A considerable portion of the citizens who had fought against the king's troops in the revolutionary struggle were actuated by vague and Utopian

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denied. It has been said by the opponents of the chamber of deputies, that when the former charter was destroyed, it was necessary to recommence a career entirely new, to create new political power, and to renounce the old title received before the revolution, which could only fix illegality on all the arrangements which it could make. It has been argued, that on the 30th of July the chamber of deputies was no longer a power in the state; that it could only meet as a commission of urgency to do one act, by which the usurpation by divine right should close, or, in other words, the fall of Charles X. should be declared; to proclaim a return to the true principle of order, the sovereignty of the people; and to put into the hands of the lieutenant-general the means of re-establishing social order on this principle.

Three means of organising France according to its real wants, say this party, then presented themselves. The constitution of 1815 might be taken, which had been sanctioned by one million eight hundred thousand suffrages, and which is called by their party better than the present charter. The duke of Orleans by this would be emperor, and his election would have been submitted to the sanction of the people. Or a national congress and constitutional assembly might have been convoked to form a new constitution. The chamber did none of these things. But it might have obtained still a sanction of its acts by passing a law of elections, and then dissolving itself. Instead of this, however, it keeps its usurped power, and can never, it is alleged, escape from the vicious circle drawn about its origin.

theories of government, calculated to distract the minds of ardent and generous youth, though they could never be realised in the existing state and relations of France without adding the dangers of civil anarchy to foreign intervention. One party had been formed for the duke de Bordeaux; and the name of Napoleon II. was favourably pronounced by another. One set of politicians imagined that the constitution given by the Bourbons ought to be entirely abolished; another, that the charter, which had been the watchword of patriotism during the contest, should be the symbol of political faith at its close. Foreign governments, too, had their eye on the state of France, and might give encouragement to resistance when uncertainty prevailed, while they would despair of disturbing a settled arrangement. M. Berard, a banker, at whose house some of the preliminary meetings of deputies had been held, brought forward on the 6th of August those propositions, for declaring the throne vacant, modifying the charter, and offering the crown to the duke of Orleans, which were finally adopted. A few of the royalist members contended for the doctrine of legitimacy and the rights of the duke of Bordeaux; but the party was feeble in the chamber, and still more feeble in the nation. Those who had been writing, speaking, or conspiring for the last ten years against the government of the Bourbons on the pretext that it had been imposed by foreigners, and was founded on principles at variance with the spirit of the age, could not belie their opinions by continuing the obnoxious arrangement when the power of changing it was in their

hands. Others saw in the recognition of Henry V. a long minority infested with dangerous intrigues, an increased difficulty of a final adjustment, and the germ of a civil war. The infant king could not be abandoned by his own relatives; and, if educated amid the prejudices of the court, or by jesuits of its appointment, would be likely to expose the nation at some future period to a crisis similar to that from which it was now escaping. Though the debate was therefore perfectly free, only four or five of the deputies spoke warmly in favour of the duke of Bordeaux.

The modifications of the charter embraced more doubtful matter. These modifications formed a compromise between two parties unconnected with the late family; one of whom was desirous of changing as little of the existing order of things as possible, and the other, of abolishing the charter altogether, and reconstructing the constitution anew. When the charter was mentioned in the chamber, some of the latter party cried out, "What have we to do with the charter? the charter is dead." The great majority of the assembly, however, could not consent to abandon, for a doubtful experiment, a great constitutional act, of which the people had been demanding the strict execution for fifteen years, which had been the rallying point of popular valour during the battle, and to which the people supposed that they gave a triumph when they conquered. It was, however, subjected to a critical revision, and came out of the ordeal with many modifications, suppressions, changes, and additions, which materially altered its nature.

The charter of Louis XVIII. contained seventy-four articles. The charter of 1830 is limited to sixty-six, *with nine promises of laws.* The preamble to the act of Louis is very properly suppressed, as an insult to the nation, having broadly asserted the doctrine of the divine right of the sovereign to give or withhold the franchises of his people as he chooses. It was necessary likewise to modify the fourteenth article of the old charter, respecting the royal power, on which the late government had relied as a justification of their fatal ordinances. As it was intended henceforward to abolish the pageantry of a coronation, it was necessary to change the article which regulated the mode of taking the oath to the charter. These, as well as some other articles, referring to the peculiar state of things in which the first charter was issued, were either formal or necessary changes; others were more important and doubtful. The provision which made the catholic religion the religion of the state, is abolished. Every system of faith in France, even the Jewish, is now placed on the same level, and the state is entirely divorced from the church. By an article of the charter, the censorship can never be reimposed on the press. The initiative of proposing laws is given to the members of the two chambers, as well as to the crown. The age of eligibility to the chamber of deputies is properly reduced from forty to thirty years, and of the electors from thirty to twenty-five. The president is to be elected by the chamber, and the sanction of the king to the appointment is declared unnecessary. The electoral colleges, likewise, are to elect their

own presidents. The sittings of the chamber of peers are opened to the public, and its hereditary privileges are to be subjected to a new examination.

The two last articles are new, and do little credit to the good sense and reflection of the chamber. The charter is placed under the protection of the national guard and of all French citizens. Under whose protection could it be placed? If this is meant to convey any right to the national guard which they had not as French citizens, it may be mischievous; if not, it must be useless. The last article would almost provoke a smile, if in such grave matters ridicule would not be misplaced; it converts the colours of a cockade into an article of the constitution! *

By a particular arrangement the peerages granted by Charles X. were annulled, and the necessity declared of providing by separate laws for the application of jury trial in offences of the press — for ministerial responsibility — for the re-election of deputies who accept of places under the crown — for the annual vote of the army contingent — for the organisation of the national guard, with the choice of officers by the guards themselves — for securing the officers of the army against arbitrary cashiering — for departmental and municipal institutions, on the elective system — for freedom of public instruction — and for the abolition of the double vote, and a new electoral law.

Every change thus made, or promised, in the permanent enactments of the charter, confers some new

* The article is thus expressed: "France resumes her colours: in future, the tricoloured cockade only shall be worn."

popular right, invests the people with some new control over their rulers, or gives them some new power in managing their own concerns. While the press is declared free, and the censorship is for ever abolished, a jury of the country are to decide on its offences. The sessions of the chamber of peers are declared public, so that public opinion will act more directly upon its proceedings, or be acted upon by its knowledge and patriotism. The initiative in proposing laws is to be shared by every member of either chamber with the crown. If a deputy elected by the people is promoted to office by the crown, the commission which they gave him ceases till his re-election. In municipalities and departments, and in the management of the local administration, the popular will is to be made known, and the popular power exercised, by the choice of their own counsellors. The defence of the country, and the protection of the public peace, is intrusted to the people themselves, as national guards, with the power of electing their own officers. Thus publicity and popular control are everywhere secured.

It must be acknowledged, that the only violent measure adopted on this occasion was the decimation of the house of peers; and the only disputable change in the articles of the charter, that which entirely separated the state from the church. The chamber of peers never enjoyed any credit in France, and a marked contempt was shown to its rights and powers in all the transactions of the deputies. This act of arbitrary violence, therefore, excited little attention at the time, nor probably would the total suppression of the chamber have

created any sensation. But the deputies ought to have recollected that, whatever was the intention with which the deposed king had made such additions to the peers, he was only exercising a prerogative which belonged to him by the charter; and that the annulment was a confiscation. These nominations were called the work of treachery; but was not every nomination which his majesty made of the same kind? They were said to be dangerous to the new order of things, and to threaten the stability of the charter, which the deputies were modifying. But how was that proved? Was it proved by the absence of every peer so nominated, when such important proceedings were going on? And had not his majesty the remedy in his own hands, by making new batches sufficient to overbalance the old? If the question had been, as it has sometimes been represented, whether the authors of the revolution were to sacrifice ninety-three unpopular nominations, made with a design hostile to the public liberties, or to expose the new order of things to certain failure, there would have been no room for hesitation; but the absence of the obnoxious peers on this occasion, and their subsequent refusal to take the oath of allegiance, offered a sufficient guarantee of their inability or unwillingness to create any disturbance or embarrassment.

When the chambers had declared the deposition of king Charles X., and had settled the terms on which their future sovereign was to obtain the crown, the last part of their duty was to propose the duke of Orleans as their sovereign, on his acceptance of the proposed compact. When the vote

was called for these momentous propositions, the number of deputies present amounted to two hundred and fifty-two, of whom two hundred and twenty-nine voted in their favour, and thirty-three against them. As the chamber, with its full complement, amounted to four hundred and thirty, the deputies who established the new order of things, and gave away the crown, amounted to only three above the half of the representatives of France.

The whole discussion on the settlement of the government lasted only about six or seven hours, on Saturday the 7th of August. It was concluded by five o'clock in the afternoon; and the majority immediately repaired in a kind of procession to the Palais Royal, escorted by a detachment of the national guard, with their bill of rights and their offer of the crown. In the long line of nearly two miles of streets, which they had to traverse, they were hailed with testimonies of popular applause. The gates of the palace were thrown wide open to such welcome visitors. The declaration containing the charter was read over to the lieutenant-general, and his royal highness accepted with cordial solemnity all its engagements, and pledged himself to fulfil all its promises. His royal highness then appeared at the balcony of his palace, with M. Lafitte, the president of the chamber, and old general Lafayette, who, taking the hand of the king elect, and addressing himself to his fellow-deputies, exclaimed, "I have always, you know, been a republican; and here is the best of republics!"

In this solemn transfer of the crown, in this act of popular sovereignty, the chamber of peers was en-

tirely overlooked. There had been no conference between it and the other chamber. There was no concert in their movements. The peers had received the resolutions of the deputies after they had been accepted by the prince; they came, with their tardy adhesion, to the palace about five hours afterwards; and though they had brought a protest instead of a concurrence, it would have made no difference in the final arrangement.

The chamber of deputies had every motive for despatch, though nothing could justify their total neglect of the other branch of the legislature. Assemblages of republicans, consisting of students from the different schools, who had fought during the revolution, and the leaders of different popular associations, had collected round the chamber on the 6th, and had excited some alarm among its members. Addressing themselves to the deputies as they passed, they declared, that in not deciding for a republic they were betraying the cause of those who had driven away the Bourbons. General Lafayette and another popular deputy, M. B. Constant, harangued them on their illegal proceedings, and requested them to disperse quietly, with some effect; but did not entirely obtain their object. After the sitting was over, they proceeded, to the amount of several hundreds, to the place de Louis XV., in a tumultuous manner, and threatened to engage greater bodies of the students, and to procure a reinforcement of armed citizens from the fauxbourgs on the following day, to compel the chamber of deputies to do its duty. It was suspected by some, that general Lafayette had not been so zealous as he ought to have been in

exerting his influence to put down this political mob, and that he would not have been displeased to hear the word President of a Republic attached to his name. In this case the government could not have stood a month, and all Europe would have taken the alarm at the prospect of anarchy in France. In such critical circumstances, M. Delessert, and several friends of the venerable republican, waited upon him and his son, M. George Lafayette, to press them to more active interference, on a threat, that if the assemblage again collected it must be dispersed by an armed force. This menace had its effect for the time. Delegates were sent round to the clubs and the schools to countermand the meeting; and the deputies were allowed to vote the charter, and to dispose of the crown, without molestation or tumult.

It is proper to bear in mind, that besides the party of the exiled dynasty, which did not now dare to undertake any hostile measure, two other parties had started up from the bosom of the revolution itself, as hostile to each other as to the Bourbons, whom their joint efforts had overthrown. Hitherto pressed together by what they considered as the common despotism, their divergence in views, interests, and objects became marked as soon as that pressure was withdrawn, and the motives for their combination against it were removed. The one party regarded the revolution only as the expulsion of the Bourbon dynasty, and a security for the execution of the charter; the other, as the overthrow of the charter, along with the dynasty. The one justified the resistance of the people to the late government, on the ground of its perfidious designs on their

liberties, and its illegal attacks on their persons: the other claimed merit for conspiracies against the Bourbons long before they had openly violated their contract with the nation. The one saw, in the simultaneous rising of the Parisians, the instinct of self-preservation, as a free people; the other, only the instinct of democratic change, to reach popular sovereignty. The one sought, in the state of things which the revolution had left, a continuance of the principles of the restoration, with a change of persons to administer an improved monarchy, in good faith, under the new charter; the other, passing over the restoration and the empire, proposed to start in its career of improvement from the station occupied by the constituent assembly. The one proposed to let all the social fabric stand which experience had not proved to be unfit for the temple of freedom, and to embellish or improve it as knowledge advanced or civilisation increased; the other was for pulling it down, in order to erect an edifice entirely new, on Utopian principles. The one was for stereotyping the new order of things, in order to avoid rash schemes of turbulent innovation, as soon as the doctrine of divine right and the feudal prejudices of the emigration had been erased from the codes and institutions of the community; the other was for following up the principles of mob-sovereignty, by the trial of perpetual change to reach theoretic perfection. The one, in departing from the legitimacy of the holy alliance, wished to establish a new legitimacy behind the barricades of freedom; the other would allow no legitimacy in opposition to popular volition or caprice. The one trem-

bled at the sight of political societies, debating clubs, and party processions; the other thought them useful to freedom, and consistent with order. The one adopted the duke of Orleans for their king, partly because he was a prince of the blood, and already near a throne which his social position would most easily reconcile with Europe; the other, because he was a revolutionist, and could sing the Marseillois hymn. The one regarded his government as a monarchy under popular control; the other, as a republic under the royal mantle. The one wished to preserve an hereditary peerage, as a counterbalance to the influence of too popular a chamber of deputies; the other looked upon an hereditary branch of the legislature as a standing absurdity, and poured upon it all the vials of its contempt.

Their notions on nearly every institution for securing freedom of industry, freedom of the press, freedom of elections, and the exercise of other franchises, differed as much as their ideas on the true foundation of political power. The one was for extending the electoral qualifications to the great body of the people; the other, for limiting it to considerable property. The one, therefore, would nearly have been satisfied with the abolition of the double vote, and the reduction of the age of eligibility; the other was for radical reform, and for dispensing with all the requisites of fortune in the candidate. The one declared against all the regulations for requiring security from the journals, and petitioned for the repeal of the stamp duties which limited their circulation; the other looked upon these checks as necessary over a press already too

factiously powerful. The one, at the formation of the charter, clamoured for cashiering the royalist judges, and remodelling the tribunals; the other insisted on maintaining the independence of the magistracy as the only security for the impartiality of their decisions.

By the praiseworthy despatch of the chambers in nominating the monarch, and the popularity which the king acquired in unhesitatingly and even enthusiastically accepting the terms on which the crown was conferred, the angry discussion of these questions, and the agitation of the parties by whom they were respectively maintained, was for some time adjourned. The duke of Orleans proceeded on Monday (the 9th of August) to the chamber of deputies in great state, amid applauding crowds, who insisted on shaking the king whom they had made by the hands, and took the oath to the new charter; thus promptly terminating a provisional tenure of power which might soon have been exposed to danger.*

* "The new king of the French," says baron Capelle, one of the ex-ministers of Charles X. who signed the ordinances of July, in a pamphlet, entitled "*La Vérité sur la Revolution,*" (printed but not published), "was immediately after, not anointed, not crowned, but simply *installed*, with due ceremony, as they instal a president of a court, a prefect, a mayor, in calling to the installation the authorities or functionaries who are his equals or his inferiors in office. No longer was there any of the splendour of the throne, no longer any royal guard, nothing that could satisfy the just pride, the advanced civilisation of France." Was a man who could make such a complaint against the revolutionists fit for being a minister? had he been a master of the ceremonies, or a herald at arms, the objection would have been at least suitable to his profes-

Meanwhile his unhappy and infatuated predecessor was on his way to exile, with all his family. The troops, in retiring on St. Cloud, on Thursday, told him the full extent of his misfortunes, and showed no disposition to attempt to repair it. Without provisions, without pay, fasting, fatigued, and discouraged, they could listen to no proposal to renew the combat, though reinforced by several regiments from a distance. One regiment of the line piled its arms, and marched off to Paris in a body. Officers and men began to feel that the country was universally against them. On Friday, the 30th, the guards kept possession of all the roads leading from Paris to St. Cloud, but saw themselves surrounded with a hostile population. The courtiers and servants of the royal family had deserted the king, and had either gone to Paris on pretexts of business, or had left the palace without any pretext whatever. The people of Versailles had risen like those of Paris; and their national guards, which had returned to service, were so powerful, that the lieutenant-general of the cavalry of the royal guard entered into an agreement with them to preserve the peace of the town. On Friday the royal troops kept their position at St. Cloud, amid manifold humiliations, privations, and discouragements, which the king was either unable or unwilling to alleviate. On Saturday (July 31) the troops learned with dismay that his majesty had left St. Cloud so early as three o'clock in the morning. When he had gone forward, there

sion and tastes. Such a statesman ought to have been exempted from the danger of signing any other ordinances than those for marshalling a procession or regulating a costume.

was no reason why the troops should remain where they were, even though their ranks had not been thinning by desertion, and though whole regiments were not about to join the standard of the lieutenant-general of the kingdom. The king had gone to Trianon, in the park of Versailles, where all the royal family, accompanied with the ministers, met for the last time. On Sunday, the 1st of August, his majesty, with his daughter-in-law the dauphiness, who had just returned from the south, without knowing the deplorable state of affairs till she found that she could not enter Paris, accompanied with the duchess of Berry and her children, proceeded to Rambouillet, a hunting château of the crown. The guards followed them, resolved to protect the royal family, and to resist any attempt to insult them, without taking any further part in the political struggle. They passed on Saturday though Versailles, where the national flag was already flying.

On Sunday the 1st of August his majesty learned, as we are told by his minister, M. le baron Capelle, in his account of the revolution, that the duke of Orleans had been proclaimed lieutenant-general of the kingdom "by some fifty deputies;" and wishing to rescue him from the painful position in which a mission conferred by such means had placed him, sent him his royal nomination to the post which he already occupied. On the following day he signed his act of abdication along with the dauphin, and transmitted it to the lieutenant-general of the kingdom, together with an ordonnance nominating his royal highness regent, under the minority of Henry V. The only answer which the deserted

monarch received to this useless exercise of authority was the arrival of commissioners from the provisional government, with orders to hasten his departure from the kingdom. His majesty refused to see them, or to receive such an "indecent injunction," but was soon oblig-d to change his views.

Attempts had been made to sound the guards, as to their disposition to try the fortunes of a struggle in *La Vendée;* but no encouragement was given to the project. "The officers and soldiers," says the staff officer, to whom we have repeatedly alluded, "remained thus far with their colours — the officers from fidelity and honour, the soldiers from a sense of duty, and from attachment to their officers; but both felt, from the time of their leaving Paris, that after the events which had *occurred, they had only to place themselves, during the negotiations which were to decide the fate of France, between the royal family and that portion of the people which might be excited to make an attack upon them.*"

His majesty having refused to see the commissioners — marshal Maison, M. de Schonen, and M. Odillon Barrot — or to give up the crown jewels, and having shown a disposition to remain at Rambouillet, under the protection of about nine or ten thousand guards, and forty-two pieces of artillery which were with them, the provisional government determined to compel his retreat. An expedition of the national guard was accordingly proposed, and sent on to Rambouillet, in coaches, postchaises, omnibuses, and every other sort of vehicle, the formidable nature of which was so impressed on the

mind of his majesty by the commissioners, for whom he now sent, that he set out at ten or eleven o'clock at night, on the 3d, in great trepidation and confusion. There can be no doubt that the Parisian force was much magnified in number and power; but it may be regarded as a fortunate circumstance, that the king acted on the misrepresentation, and avoided useless bloodshed. On the following day (Wednesday, August 4th) his majesty, yielding to the counsels of the commissioners, dismissed all the troops, except his body guard, at Dreux; and was attended to Cherbourg by this force and the commissioners. He arrived at this port on the 16th of August, and on the 17th was on British ground.

It must have appeared evident from this statement, and from other previous intimations, that though the battle was won in the streets of Paris, all France was ready to acquiesce in the award of victory, and to join in maintaining the fruits of the triumph. The ordinances excited the same feeling of indignation in the provinces as in the capital; and resistance must have begun in the provincial capitals, if Paris had not taken the lead. Wherever the mail coach arrived, consternation first, and then insurrection, followed. At Rouen, at Nantes, at Lyons, and various other places, resistance had been organised before their inhabitants knew of the revolution at Paris. This simultaneous movement of enthusiasm, excited by the same cause, and directed to the same end, — while to superficial observers it has all the appearances of an extensive conspiracy, — only proves that the mind and feeling of the nation had been prepared by the press for an

approaching attack on its liberties; and that every citizen who should first raise the standard of resistance was assured of sympathy and support from all the rest.

The Bourbons, having their power established by foreign bayonets, and conducting themselves in France as foreigners, can only find a parallel in the greatness of their reverses, and the irretrievable rapidity of their fall, in the sovereigns of Spain, who lost Portugal in a single night.

The determined courage shown by the Parisians, in their resistance to illegal oppression, and their instantaneous return to order when their rights were secured; the speedy re-establishment of the sovereign authority by the chambers, without faction or violence; the universal acquiescence of the nation in the settlement of their constitutional liberties, and the humane protection afforded to the exiled sovereign and his family, who had done so much to provoke resentment, produced an electric effect all over Europe. In Great Britain the people considered the cause as their own, and triumphed in the victory which their neighbours had won. They felt that if a despotic government had been established in France, the tenure of their own rights would have been less secure; and they, therefore, mingled the expression of their admiration with that of their gratitude. Meetings were held in the capitals and chief towns of the three kingdoms, to express their sympathy with the French people, while liberal subscriptions were set on foot for the relief of their wounded citizens. Even those most opposed to popular insurrections concurred in ad-

miration of that of Paris. The feeling with which the news was received in the other countries of Europe partook more of secret hope or of alarm, than of public sympathy. From Naples to St. Petersburgh, from Lisbon to Vienna, absolute monarchs trembled at hearing beneath their thrones the rumbling of the earthquake which overturned that of Charles X.; and the people were roused to hopes of redress and reform, by witnessing the panic of their rulers, and feeling increased confidence in their own strength.

CHAP. VII.

ADMINISTRATIVE AND LEGISLATIVE CHANGES IN FRANCE AFTER THE REVOLUTION. — TRIAL OF THE EX-MINISTERS, AND THE RIOTS WHICH FOLLOWED IT.

THE history of the five months (from August to January) which succeeded the settlement of the crown in France, is extremely interesting, as an exhibition of the energy and tendency of the principles established at the revolution in July, whether in a state of rapid development, or struggling against a partial check. A detailed narrative would embrace —

1. Those changes in the places of trust under the crown, or in the administrative, legal, and military departments of the state, which were thought necessary to establish a harmony between the agents of power and the new system which they were called upon to execute.

2. The foreign relations of the new dynasty; the despatch of special missions, to announce the accession of Louis Philip I.; the manner in which they were received; and the negotiations set on foot to secure France against danger, and Europe against disturbance.

3. The measures taken to command respect abroad and tranquillity at home, by the increase of the army, and the extensive organisation of the national guards.

4. An account of those partial disturbances occasioned by unemployed workmen in the capital; of the hostility directed by distress against machinery; of the manner in which the monied concerns of the nation have been affected by the state of public affairs; of the movements of the clubs and political associations, and of the measures by which they were checked.

5. A statement and description of the proceedings in the legislative chambers, and of the measures introduced or adopted to realise the promises, or to develope the principles of the charter. And,

6. The impeachment and trial of the ministers of Charles X.; with the riots which preceded and followed it.

It would be impossible, in the short space allotted to our retrospect, to enter into details on any of these topics; but we shall give a brief enumeration of the chief points of interest.

The king, on his acceptance of the crown, lost no time in making a definitive settlement of his council. On the 12th of August, the *Moniteur* contained an ordinance, nominating the following list of ministers, most of whom had held office for some days before, under the title of provisional commissioners of their respective departments:—M. Dupont (de l'Eure), keeper of the seals; count de Gerard, minister of war; the duke de Broglie, minister of public instruction; M. Guizot, minister of the interior; baron Louis, of finance; count Molé, of foreign affairs; and count Sebastiani, of marine. To these secretaries of state occupying portfolios were added four members of the cabinet who held no ministerial depart-

ment: these were, the two bankers, M. Lafitte and M. Casimir Perrier, whose liberal principles and great wealth had enabled them to play so important a part in the recent political history of France; M. Dupin, the celebrated barrister; and M. Bignon, well known as a publicist and diplomatist. These names, though the symbols of divers shades of opinions, and therefore calculated to inspire little confidence in the stability of the cabinet, afforded at least a guarantee, that rash or extreme measures would not be adopted, so long as they remained united. By selecting baron Louis and count Molé, known as ministers during the restoration, along with M. Guizot and the duke of Broglie, whose moderate views were as generally allowed as their philosophical accomplishments are admired, the king gave a pledge, both to France and to Europe, that neither democratic theories nor disorganising doctrines would be embodied in the acts of his government. Count Sebastiani had likewise given evidences of great political capacity, and had supported in the chamber principles too enlightened, with a spirit too independent, to admit either of being violent himself, or submitting to the violence of others.

These ministers immediately proceeded to change all their subaltern agents, who were either supposed not to be attached to the new order of things, or who had rivals among the friends of the government more attached to this order than they. As there was, from this cause, much patronage to be disposed of, there never was probably a greater scramble for place and office. Candidates multiplied with a won-

derful rapidity, and beset in miraculous abundance the houses of every person supposed to have any influence,— from the Palais Royal down to the bureau of a patriotic journalist. All who had ever been prosecuted for libels or conspiracies under the Bourbons, — all who had deserted the white flag during the hundred days, — all who could bring titles of having been victims under the restoration,—all who had given a vote or pronounced a speech against the Villèle cabinet or the late ministry,— all who could pretend to have seen a musket fired, or to have encouraged a patriot mob during the late revolution, —all who could vociferate the Marsellois hymn,— made themselves sure of promotion under the new government. Whole generations of neglected or persecuted patriots started up in the provinces as well as at Paris, from the jacobins and regicides of the first revolution down to the mob combatants in the last. Among these there were of course many who only became victims after the persecution had ceased, or heroes after the battle had been won; —but the sight of a ministerial antechamber, and the overflowing crowds of applicants and sycophants who besieged the public offices, did no credit to the disinterestedness of the party who had gained the victory, and who seemed to look upon official emolument as a kind of booty.

Professor Guizot, who had obtained the seals of the interior, took care of his literary friends, his pupils, and his coadjutors in the journals. General Gerard, the favourite of Napoleon, employed his influence in the war-office to reward the old officers of the empire for their neglect during the restoration;

and the other holders of portfolios, though they had less in their power, did not show less desire to secure friends to the new dynasty.

By the end of September, seventy-six prefects out of eighty-six, and one hundred and ninety-six sub-prefects out of two hundred and seventy-seven, had been changed. The secretaries and counsellors of prefecture underwent the same fate; sixty-three of the former out of eighty-three, and one hundred and twenty of the latter out of three hundred and nineteen, being changed. These dismissals descended down to the mayors of the lowest hamlets; three hundred and ninety-three of whom, appointed by the late government, were dismissed, to make room for liberal successors. The keeper of the seals was not less unsparing in the department over which he presided: seventy-four king's procureurs, and two hundred and sixty-four of their substitutes, were dismissed to make room for the friends of the revolution. The minister of war changed sixty-five general officers out of seventy-five. Thirty-nine colonels commanding regiments of infantry, and twenty-six commanding regiments of cavalry, were required to give up their honours to more liberal officers. Nearly all the governors of the fortresses in France were obliged to resign, in favour of officers who had been distinguished in the republican or imperial armies. The minister of marine had fewer changes in his department, as the officers more promptly and cordially adopted the national colours. The duke de Broglie had some changes to make in the higher direction of his ministry. Five inspectors of public instruction and rectors of colleges either

resigned their situations, or were dismissed, to make room for firmer adherents of the new monarchy. It was particularly remarkable that, in the civil and legal appointments, those who had distinguished themselves by their opposition to the Bourbons, in the journals, or through the press, had their claims soonest recognised. A considerable number of journalists were appointed prefects or sub-prefects, and many more were offered places as chiefs in the different offices. The revolution had been called the triumph of journalism, and therefore its right to prize-money could not be contested.

No sooner had the news of the embarkation of Charles X. arrived at Paris, than special missions were despatched to the different courts of Europe, to announce the accession and procure the recognition of the new king. In most instances, the admission of Philip I. into the community of European sovereigns by a solemn acknowledgment, was opposed by no obstacles, and encountered little delay. In no case could it be considered a usurpation; no court was disposed to support the principles for which the exiled monarch had lost his crown; and the people of France appeared too unanimous, and too enthusiastic in their loyalty and attachment to their new sovereign, to allow the least hope of success, in a struggle to place a minor on his throne, in the person of the young duke of Bordeaux. Part of them likewise recollected that the violent excesses of the first French revolution at home, and the proselytism which it extended over Europe, by calling all national discontents and disaffection to its aid, were ascribed to threats of invasion, and to the

approach of the duke of Brunswick to the French frontiers. It was thought, therefore, politic, even by those who were most alarmed at the result of the late revolution, and felt the greatest abhorrence at the principle of popular sovereignty which it had established, to abstain from all interference, — to afford no pretext for excesses, — and to allow the volcano to consume itself, without approaching it for the vain purpose of attempting to extinguish it. No government of Europe was prepared for a war of opinion, or a crusade in support of legitimacy. England and the Netherlands quickly received the ambassadors of France, and renewed their credentials to their ambassadors in Paris. The sovereigns of Austria and Prussia, though they took some time to concert with their allies, likewise agreed to acknowledge the new dynasty; and at the end of three months, none but the most minute and the most mighty of absolute sovereigns in Europe, — the tiny duke of Modena, and the emperor of Russia, — had withheld their recognition. The former fractional part of a monarch still refuses to condescend to receive Louis Philip into the rank of kings; and the autocrat, who had forbidden the French flag to appear in his dominions, who had ordered his subjects home from France, and was concerting with his allies a French invasion, required an admonition from Poland, before he renewed the credentials of his ambassador at Paris.

Meanwhile the new government neglected nothing to place itself in a situation either for recognition or resistance — for war or peace. The organisation of the national guard at Paris proceeded with astonish-

ing rapidity, and its increase in the provinces was no less striking. Armed men seemed to start from the ground, to defend the principles which the revolution had established, and to maintain their rights against foreign or domestic enemies. In the course of a month, upwards of sixty thousand of this civic militia were supplied with arms, equipped, and disciplined in the capital alone, where it had been disbanded under the Villele ministry in 1827. In the provinces, where it was still allowed to exist, although little favoured, and little employed, its zeal was equally great, and its increase equally remarkable.

In reading the accounts of the increased ranks,— of the inflamed zeal,— of the military discipline and liberal principles, of this mighty national force; in hearing of its reviews by the king, and of the movements of its detachments from one part of France to another; and in recollecting the promptitude with which it declared for the new order of things, and put down the agents or manœuvres of the late government, some people have taken alarm, lest it should become an element of political change, rather than the guardian of civil order — a standing insurrection against the throne, rather than its pillar of support. We have not space to discuss so difficult a question; but we would only suggest, as a reason for quieting alarm, that the national guard is only the nation in arms; that it must include in its ranks all shades of opinion; that it has existed in France for forty years, without occasioning any of the numerous changes through which the government has passed; and that, if it became an instrument in the

late revolution, it was because the people had begun that revolution, because it sympathised with them as a part of themselves, and because it acted according to the principle of its institution, in preserving or restoring order after the change, instead of rising to effect it. The manner in which it put down or resisted, at Paris, the riots among the workmen who combined to break machinery; the readiness with which it interfered, at the command of authority, to close the doors and to disperse the meetings of revolutionary clubs; and the noble stand which it made for order and peace, in the tumults of October and December, when the lower class of the population seemed to be raised for the purpose of being precipitated in a mass on the authorities and institutions of the country, show how much was to be hoped, and how little apprehended, from intrusting arms to all that body of citizens who can buy a uniform, or spare a day's time to appear in its ranks.

Leaving a short enumeration of the legislative acts which have passed the chambers, to fulfil the promises of the charter, and to consolidate the public liberties, we shall proceed to give an account of the proceedings taken to bring the ministers of Charles X. to justice, without which the revolution of July could not be properly appreciated in its spirit or its merits.

Having kindled the conflagration, like other incendiaries, these men hastened to escape from the flames. Their splendid hôtels, for which they had sacrificed their master's crown, could afford them no protection. Nothing but a numerous garrison could

secure them against the popular fury. So long as the Tuilleries belonged to the king, they found a refuge at head-quarters, amid the camp of Swiss and royal guards. On Thursday morning they all proceeded to St. Cloud and resigned their offices, to save themselves and their master; but found it was too late. They remained with the court for two or three days, objects of contempt and insult to minions by whom they were formerly almost worshipped, agitated by alarm and horrified by remorse. The last time that prince Polignac was seen with the royal family, was on Saturday the 31st, at Versailles, before they set out for Rambouillet. The other ministers, who were not so identified with the fanaticism of the king, made their escape in different directions.

The new government, which had been installed in Paris, took no steps to bring them to justice: it issued no order for their arrest; it offered no reward for their detention; it sent no agents in pursuit of them. They were left to their own ingenuity in evading arrest, and to the voluntary justice or undirected zeal of the people and the local authorities in securing their apprehension. Three of them succeeded in effectually making their escape — two of them, M. de Haussez and M. de Capelle, to England, and M. de Montbel to Switzerland; the other four were apprehended at great distances from Paris, in various disguises, under various names, and with false passports. The agents, in all cases, in their apprehension were the people and their protectors the national guard. The prince de Polignac was apprehended on the 15th August, at Granville in Normandy, as he was about

to pass to Jersey, in the disguise of a servant to a lady, with a passport from Caen. Thence he was transferred to Saint Lo, under the charge of a detachment of troops, whence he wrote a very ridiculous letter to the president of the chamber of peers, protesting against the violation of his privilege as a peer, and claiming his liberation as a right of his order; expressing his conviction that no penal proceedings could reach him, and asking permission to retire quietly abroad. The chamber declared that privilege could not protect him against a pending impeachment of the chamber of deputies. M. de Peyronnet, M. de Chantelauze, and M. de Guernon Ranville were arrested at Tours. They were all transferred to the castle of Vincennes, in the neighbourhood of Paris, in the last days of August, on the order of the commission of the chamber of deputies.

Though they had not been arrested at the order of government, they could not now be discharged without a trial. Their trial, however, was looked upon as a source of embarrassment, and their necessary punishment as a calamity. The friends of order and humanity had hoped that the revolution might end without scaffolds; that as, in its generosity and courage, it had been a contrast to the last, so it would redeem its cruelties by shedding no blood after the struggle had ceased. On the 13th August, two days before the arrest of Polignac, M. Salverte, one of the members for Paris, made a motion in the chamber of deputies, that there was ground to impeach the ex-ministers of high treason. The subject was referred to a commission, who, some

days afterwards, demanded and obtained from the chamber the power of examining witnesses and of drawing up indictments, ordinarily vested in the judges of instruction, or in the chambers of counsel, for arranging the proceedings preliminary to a public trial. It was contended against this demand, that the chamber of deputies was merely the accuser, and ought not to be invested with the functions of judges of instruction; that the chamber of peers was, in this case, the only examining magistrate or chamber of council; that the ex-ministers were impeached by their being arrested; and that the whole process of their trial should be conducted by their own judges, before whom the accuser might cite witnesses or produce papers. After a warm debate, the powers demanded by the commission were granted; on the 29th August they underwent an examination. Up to this time they were kept under unnecessary restraint; they were not permitted any intercourse with their families, and were not allowed any opportunities of speaking even with their counsel, except in the presence of third parties. They consequently refused a privilege so restricted, and protested against such treatment. The commission of the chamber of deputies, we are glad to think, did not warrant these rigorous proceedings.

On the 23d of September the committee delivered their report, stating that there were grounds of impeachment against the ex-ministers, and proposing the following resolutions: That the chamber of deputies accuses of high treason MM. de Polignac, de Peyronnet, Chantelauze, de Guernon

Ranville, d'Haussez, Capelle, and de Montbel, subscribers of the ordinances of the 25th July—

1st, For having abused their power, to falsify the elections, and to deprive the citizens of the free exercise of their civil rights:

2d, For having arbitrarily and violently changed the institutions of the kingdom, and for being guilty of a conspiracy against the safety of the state:

3d, For having excited to civil war, and armed one class of the citizens against another, and carried devastation and massacre throughout the capital, as well as through several of the communes; all crimes provided for by the 56th article of the charter of 1814, and by articles 91, 109, 110, 123, and 125 of the penal code.

Nothing could be more loose, vague, or irrelevant than the report of the commission, either in its statement of facts, or in its application of law. It was, for the most part, a factious history of the restoration,—a bill of indictment against two reigns,—an impeachment of the Bourbon dynasty, as much as a charge of high treason against the accused. Its object seemed to be rather a justification of the revolution, than an act of attainder against the late cabinet. It attempted to prove that a continued conspiracy had been carried on in the Tuilleries against the people of France for the last fifteen years, with more or less success, and more or less activity; that every successive ministry had either been members of this conspiracy, or dupes of the conspirators; and that M. de Polignac and his colleagues, by adopting the plot, and endeavouring to carry it into execution, were answerable for all its

previous crimes as well as its attempted completion. Such an inferential establishment of guilt is neither consistent with common sense nor common justice. If attempts against the constitution had been made for the last fifteen years by ministers who, instead of being impeached, had been rewarded with peerages and honours; if the nation, by its acquiescence, had agreed to the curtailment of its rights; if it had allowed the chamber to be returned by double votes, which were now declared unconstitutional; if it had allowed its duration to be changed; if it had not only sanctioned the war with Spain, but had gloried in its success; if, in fact, it had permitted all the abominations which are contained in the report, as evidences of the counter-revolutionary tendency of the court; if all these things had been done without creating any disturbances, — then the authors of the ordinances, who went only one step farther, would have had reason to contend that their guilt was diminished, instead of being aggravated, by the enumeration of the crimes of their predecessors. We need not allude to that part of the impeachment which accused the ex-ministers of kindling the fires or encouraging the incendiaries of Normandy. The charge was as absurd as if the duke of Wellington were accused of originating the conflagrations in Kent and Hampshire.

The report of the commission was finally agreed to on the 28th of September, after two days' discussion, and a commission of three was appointed on the 29th, to conduct the proceedings before the chamber of peers. The impeachment was pre-

sented to that chamber on the 30th of September. On the 1st of October the peers deliberated on the message of the deputies, and resolved to form themselves into a court of justice on the 4th of the same month. By the 29th of November the chamber of peers had examined witnesses, and drawn up their report, which was immediately published, and which corrected many of the erroneous impressions created by the proceedings of the chamber of deputies. They appointed the trial for the 15th of December.

On that day it accordingly commenced, the state prisoners having been transferred from the castle of Vincennes to the palace of the Luxembourg some days before. The most complete arrangements had been made for the accommodation of the court, the counsel, witnesses, and spectators, as well as for the protection of the prisoners and the judges. The palace was, in fact, converted into a kind of fortress, as if to resist an armed populace, and every room became a barrack; bolts and bars, and massive doors, and vigilant guards, and an imposing array of arms were employed, to prevent at once the escape of the prisoners, and the invasion of the mob, who demanded their blood. The civil and military authorities were fully impressed with the danger of disturbances on such an occasion, from the experience of the tumults which took place on the 18th and 19th of October, on the bare supposition that the ministers might not be executed. From the movements of the unemployed population of the suburbs, and from the hopes expressed by the furious revolutionists

that something would be done for their cause, by the crowds which agitators might collect around the sanctuary of the law, they were aware of the immense consequence of a movement which would give massacre for justice, and endanger not only the temporary tranquillity of the capital, but the existence of the throne, and the stability of the new institutions. They knew that Europe was looking on, and would record every act of tumult as a sign of incurable anarchy. They knew that the trial of the ministers of Charles X. was, in fact, to be a trial of existing order, and that a few hours of political confusion might be equivalent to a second revolution. Conspirators and agitators of the republican stamp, dissatisfied with what had been already done, and leagued with Bonapartists,—with destitute adventurers, and starving speculators on the wrecks of public and private fortune, — were ready to take advantage of so tempting an occasion to raise themselves into consequence.

The trial began each day at ten o'clock in the morning and rose at four, to avoid any dangers from nightly sittings. The prisoners had only one counsel each. The counsel for prince Polignac was M. de Martignac, who had long left the bar, and who was head of the ministry which the prince had displaced, but whose defence he nobly undertook. M. Hennequin was the advocate of M. de Peyronnet; M. Cremieux defended M. Guernon Ranville; and M. Sauzet, a young advocate from the bar of Lyons, undertook the defence of M. Chantelauze, who had been president of the court before which he had been accustomed to plead. The attendance of the

peers was very full, one hundred and sixty being present; and only twenty having sent excuses, for various reasons of health or business. The three commissioners for the chamber of deputies were M. de Berenger, the author of the report on which the prisoners were impeached, M. Persil, the attorney-general, and M. Madiez de Montjau.

Never did a trial take place amid greater agitation, or excite more intense interest both at home and abroad. Never was a tribunal erected amid more extraordinary circumstances, or employed in deciding on a more extraordinary offence. The accusers, the judges, the character of the prisoners and the nature of their crime, were all new to French judicial proceedings. It was the trial of the restoration under the revolution—of the invaders of one charter under the dominion of another—of the ministers of one dynasty, by the peers of its successor —of the defeated cause, by the successful—of persons accused of treason, —not for breaking the law, and tried in the name of the sovereign,—but of persons for attempting, at the command of the sovereign, to change the law and the constitution. There is no wonder, then, that an accusation without precedent to guide, without enactment to direct, without example from history, without any principle but vague analogy, without even any political law in which the crime laid to the charge of the prisoners is mentioned under the name of treason, should be conducted with little regularity, and lead to a sentence which professes to be founded on no recognised legal authority.

The facts brought forward in evidence against

the ex-ministers comprised the history of the late revolution; it would, therefore, be superfluous to re-state the depositions taken on the trial. The impeachment embraced four charges against the accused: that of having falsified the elections; that of having arbitrarily changed the institutions of the country; that of having been guilty of a plot against the internal safety of the state; and that of having instigated to civil war, by arming one part of the citizens against another. The first rested on the unconstitutional circulars by which the ex-ministers required all public functionaries to vote with them at the elections, or on correspondence which held out offices or place as a reward for electoral support; but it did not appear that the interference was greater at the last election than it had been on former occasions; and though it had been so, the charge was very distant from high treason. One of the most serious facts connected with this part of the impeachment was not only explained satisfactorily, but furnished M. de Peyronnet with an opportunity for showing his zeal in ordering the execution of the laws. The candidate for Montauban, M. de Preissac, had nearly fallen a victim to the violence of his royalist antagonists. The news of the scandalous proceeding was no sooner known at Paris than M. de Peyronnet ordered a judicial enquiry into the conduct of the authorities who had connived at the violence.

The plot against the safety of the state could be nothing else than that which was consummated by the signature of the ordinances, and therefore is the same as the third charge. The issue of these

ordinances to change violently the institutions of the country, and the enforcement of them by military massacre, constituted, therefore, the great and only crime of the accused. The signature and publication of the former scarcely required to be supported by testimony, and the flagrancy of the latter was fully as notorious. The examinations of the prisoners themselves, and of the forty-five witnesses whose depositions were taken, were directed to the end of ascertaining the connection between the issue of the ordinances, for which the ministers were responsible by their signature, and the sanguinary measures by which they were supported. With this view, all their official proceedings during the four days which intervened between the appearance of the *Moniteur* on Monday the 26th of July, and their resignation on Thursday the 29th, underwent a severe scrutiny, for the discovery of circumstances to aggravate or alleviate the weight of their guilt. Had the ordinances not been a violation of the laws and a subversion of the institutions of the country, it is plain that they might have been enforced without crime; and, their illegality being admitted, had they been withdrawn before blood was shed, or had the ministers interfered to prevent civil war, it is as plain, that their crime, though great, would still have been very different. The result of the evidence is, unfortunately, against them in both cases. The arbitrary and illegal ordinances avowed by them were supported by civil war, which they provoked and directed. It appeared, from their own admission, that they had agreed to subversive measures about the 10th of July, when they received the news of

their success in Algiers; and that they were perfectly aware of their illegality and dangerous tendency.

It was proved, by their own testimony, and that of others, that they held a council on Tuesday the 27th, in which they agreed that Paris should be declared in a state of siege. It was undeniably established, that they continued in the Tuilleries at head-quarters from Wednesday to Thursday morning during the hottest of the contest, when they must have heard the roaring of the cannon firing grape-shot on the people, and have seen infantry, cavalry, and artillery, ranged underneath the windows of the palace, and marching forth for the attack. It was proved that the commander-in-chief was in an agony of desire to give up the contest, without being permitted to do so. It was proved, that when the five deputies arrived to propose conditions of peace, the prime minister, knowing their purpose, refused to see them. A fact still more dangerous to their character was proved, in the orders for arresting the deputies, which had been issued and recalled by the commander-in-chief, but which they must have warranted. It was proved, that up to Thursday morning, when all the streets were barricaded, and when the Boulevards were covered with the trees which had been hewn down to prevent the arrival of fresh troops—when the citizens had been victorious in all encounters—when the soldiers of the line had declared in their favour—when the public places were covered with the dead, and the hospitals filled with the wounded—when the royal ensigns had been pulled down, and the national

colours floated on the towers of Nôtre Dame—when the walls were riddled with bullets, and head-quarters were about to be attacked, that the prime minister still hesitated about staying the slaughter, to such a degree that a project was formed of taking him and his colleagues prisoners, while an attempt should be made to obtain from their master the repeal of the ordinances. Though they declared that they had not acted as ministers from the Tuesday night, when they signed the ordinance for putting Paris in a state of siege, it could not be denied that they were still ministers, — that they had not resigned, that they could recall from Marmont the high powers which they had conferred upon him, and that they had issued orders so late as Wednesday for the royal court to assemble in the Tuilleries.

This being the state of facts, what is the law on the subject? Had victory not decided against the Bourbons — had the people, on the repeal of the ordinances and the dismissal of the ministry, been satisfied to let Charles X. remain on the throne, it is undeniable that his ministers might have been accused of treason against his authority. Does the change of dynasty alter the law? What statute, what custom appoints the tribunal in this case — defines the crime, and specifies the punishment? The fifty-fifth article of the charter of 1814, which existed when the ordinances were published, says, that the chamber of deputies has the right of impeaching the ministers before the chamber of peers, which has *alone* the right of judging them. The fifty-sixth article declares that they can only be tried for treason or embezzlement, and that particular laws shall afterwards define this

kind of crimes, and determine their prosecution. The particular laws here promised have never yet been enacted. The crime of treason is not found in the French code; even the word is not to be discovered in French, expressive of a state offence. In the absence of these particular laws, the commission of the chamber of deputies appealed to certain articles of the penal code, in which they found the description of crimes similar to those charged upon the ex-ministers; but none of these is called high treason, nor do they when united constitute by accumulation this offence. Besides, none of them allude to ministerial responsibility, nor even mention the word 'minister of the crown.' As the French have not the term *treason* in their constitutional law, they must take it, along with their precedents, from England. Against whom, then, did the ex-ministers commit high treason? Against Charles? No; he is exiled himself, and nobody demands in his name the punishment of his servants. Against Louis Philip I.? No: he was not then elected. The fact is, that the French could not have any constitutional law which punished the crimes of a minister acting under the direction of the king. Up to the time of the revolution, the king himself was the state, and his ministers were responsible only to him, as the ministers of all absolute sovereigns must be. Under Napoleon, when the penal code was made, it could not have been imagined that the servants of the emperor could commit high treason, if acting by his directions, to be punished by tribunals deriving their authority from his will.

The ministers could not be brought before any

other court but the chamber of peers, by the article 56 of the charter; and when brought before that chamber, there was no law which touches them, the code having referred to other crimes than that of ministerial high treason. The reporter to the commission of the chamber of peers, seeing this difficulty, tried to evade it in two ways — by saying, that "public justice is not only of public right, but of the right of nations; it is inherent in the natural right which belongs to every people to watch over their own preservation: it ought not to be, it cannot be without tribunals and laws." Nothing can be more vague and inconclusive than such a remark, which introduces into criminal justice all the unsatisfactory generalities of the unwritten law of nations. Not feeling secure in this position, the noble reporter secondly maintains, that, the trial being instituted on the demand of the deputies, and conducted before the peers, these two legislative bodies in their legislative capacity can supply the want of a previous specification of the crime of treason. The proceedings on such a trial may, he thinks, be not only judicial, but legislative; thus, the power which applies the law can likewise make it. To this doctrine it is almost needless to object — first, that the chamber of peers; sitting as a court of justice, can no more make a law, or concur in the making of a law, than any other tribunal: secondly, that the chamber which impeaches is an accuser, proceeding upon an existing law which has been violated, and is neither, therefore, a legislator nor a judge: thirdly, that if the two chambers were to make a law without the concurrence of the king,

they would entirely abolish his power in legislation: and, fourthly, that though all three were to concur in the act, and apply it, it would be an *ex post facto* law, and therefore a monstrous injustice.

The attorney-general, who was one of the commissioners for conducting the impeachment, saw the weakness of this defence, and abandoned it. He asks, Was there, then, no punishment for ministers for the last fifteen years, during which their responsibility was to be found in the charter? and could they, in the execution of their office, have committed the most odious crimes with impunity? Could they have betrayed the nation, given up French territory to foreigners, and converted to their own use the property of the state, without a judge to try or a law to punish them? This certainly would be the consequence of supposing that they could only be tried before the peers, and that the peers had not yet received a rule for their trial. The learned gentleman answers the objection which puzzled the noble reporter of the peers' commission, by saying, that, before the charter of 1814, the ministers were responsible; that the constitution of the year VIII. article 72, expressly states, "that the ministers were responsible for every act signed by them, and declared unconstitutional, for the non-execution of the laws and regulations of the administration, and for all the private orders which they give, if these orders are contrary to the constitutional laws and regulations." This law, he contends, was in force at the promulgation of the charter in 1814; ministerial responsibility, therefore, existed; and the promise of a new law to define the facts to

which this responsibility referred, could not render innocent, conduct which was before criminal. Till the new law was enacted, the old was valid, because it had not been abrogated; and that old law regarded as treasonable acts the violation of the constitution, the excitation to civil war, or the illegal employment of a military force.

The defence set up for the prisoners was contained in a powerful and eloquent developement of the following propositions. That the impeachment was inadmissible — 1st, because the fall of the dynasty had destroyed the conditions of the trial, and left it without legal cause, object, or interest. 2dly, Because the accused cannot find in the present state of French institutions the formal guarantees which the charter had promised them, in submitting their responsibility to a judicial enquiry; and no condemnation can be pronounced against them judicially. 3dly, Because there existed no written law before the facts denounced which can be applied to them.

But if this formal objection was over-ruled, the defence then would enter into an examination of the charges in the impeachment, and show that they were not supported by the evidence, endeavouring to prove that the elections had not been falsified, — that the institutions of the country had not been violently or illegally changed, — and that the accused never intended to excite to civil war, or to shed the blood of the citizens. These propositions were illustrated and enforced by M. de Martignac with great cogency of reasoning, and with brilliant declamation. His first argument resolved itself into this, that the

principle of ministerial responsibility is inseparable from the principle of the inviolability of the monarch. If the ministers are responsible for the acts of their master, why is Charles X. banished, and three generations of his family disinherited? If, on the contrary, Charles X. is banished because he was responsible, then why are his ministers accused of acts for which he has already paid the forfeit? To this reasoning the reply is easy. The ministers have nothing to do with the ultimate fate of their sovereign, whose ruin they have caused: they are responsible only for their own acts; and of this responsibility they cannot divest themselves, whatever may be the decision of the nation with regard to their master. The greatness of the catastrophe which their treason has caused cannot excuse its commission, because by accident they may have done more harm than they intended. If a man, by attempting to steal a quantity of gunpowder, kindles the powder-magazine, he cannot be allowed to plead against his liability for the theft, that he has blown up the building in which it was contained. The second argument of the counsel,—that no law of ministerial responsibility had passed,—is equally untenable; for it cannot be imagined that such crimes mentioned in the charter can be committed with impunity, because a formal act for regulating their punishment has been delayed. The third argument,—namely, that if the acts of the ex-ministers are to be tried, the court of peers, as at present constituted, was not a proper tribunal,—is more plausible than forcible. It is, indeed, true, that the chamber is different from that which existed before they committed their

offences; but it is equally true, that it has not, like a special commission, been formed on account of any bias against them. On the 30th of July the chamber consisted of three hundred and thirty-five members, ninety-three of whom were struck off as the peers of Charles X., and fifty of whom refused to take the oath to his successor. Thus, one hundred and forty-three names were erased from the list of judges, leaving only one hundred and ninety-two, or five eighths of the original number. This chamber had taken a new oath, and might be supposed more hostile to the prisoners than those who were either not allowed to enter, or who refused to be sworn. But if this argument were allowed to disqualify them, no judgment could be obtained on any political offence committed before the late revolution. But the competence of the court, if it was meant to be disputed, should have been disputed at the commencement of the proceedings. If denied, it would be equivalent to impunity for the crime of the ministers; because no other court more impartial, not even a jury, could be found who had not taken the oaths, or did not support the government.

The part of the defence which applied itself to an examination of the acts charged as treason was not more successful. It was impossible to give any assent to the proposition, that the ordinances did not arbitrarily, and violently change the institutions of the country; because the 14th article of the charter said, that the king might make "ordinances for the execution of the laws *and the safety of the state*." If such latitude of interpretation were allowed for the latter part of the article, the charter would be a

dead letter, as it might at any time be abolished on pretext of "the safety of the state." It is true that this clause is expunged from the new charter, because it was liable to abuse; but that does not excuse former appeals to its authority, as a justification of treason. The excitement to civil war, or even the declaration of civil war, was brought home to the ministers in their ordinance to place Paris in a state of siege, and the troops to fire without giving the orders for reading the riot act.

The defence set up and eloquently supported by M. Sauzet, the advocate of M. de Chantelauze, was, that the Bourbons and the country had been at war for fifteen years — that the safety of the throne was menaced — that the ministers only took the initiative — that they were defeated, and were now prisoners of war against whom no charge of treason could lie. The defence was more ingenious than solid.

M. de Peyronnet read a kind of memoir of his own life to answer calumnies, and to show that he had always been a humane man, that he had been a friend of the charter, and that he was averse from blood. A similar memoir of the life of prince Polignac was read, as part of the speech of his counsel, which rectified many mistakes, and established many claims to indulgence.

The counsel displayed great zeal, eloquence, and talent, characterised with much moderation, urbanity, and feeling. The demeanour of the prisoners neither betrayed fear nor insolence, but was throughout self-possessed, grave, dignified, and respectful to the court. We cannot, unfortunately, bestow the same unqualified praise on the conduct of the peers, who,

however disposed to render strict justice, and however right in their ultimate decision, showed too favourable a disposition towards the defence, and something like an indication that their minds had previously been made up. The commissioners of the chamber of deputies performed their duty with that zeal and fidelity which became their mission, but without showing any desire to inflame the passions of the public, or to extort a capital condemnation from the conscience of the judges.

The trial lasted for a week, from the 15th to the 21st of December inclusive. The three first days were employed in reading the evidence, and hearing evidence; the four last, in the defence and the reply. The house took only two hours to deliberate on the punishment, which was imprisonment for life on all the prisoners, accompanied with the additional penalty of civil death on prince Polignac. They were hurried in safety the same evening to the castle of Vincennes.

The tumults which were always apprehended, and which took place during the two last days of the trial, gave it additional importance. During Monday and Tuesday, immense groups of persons, composed of workmen, artisans, and labourers, crowded to the Fauxbourg St. Germain, pressed forward to the palace of the Luxembourg, and filled every street, place, and avenue leading to the seat of the noble tribunal. These assemblages were generally composed of the lower classes of citizens, or of agitators, whose situation did not entitle them, or whose patriotism did not lead them, to become members of the national guard. Among them were found persons

in better dresses and more easy circumstances, who abetted the violence of the rabble, but did not expose their safety by joining in their excesses. The cries of "Death to the ministers!" "The blood of Polignac!" and other ferocious vociferations, were chiefly uttered by the young, who did not know the extent of their danger; or by the destitute, whose fate could not be much aggravated by any change. Their chief aim seemed to be the gratification of vengeance by massacring the state prisoners, and probably the opportunity of pillage resulting from the anarchy which they occasioned. They carried sometimes a black flag, with the words "Death to the state criminals!" but often mingled with those screams of ferocity the language of sedition and treason. As they pressed forwards to their object, and encountered the crossed bayonets of the national guard, their passions became irritated by resistance, and impelled them to acts of violence. Their greatest outrages were limited to the throwing of stones at some of the officers, and hooting others. In some places on the third day they assembled to disarm some outposts of the guard, but always failed. None of them carried any fire-arms or warlike instruments. These dense masses of an excited populace were not confined to the neighbourhood of the Luxembourg, but filled the open spaces before the Hôtel de Ville, the Louvre, the Tuilleries, and the king's palace. The same spirit animated their ranks—the same ferocious or seditious cries were every where uttered. Nor did they confine their frightful assemblages to the day. For three nights they kept the armed population of Paris, the troops of the line,

and the constituted authorities of the capital, on the alert, and the great body of its respectable inhabitants in alarm and consternation, wondering whence such bands of vagabonds could come, and scarcely able to believe that they would retire to former obscurity without bloodshed and pillage.

Nothing but a guard of armed citizens could have checked without examples of rigour, or dispersed without the shedding of blood, such angry elements of confusion. But such a force was found in the national guard, whose imposing numbers were not less necessary to the performance of their arduous duties, than their patient firmness, their humane consideration, and their courageous zeal. The whole body of this civic militia considered themselves in campaign during the week of the trial, and were ready to assemble at their different posts at the rolling of the drum. The picquets and posts were strong where any pressure of the crowd was apprehended, and could be reinforced at the most sudden call. All the citizens were in uniform, from the king down to the lowest shopkeeper. Sometimes 30,000 were under arms at once; and the whole force which was ready to assemble, and which did assemble on the afternoon of the 22d, could not be less than 70,000 or 80,000 men. The infantry lined the streets and the courts of the royal palaces; cavalry and artillery supported their columns. The French capital had the appearance of a large garrison, prepared to defend itself against an invading army. This idea seemed but too alarmingly realised in the darkness of the wintry nights, when, with their arms piled in the squares of the city or the courts of the palace, they lighted their bivouac

fires, stirred them with their bayonets, and sung around them their military hymns.

The general-in-chief of this guard, old Lafayette, required all his popularity to obtain the faithful discharge of such severe duties, and more than the strength of age to support his own fatigues. In the last night of the trial, he slept at the Luxembourg, in a room next to the prisoners, resolved to defend them, or to share their fate.

The king and his family displayed the same praiseworthy firmness, and made the same great exertions to maintain order. In the three last days especially, his majesty's popularity was made the shield of the public peace, as he shared and encouraged the toils and devotedness of the national guard. He made speeches to the people—walked among them—praised and encouraged the guards assembled at the palace—rode to the most disturbed quarters—and even paraded the streets by torch-light with his hat off in an inclement winter night, to electrify his faithful subjects, and obtain peace from the enemies of order.

These exertions of the constituted authorities and the armed force were supported by exhortations, proclamations, and orders of the day, in which the duties of the citizens were explained, their national pride flattered, and the dangers of anarchy deprecated with vigour and eloquence.

The afternoon of the 22d, the judgment having been promulgated in the morning, was the most threatening. The whole force of the capital — cavalry, infantry, and artillery, troops of the line, and national guards, — could not have preserved order without

bloodshed, had the immense and enraged populace possessed a leader in whom they could rely, or been encouraged by the defection of any part of the armed force. One of the most mischievous groups, which had attacked a post of the national guard, endeavoured to give itself the appearance of leaders by investing two of its number with the uniform of the Polytechnic school; and some of them proceeded to invite the students of the other schools to join them. These young men, however, having no immediate object in a new revolution, refused to head the insurgents, and, after assisting in establishing order in their own quarter, proceeded to the palace to offer their support to the king. To this part of the history of these days of trouble is attached, perhaps, the most ominous circumstance for public order in the whole of this contest between patriotism and sedition,—between order and anarchy. These young men, consisting of between eleven and twelve thousand, with more heat in their opinions than strength in their judgments, embued with democratic principles, ambitious of popularity, seeing how necessary they had become to the support of authority, and how certainly at one time they held the balance in their hands between anarchy and the existing institutions, thought themselves entitled to make conditions of their allegiance, and to express opinions in favour of the populace, whom they had resisted. Some of them were invited to dine with the king, and the whole received the thanks of the chamber of deputies; but the reward and the honour did not satisfy their political ambition, however flattering to their personal vanity. They

therefore rejected the thanks of the deputies as an insult, and questioned their authority to speak to them in the name of France. They have lately learned the secret of their power; and the schools and fauxbourgs, — youthful enthusiasm and physical force, under the acknowledged banners of the sovereignty of the people, may yet be dangerous to the peace of the capital.

The insubordination which they have lately shown to their professors, the political part which they at different times have taken in the troubles of the capital, the thoroughly democratic fanaticism with which they are inspired, rendered it extremely dangerous and imprudent in the chamber of deputies to recognise them as a body, or to consider their interference as an element of order, by voting them the ill-received tender of thanks along with the recognised defenders of the public peace, the national guard and the troops of the line. The general estimate formed of their spirit of disorder, and the insurrectionary tendency of their opinions, may be inferred from the formal and repeated solicitations addressed to them by the gangs of ruffians to put them at their head. They did not yield on this occasion, because they had other views; but they have announced principles which would lead them to unite, if a more decided political aim were held out. They are now, by the vote of the chamber, erected into a kind of political association: instead of being an assemblage of lads subject to tutors or parents, they are exalted into a recognised authority, distinct from the heads of the colleges to which they belong; they have acquired a title to hold their

meetings or clubs, to express their political opinions; and on any popular movement, when sedition comes to seek its accomplices in their ranks, the king and his ministers must bribe them to the support of order, by concessions to their demands, or rewards to their ambition.

Their first act of power, in their new political vocation, shows the extent to which their demands may afterwards proceed, and the kind of affairs in which they will exert it. While the two prefects, of the Seine and of the police of the kingdom, were issuing their proclamations, the students of the schools of law, medicine, and the Polytechnic body likewise issued theirs. In the first, they call upon their fellow-citizens to return to order, because "the king, *elected by us*, Lafayette, Dupont de l'Eure, Odillon-Barrot, our friends and your friends, have engaged *on their honour* to a complete organisation of the liberty for which others are huxtering with us." This proclamation was on all the walls of Paris, and, notwithstanding the denial of its authenticity, or the denunciation of its illegality, it spoke the sentiments and stated the compact of the students.

On hearing that it had been denounced in the chamber, the authors of it called their fellow-students together, and not only admitted its authenticity, but acknowledged the more subversive doctrines of another proclamation, in which we find the following passage:—"As the patriots (meaning the king, and Lafayette and others) had promised large concessions, force was not necessary to acquire them. Let order be established, and we shall demand a more *republican* basis for our institutions; and we shall

obtain it. We shall always be the strongest, because we shall always act frankly. But if these concessions are not granted, then, the patriots, always the same, and the schools who march with them, will call upon you to win them by conquest."

The students persisted in the truth of its former announcement, that the king and his ministers had promised large concessions to republicanism, as the price of their assistance on the 21st and 22d of December. In placing themselves between the throne and the people, to save the former from the assaults of the latter, they affirm that the king gave his solemn engagement to their deputation, that he would aid them in "conquering more liberal institutions, if they were not granted." If such promises were made, and such authority admitted in these wrongheaded youths, the price of their assistance was dearly paid; their defection from the mob was merely temporary, and their transaction with power was a deceptive truce, and not a durable peace.

By the morning of the 23d the most perfect order was restored, and the business of life resumed without alarm. The king visited the quarters of the first and second legion of guards, to review and to thank them, and the city was illuminated in the evening, not with the fire of the bivouac, but with the lights of victory. The rejoicing of the peaceable citizens and of the constituted authorities, at the termination of these tumultuous scenes, shows with what alarm they were viewed during their continuance.

The chamber of deputies voted thanks to the national guard (whose constitutional law was under discussion at the time), and to the students of the

different schools, who met on the following day to protest against the honour.

The confidence of the public, both in France and among neighbouring nations, in the stability of the government, was increased by the manner in which it had secured this great moral victory. If the national throne and its republican institutions could be maintained by the bayonets and artillery of the national guard amid such a furious tempest, no danger was apprehended in the calm of ordinary existence. The fidelity of this intrepid and courageous body of citizens to their king and to order was the more remarkable, as we are assured that the majority of them participated in the sentiments of the mobs whose violence they repressed, on the momentous question of the trial, which they had assembled to protect.

Amid these scenes, the fate of the convicted ministers was almost forgotten. They were hurried off from the Luxembourg at four o'clock in the afternoon of the 22d, without knowing their sentence, and saw themselves, without speaking a word, again in the dungeons of Vincennes. Their sentence was read to them on the following morning; and the two most guilty, whose heads had been the most exposed, felt more surprise and consternation at its severity than the other two, whose lives had never been supposed in danger. M. de Chantelauze, when he heard of perpetual imprisonment, only remarked to his companion, that "they would have plenty of time for playing at chess."

It is proper to mention, that the description of the apprehended dangers and severe military duties of

Paris had led the national guards of the neighbouring towns to offer their assistance in protecting the peace of the capital. Detachments arrived from St. Cloud, Versailles, St. Germain-en-Laye, and other places, who did duty with their brethren in Paris. Some of the national guard of Rouen had likewise arrived.

It is made a question, whence came these mobs? what was their object in their tumult of the 22d, when the sentence had already been pronounced and the prisoners removed? were they led by persons of influence? and did these persons intend to overthrow the monarchy? On these points no certain information has yet been obtained. The prime minister, on the 20th, in the chamber of deputies, called it a conspiracy; and some of the journals spoke of a provisional government having been organised, of ministers chosen, and a dictator appointed: but no evidence exists of these facts. Four hundred persons were arrested, but chiefly of the lower orders, and for seditious menaces or vociferations, instead of treason. Some were taken distributing money, and others proclamations, on Monday.

M. Lafitte ascribed the disorders to the partisans of the fallen government, and to the ambitious or impatient tempers of republicans. He seemed to have no doubt who were the leaders; that the interest in the trial was only a pretext, and not the real cause of their assembling; that they wished to attack existing order, — the tribunal of peers first, next the chamber of deputies, and lastly the king.

The prefect of police denied his belief in this plot,

which was countenanced by M. Lafitte and M. Dupin. The minister for foreign affairs spoke of a plot: they had their eyes fixed on those machinations, and, when the time arrives, they will strike those who audaciously conspire against social order. This minister hinted at secret societies and forbidden clubs, needy adventurers, speculators in mischief, of all parties and countries, whom order tires and tranquillity alarms, as being engaged in the plot, and trying to seduce the national guard and the youth of the schools. But we shall recur to this subject in a concluding chapter, on the course of French legislation, and the conduct of the French government, since the revolution.

CHAP. VIII.

STATE OF BELGIUM BEFORE THE REVOLUTION.—TRIAL AND BANISHMENT OF DE POTTER.

BELGIUM was the first country in which the revolution of France, and the doctrine of popular sovereignty, produced their proper fruits. They found there a congenial soil, harrowed by national antipathies, and watered with the *eau bénite* of religious bigotry. The Belgians, who derive their fashions, their language, and their literature, from France,—who read almost exclusively French works, and study French politics,—who have more intercourse with the capital of France than the southern provinces of France itself,—who attend French plays, and imbibe their ideas of government from French journals,—whose code of laws and forms of administration were French,—who considered themselves, in their forced union with Holland, the victims of the same treaties which France had just broken,—who had been in hostility to the crown, on grounds analogous to those of the French liberals,—who had their Van Maanen as a counterpart to prince Polignac,—and who had been nearly on the brink of an open rupture with their government on questions similar to those which had been decided by the French revolution,—could not but feel an intense interest and a warm sympathy in the events of the

Paris insurrection. This inclination towards France, this fashionable approximation to French ideas and manners, was encouraged by immediate neighbourhood and constant intercourse. Even the feeble and faithless government of prince Polignac had been intriguing through these sympathies, and by the instrumentality of the Belgic priests, to foment the troubles of Belgium, in order to bring about a union with France; and the government of Nassau, by a fatal inadvertence, had banished de Potter and his colleagues, as if sending them on a special mission to fraternise with the French revolutionists.

The mention of this individual and his associates suggests the necessity of recurring to events which aggravated the national dissatisfaction with the Dutch government, and prepared the way for a parody on the French revolution in Belgium.

It will be recollected, that towards the end of the year the decennial budget was rejected by a majority of the second chamber, consisting almost exclusively of Belgians. So powerfully did the national predilections or the political integrity of the parties regulate their vote on this occasion, that private interests and official dependence were forgotten; and two of the king's chamberlains gave their suffrages against government. Besides these household troops, among whom defection was not expected, two or three provincial functionaries likewise declared against the budget. One of the most violent opponents of the court, not only on this occasion, but during a long course of legislative discussion, was baron Stassart, the deputy for Namur, who had been a prefect during the French

domination, and who, since the king's accession, had enjoyed a pension from the crown. He likewise voted with the hostile majority. His majesty, irritated at the resistance made to his measures by persons who enjoyed his favours or lived upon his bounty, issued, about the beginning of January, a decree dismissing these placemen from their situations, and depriving the ex-prefect of his pension.

Nothing, in the existing circumstances, could be more unwise than this step, which the king dignified with the name of firmness. It announced to the nation that his majesty meant to resort to intimidation to secure acquiescence in his plans, when the common feelings of dependence and gratitude had proved insufficient to command obedience; and it showed, that though the law did not prohibit the union of the character of legislator with that of courtier or public functionary, the government had resolved that the honest discharge of the duties of the former were incompatible with the subserviency required of the latter. But the mischief did not end here. In the temper of the public mind, these men (merely because they had been disgraced for giving a vote against their master and benefactor) were immediately exalted into patriots and martyrs, and found their sphere of influence enlarged much beyond their original means of opposition. Men of honour and principle would have resigned their offices or emoluments, when obliged by their opinions or their feelings to oppose the measures of the sovereign from whom they held them. They would have seen that it was difficult, in a period of excitement like that of the Netherlands, to keep a po-

litical conscience and a chamberlain's key—but the motion of resignation should have come from themselves: at any rate, they ought not to have been dismissed by the king in such a way as to connect their disgrace at court with the discharge of their duties in the chamber.

This connection, however, was openly and even studiously announced and defended in the ordinance of their dismissal, the preamble of which is as follows:—"Considering that the circumstances that preceded and accompanied the last discussion on the budget tend more and more to prove, how important it is that public functionaries of the state in general, and in particular those who fill places of confidence, should be sincerely attached to the views, to the principles, and the march of our government; that they should support it, and in this respect give an example to their fellow-citizens: considering that this devotion is not only the duty of those who are placed in this situation, but that it is absolutely indispensable to the necessary force of government, and to the maintenance of our constitutional institutions: considering, however, that the circumstances above mentioned have, to our great regret, brought to our knowledge the fact, that some public functionaries, and even officers of our household, have, by their public conduct, manifested an entire aversion to the principles and system of our government; and considering that among these persons there are some who, being at the same time members of the states general, preserve, as such, the constitutional right of freely and independently giving their votes, and manifesting their

opinions on the subjects under deliberation; but that these sentiments nevertheless, when in opposition to the principles of a government which, as functionaries, they are bound to defend and to cause to be respected, do not permit us any longer to intrust to them the execution of our orders, or to allow them to enjoy marks of our favour, we have decreed," &c.

The names thus erased from the court almanac and pension list, to be placed in the calendar of political martyrdom, from which they are again erased to make room for the authors of the barricades, were MM. de Bousies, Ingenhouz, Luyben, de le Veilleuze, Delafaille, and de Stassart. The odium of this decree was of course given to Van Maanen, because he was supposed to be the evil genius of the monarchy, but it was meant to fall on the king and the Dutch. The disgrace of a few courtiers or placemen, of whose existence, on ordinary occasions, the people would not have thought, was magnified into a species of *coup-d'état*. "The acts of violence to which the government has resorted," cried one of the journals, "have *produced in all parts of the kingdom an extraordinary sensation, the effects of which are incalculable.* He that is not for us is against us, say the ministers; and the citizens reply, He who is not for us is against us. They have opened a road which they cannot quit without falling. This measure of violence will render a thousand such measures necessary, till they are overpowered by public indignation."

The disgraced functionaries received visits or cards of recognition from numerous bodies of their

countrymen, to express respect and gratitude for their civil courage,—and were assured of the esteem of "four millions" of their fellow-citizens, in other words, of all the inhabitants of Belgium. The injurious consequences of this act of rigour were not confined to this new excitement of clamour and disaffection. The loss of emoluments which the disgraced members of the legislature had sustained, naturally suggested a project of indemnifying them by the liberality of their fellow-citizens. Never was a faction more active or more audacious than the union of priests and liberals who now directed the public mind and the popular passions in Belgium. A project of subscription was no sooner suggested than it was acted upon. The press lent its zealous aid to promote the cause. Its instantaneous success suggested new means of opposition to the government; and on this original proposal of a limited indemnity by popular contribution was subsequently provided the vast plan of a political union, (like the catholic association in Ireland, but more dangerous, because it would have embraced a whole nation instead of a religious sect,) which, under the name of subscribers to the fund, would have arrayed all the active part of the people against the existing order of things in the Netherlands. While the lists of this union would have composed the muster roll of a force capable of overturning the monarchy, its contributions would have furnished a treasury, out of which every factious demagogue or political delinquent would have been paid for his services, or indemnified for his losses.

M. de Potter, who had then been in prison fifteen

months, for a former libel on the government, launched from his place of confinement this dangerous scheme of conspiracy against the government, — if that can be called a conspiracy, where the conspirators correspond through the public journals, and display their strength and numbers in open day. The following is an outline of the plan before it received the improvements of M. de Potter. After stating that several good citizens had been struck by the services rendered to the nation by the members of the states general, who were daily sacrificing their private interests for their public duty, it proposes a national subscription to indemnify them by the subjoined means.

" Art. I. There shall be opened over the whole extent of the kingdom a national subscription, the produce of which shall be consecrated to indemnify the members of the second chamber of the states general, for the loss of the emoluments or pensions of which they have been deprived, for their conscientious resistance to the illegal action of power.

" Art. II. This subscription shall be collected in all the cities, towns, and villages of the provinces of the kingdom, where three citizens at least shall assemble in private committee to direct the operations.

" Art. III. No subscription shall exceed a florin (about 20*d.* sterling).

" Art. IV. Those who would wish to contribute a larger sum than that mentioned above, must take as many inscriptions, in separate numbers, as he gives florins.

" Art. V. Each committee shall name a collector,

who will receive the amount of subscriptions at the time of inscribing the names of the contributors.

"Art. VI. All the funds thus raised shall be placed at the disposal of a general committee for the whole kingdom, which shall elect the general collector.

"Art. VII. The receipts shall be published in the journals, with a notice of the number of each committee."

On this M. de Potter engrafted articles still more dangerous; he proposed not only to indemnify public functionaries for any sacrifices which they might be called upon to make of their interests to their duties, but all citizens who might suffer in any way for a legal resistance to power. He proposed that the subscribers should engage in the exercise of all their political functions, to support only those who belonged to the association; and that the members of the states general, and of the provincial states who did not join this society, should never obtain the suffrages of the subscribers. In short, the regulations which M. de Potter promulgated for his Belgic confederacy would have raised up a government against the government,—would have given the society a budget of their own to oppose the functionaries maintained by the resources of the state,—would have obtained the allegiance of the Belgians by the fear of excommunication from power,—and would have made a total separation between the subjects of the king and the members of the association.

The government, which did not see the immediate danger of the subscription, no sooner read the

letter which de Potter published in the journals on the 3d of February, than they took the alarm. As the letter was published in two or three of the journals,—namely, the *Courier de Pays Bas*, *Le Belge*, and *Le Catholique*,—the law officers of the crown proceeded against their editors, Barthels, Coche Mommens, Vanderstracten, and de Nève. M. de Potter being already in prison, his papers were seized and examined, when a correspondence was discovered between him and a M. Tielemans, an advocate occupying a place in a government office at the Hague, and an active opponent of the administration by which he was employed. All these parties were fully committed for trial; their papers were seized; and they themselves, during the interrogations, were placed in secret confinement. The progress of the examination was every day mentioned in the journals. The severe treatment to which they were subjected was made the subject of perpetual complaint against the government; their most trifling actions became of importance; and the whole interest of the country would appear, from their own statements, to have centred in their prison. The subscription was of course interrupted, and its importance entirely overpowered, by the proceedings taken against its authors.

The great masses of letters which had passed between the two prisoners, de Potter and Tielemans, discussed every public question that agitated the country, and contained the views of the writers, not only on political measures, but on political characters. The king, under the nic-name of *tutor*, was not spared; the ministers were abused in unmea-

sured terms; the members of the states general who supported even liberal views did not escape — some of them being accused of hypocrisy, some of timidity, some of selfishness, and others of ambition. The authors likewise expressed their opinions freely on theories of government, and de Potter, especially, avowed himself a republican. Whatever embarrassed the ministry was hailed by them with satisfaction; and whatever the ministry proposed had their decided opposition. But there was no evidence in that correspondence that the parties had formed any plot to overturn the government, farther than through the medium of public opinion or factious opposition.

An air of criminal mystery was given to these letters by their being written under feigned signatures, and by their allusion to persons and things under figurative or slang names. Thus, for instance, the *Courier de Pays Bas* is called the *postilion;* one of their friends, the advocate Jottrand, gets the name of *Socrates;* another friend of their own is called the *weathercock;* another, the *asparagus;* a fourth, the man *of certificates;* and a fifth, the *duchess.*

They speak of some of their projects under the title of *a burning ship*, or an incendiary machine, which they intended to launch. This, however, only alluded to a proposition which they had requested a deputy to make in the states general. In alluding to public affairs they say, "that they go very badly — thanks to *our tutor* who conducts them;" but they do not propose to get rid of the *tutor.* Nearly every prominent member of the states general or the

ministry had metaphorical designations or nicknames, which seemed to have no other object than to make them ridiculous. The real danger of the prisoners consisted in their public efforts, and in the influence which, by their journals, they exercised over the public mind.

After upwards of two months' deliberation, the law officers of the crown, who had at first resolved to try the prisoners on a capital charge of attempting to overthrow the government, limited the indictment to the minor offence of *directly exciting* the inhabitants to a plot, or an attempt, or a crime, having for its object to destroy the government of the country; "which plot was to consist in the establishment and carrying into effect of a confederation or association, of the nature of these proposed by the accused in the journals; and of having committed this act as authors or accomplices, having in the latter capacity given orders to commit it, or in having knowingly aided and abetted the author or authors of the act in the proceedings which served to prepare or facilitate it, or in those which consummated it."

Of these conspirators M. de Potter was the only one who had acquired a high reputation for talent and knowledge, and who was dangerous by his activity in propagating his principles. He was known to his countrymen, and even to Europe, for the publication of works which were very generally read, directed chiefly against the influence of the catholic clergy. His *Ecclesiastical History*, and his *Life of Scipio de Ricci*, had acquired him a great name, and, from their hostility to the Jesuits and high-church party,

might have made him popular with a protestant government. Being of a restless and turbulent spirit, inflamed with pride and ambition, and having early imbibed democratic opinions, he was equally hostile to the supporters of priestcraft and of monarchical institutions. His letters show that he rejoiced in every disorder which tended to overthrow existing church government and monarchical systems. He had gone to Rome to obtain the materials for his ecclesiastical history in the time of Bonaparte, when the pope was in exile; and his speculations seem all to have been directed against the holy see, which was then humbled. In his *Life of Scipio de Ricci*, he collects the most objectionable and criminal acts of the opponents of that reformer, and palliates the excesses of the French republicans when directed to the overthrow of ecclesiastical authority. His abuse of the catholics, and more especially of the ultra-montane party who domineered in Belgium, occasioned a belief, that in 1825 he was desirous of being employed by the protestant government of the Netherlands. Either from displeasure at the king for neglecting his merits, or from a feeling of disappointment at not being employed, he became, two years afterwards, the most bitter enemy of the house of Nassau; and joined the objects of his previous satire and abuse in forming a union to overturn it. In combining with the catholics for this purpose, he could not pretend that he had changed either his creed or his views of ecclesiastical domination. He was still a professed infidel, and a warm republican. He relieved himself, indeed, from his apparent inconsistency, by declaring that he was previously in

doubt whether strict catholicism could be made consistent with civil liberty; but avowed that the readiness with which his project for the freedom and independence of his country had been received and adopted by the catholic clergy had altered his opinion.

The fact was, that differing in every other point, they only agreed to hate the Dutch, to vilify the king, and to attempt the overthrow of his government. De Potter had, by agreeing in the sentiments of the author of Babeuf's conspiracy, shown himself a determined revolutionist. He had even abetted the proposers of an equal division of property, and praised the work which pronounced a pompous eulogium on Robespierre. He had been prosecuted, in November, 1828, for two articles in a journal, in which he had been extremely abusive of the government, and had provoked to revolutionary disturbances. On his trial, at that time, he displayed as much fanaticism or sedition as in the libel which had been prosecuted. The court condemned him to eighteen months' imprisonment. The consequence of this sentence was, a tumult after its delivery, and an attack on the house of the minister of justice, which the military force was called out to quell. During the period of his imprisonment, he continued his inflammatory communications with the journals, and published articles which showed that the original violence of his temper and opinions had been aggravated and exaggerated by the punishment which they provoked. He had been fifteen months in prison when the new prosecution began. The original proposition of the

subscription would have been of little consequence, without his additions. It was his fertile invention which suggested that the public functionary, displaced on account of his opposition to the government, should receive from the purse of the new confederation two thirds of his salary; that every member of the confederation who should resist legally, and who should fail in his resistance, should be indemnified to the amount of his losses and damages; that this national treasury should decree honorary rewards to citizens who deserve well of their country or its institutions; that the subscriptions should be in the nature of a perpetual annuity, to the amount of a certain per centage on the taxes of the contributors; that every confederate or associate should engage to resist government legally, when possible; and that all the confederates having a right to vote, whether as provincial electors, as members of the communal council, of the equestrian order, or of the provincial states; in short, every individual having a voice in the elections should engage to give his suffrage only for individuals of the confederation.

The trial began on the 16th of April, and did not conclude till the 30th. The evidence was of course short. As the charge consisted in the publication of letters or articles, the authorship could not be denied. No less than twelve counsel were heard during these sixteen days' debate; and nearly all the members of the subsequent provisional government, together with some of the most distinguished deputies of the national congress, were engaged in them.

The proceedings appearing every day in the journals, spread wider the feeling of disaffection which they were intended to check; and the sentence, which was harsh and severe, beyond public expectation or former example, completed the breach between the Dutch government and the Belgians, and prepared the way for the revolution of August and September. On M. de Potter, who had just about finished the term of his former condemnation, the sentence was, banishment from the kingdom of the Netherlands *for eight*, on M. Thielmans and Barthels seven years, and on M. Nève five years; the two others being acquitted.

The penalty of exile, which must always be unjust because unequal — which inflicts upon different persons guilty of the same offence, and adjudged to the same term of banishment, very different degrees of damage or suffering — which to those whose existence depends upon a continuance of their ordinary business in the bosom of their country, may be equal to a doom of perpetual ruin; whereas to others it would be a mere temporary inconvenience — was the most ill-judged act of justice or vengeance which could have been invented by the ingenuity of man for the defendants in this case. Were they merely turned out of the Netherlands, and allowed to pass into the neighbouring departments of France, they might annoy the government as much as ever. Their pen was the instrument which the Dutch ministry dreaded; and their pen could have been as powerful at Lille or Valenciennes as at Brussels or Antwerp. If, on the other hand, the government of the Netherlands interfered with their French neigh-

bours, to deprive the exiles of an asylum in France, they incurred the charge of a double persecution: first, that of driving the subjects of the state out of their country; and then, of preventing them from enjoying foreign hospitality.

This charge the Dutch government, in fact, incurred. The exiles were refused admittance into France. Prussia shut her gates against them. The only place in which they could get permission to look for a retreat was the mountains of Switzerland; and Prussia, alarmed for her Rhenish provinces, would not allow them to pass through her territory to the asylum which the Swiss mountains offered. After remaining, therefore, for nearly three months on the Belgic frontier, (while their friends and the Dutch government negotiated with neighbouring states,) they were at last allowed to pursue their journey, and had just arrived at Strasburg when the revolution of France in July called them to Paris; and sent M. de Potter, in six weeks afterwards, to succeed the king of the Netherlands, as head of the provisional government of Belgium!!

We must defer some of the intervening events, and the history of the Belgic revolution, to a subsequent chapter.

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.

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